

NOT THE END OF HISTORY : THE CONTINUING ROLE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN BRITAIN

Gabriel Kikas

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NOT THE END OF HISTORY: THE CONTINUING ROLE OF NATIONAL
IDENTITY AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN BRITAIN

By

Gabriel Kikas

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University of St. Andrews
St. Andrews, Scotland (UK) KY16 9QT



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ABSTRACT

Francis Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm critiques the post-Cold War era. His premise is that liberal democracy is emerging as a global phenomenon because of the collapse of communism as a viable ideology. As a result, the states of the international system are then able to concentrate their efforts in economic maximization and in the building of an international consumer environment.

Fukuyama's paradigm is compared to the integration scholarship of David Mitrany and Ernst B. Haas. As Fukuyama perceives nationalism becoming a less relevant issue in Western Europe because of the progressive elements of economic and political integration, Mitrany was one of the earlier political theorists to articulate that the purpose of politics was about the solving of practical problems of states through the development of functional international agencies. Haas believed that not only was nationalism dormant in Western Europe, but that its states would slowly but surely relinquish their sovereignty because of pressure from economic and political groups interested in the development of a supranational Europe. What Haas came to realize, however, was that the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination remain important variables in certain regions of Western Europe.

The purpose of this dissertation, then, is to examine the clash between economic maximization and the role of ideas in Western Europe focusing particularly on a state not known for its nationalistic fervor. This dissertation examines the British Conservative Party's and the Scottish National Party's (SNP) position regarding devolution (the Union) and the future scope of the European Union. The SNP is important to analyze because it offers a radical alternative to the status quo and, moreover, this project examines the Party's internal divisions over the EU and its relevance to the devolution principle. There are certain factions within the Tory Party which perceive the establishment of a single currency as detrimental to parliamentary sovereignty and that there should be a repatriation of functions back to the member states. This empirical exercise adds credibility to the argument that despite the alleged and perceived benefits of further economic and political integration, there are political groups who perceive certain issues, like self-determination, worth defending. In a liberal democracy there can exist clashes over fundamental issues. This, thus, offers a sound contribution to the *End of History* debate.

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Mr. Ian Stewart of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association provided speeches and the necessary statistics regarding the Conservative Party's position on the United Kingdom. I am most grateful to his answering my many questions back in August of 1995. In my many interviews, however, the two of which I most enjoyed was my talks with Mr. Jim Fairlie and Mr. Jim Lynch. They were both frank about the current state of affairs in Scottish politics and, moreover, provided me with either written material or with names of other people to contact about my research. They have my deepest thanks.

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Gabriel Kikas

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the Summer of 1989, the journal *National Interest* published Francis Fukuyama's widely-read article "The End of History?"¹ At the time Owen Harries, who served (and continues to serve) as the journal's editor, was searching for a philosophical piece that would serve as a reflection of the contemporary international scene of that year; he wanted, as Harries explained, a piece that would "link history with the great traditions of political thought."² Harries believed that Fukuyama's article, which was originally a lecture he delivered before the Committee of Social Thought at the University of Chicago in February 1989, to be a "provocative, stimulating essay, just what the times needed."³

Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm is an intriguing commentary on the contemporary political culture of the post-Cold War world. His basic premise is that liberal democracy has become a global phenomenon as a result of the collapse of communism as a viable and working ideology.⁴ Fukuyama's *End of*

¹ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest*, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18.

² James Atlas, "What is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom is He Saying it?" *New York Times Magazine*, 22 October 1989, 40.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton, Ltd., 1992).

History paradigm suggests that economics, rather than the ideological rivalry that consumed the Cold War period, will now preoccupy the activity of states in the international community.⁵ National capitals, Fukuyama asserts, can concentrate their efforts on economic maximization and on the building of a global consumer culture.⁶

Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm produced a plethora of commentary from political pundits and scholars. Commentaries have criticized Fukuyama for misinterpreting the writings of Hegel and Kojève and for overlooking the obvious empirical fact that conflict and political turmoil is still in progress in certain regions of the globe such as Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.⁷ In Eastern Europe political uncertainty also includes the economic and political

⁵ Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: The Free Press, Ltd., 1995), xiii.

⁶ Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 18.

⁷ Joseph McCarney, "The End of History?," *Questions of Ideology*, no. 1 (July 1993): 1-21; John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-56; Margot Norman, "The End of History: Is it Really All Bunk?," *The Sunday Telegraph*, 8 March 1992, iii; Richard Peet, "The End of History ... Or its Beginnings?" *Professional Geography*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (November 1991): 512-519; Stephen Sestanovich, "Response to Fukuyama," *National Interest*, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 32-35; Norman Stone, "A New World Order," *The Sunday Times*, 1 March 1992, Sec. 7, 1; Judith Weinraub, "The End of History: Well, Not Quite," *International Herald Tribune*, 19 March 1992, 18; and George F. Will, "History Revs its Engine," *Newsweek*, 25 September 1995, 28.

challenges of democratic transformation.⁸ Other commentaries have concentrated their critique of the *End of History* paradigm by taking a new look at the economic and social problems of the United States.⁹ Moreover, there is the question of whether or not capitalism -- as understood and perceived by Western states -- is compatible with regions like Asia and the Middle East.¹⁰ Finally, Fukuyama further provoked political theorists to ponder the ethical difficulties of liberal democracy at the end of the historical process.¹¹

There is a paucity of literature, however, commenting upon the impact of *End of History* paradigm on the contemporary political scene of Western Europe. Fukuyama asserts that his *End of History* hero,

⁸ Ralf Dahrendorf, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe* (New York: Time Books, 1990) and Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

⁹ Francis Fukuyama, "Race and Culture," *The National Interest*, no. 38 (Winter 1994/95): 97-103; James Kurth, "The Real Clash," *The National Interest*, no. 37 (Fall 1994): 3-15; Claes G. Ryn, "Democracy Boosters," *The National Review*, 24 March 1989, 30-32 and 52; and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural America* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1992).

¹⁰ Benjamin Barber, "Jihad v. McWorld," *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1992, 56-63 and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

¹¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993); Samuel P. Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," *The National Interest*, no. 17 (Fall 1989): 3-11; and Leszek Kolakowsky, "Uncertainties in a Democratic Age," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1990): 47-50.

Alexandre Kojève, believed the European Community to be an "appropriate institutional embodiment of the end of history."¹² West Europeans came to an ideological consensus at the end of the Second World War because they no longer faced "great political goals to struggle for and [that they] could [therefore] preoccupy themselves with economic activity alone."¹³ While the pace of the European integration process is dependent upon the political willingness of the EC's member states,¹⁴ Fukuyama notes that the economic and political challenges that politicians like John Major and Helmut Kohl face in pursuing integration are simply "subsidiary" issues.¹⁵ As in any other liberal democracy, Fukuyama observes, interest groups and political parties articulate political differences over issues of economic maximization and social welfare;

¹² Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 67.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Read, for example, Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, ed., *International Regionalism* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1968), 177-230; Alan S. Milward, *The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992*, with F.M.B. Lynch, R. Ranteri, F. Romero, and V. Sorenson (London: Routledge, 1993); and Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act," in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 41-85.

¹⁵ Interview with Francis Fukuyama, at the RAND Corporation, in Washington DC (USA), 16 December 1993. See Appendix A for a complete transcript of this interview.

however, the "broad framework of the house" remains intact.¹⁶

In this study, the *End of History* paradigm is compared and contrasted to the integration scholarship of David Mitrany and Ernst B. Haas. Like Fukuyama, both Mitrany and Haas conclude nationalism to be anachronistic to economic and social progress in international politics. In particular, Mitrany emphasized in his earliest work that practical politics should now work towards alleviating economic and social problems through the development of functional international agencies.¹⁷ The problems of environmental degradation and the depletion of national resources, the functionalists argue, demand a global response.¹⁸ Building upon the work of Mitrany, Haas believed that the influence and overall merits of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) would "spillover" into other functions of the state at the regional, rather than the global, level.¹⁹ For the neo-functionalist, then, "the growth of central institutions and the shift in the locus of authority from the national and the supranational took on great importance..."²⁰

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ David Mitrany, *Progress of International Government* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933).

¹⁸ Anne McLaren, "Homo Sapiens: The Third Revolution," *Science and Public Affairs*, (Winter 1994): 8-12.

¹⁹ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).

²⁰ Emil J. Kirchner, "The European Community: A Transnational Democracy?" in Ian Budge and David McKay,

This dissertation challenges the above assumptions. The difficulty with Fukuyama's analysis in particular is that his paradigm underestimates the role of national identity and the power of ideas in certain regions of even Western Europe. The creation of the European Union pertains to the building of new economic and political institutions. This includes the completion of the European Monetary Union, the strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament, and, at the intergovernmental level, the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Home and Judicial Affairs.²¹ As will be shown in this study, these novel conditions of statecraft pose for some West Europeans a direct and fundamental challenge to their understanding of concepts such as political accountability and sovereignty.

While there are those who argue that the creation of the single market would foster job opportunities and influence free trade with other markets worldwide,²² the recasting the "European Bargain" cannot be attained, as Sandholtz and Zysman seem to suggest, by the sheer alleviation of technical questions and the creation of a wider consumer culture.²³ The argument developed in

eds., *Developing Democracy: Comparative Research in Honor of J.F.P. Blondel* (London: Sage Publications, Ltd., 1994), 253.

²¹ Werner Hoyer, "The Shape of the Union after 1996," *European Brief*, Vol. 2, No. 7 (June 1995): 7.

²² Ibid.

²³ Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European Bargain," *World Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (December 1989): 101.

this study is that despite the perceived and purported benefits of economic and political integration, there are certain groups who perceive certain issues, like self-determination, worth defending and more important than these gains. After all, what prompted the Swiss electorate to reject membership into the European Economic Area in 1992 or, a year later, to adopt an initiative "designed to reduce road traffic in the Alps, thus complicating the bilateral negotiations between Switzerland and the EU over transportation policy[?]"²⁴ Can the integration process be validated merely by the opening of Honda and Mazda plants across the western part of the European continent? Is what is good for Ford and Renault good for Europe?

Finally, this empirical exercise takes as its case study the clash between economic maximization and national identity within the United Kingdom, a state not known for its nationalistic fervor. This study concentrates on the continuing role of national identity and state sovereignty by examining the Scottish National Party's (SNP) and the British Conservative and Unionist Party's position regarding devolution (the Union) and the future scope of the European Union. For the SNP, Scotland is a nation (and was a state) in its own right because it possesses its own education and legal system and, moreover, its own

²⁴ Thomas Bernauer, "The Swiss Switch to a World Role," *European Brief*, Vol. 2, No. 7 (June 1995): 21. For more on the Swiss Referendum, see *Keesing's Record of World Events*, Vol. 38, No. 12 (1992): 39244-39245.

unique sense of sovereignty.²⁵ In understanding the devolution debate, the Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown eloquently summarizes the UK's political predicament:

The "end of history" brigade should note the irony. At just the moment when Western liberal democracy in concert with liberal market capitalism became triumphant over authoritarian command societies, our present nineteenth century model of parliamentary democracy seems itself to be reaching the limits of its own utility and effectiveness. As democracy takes root in countries around the world previously dominated by one-party rule and dictatorship, parliamentary democracy seems more ineffective than at any time since the Second World War.²⁶

While the Labor Party perceives the House of Commons as an overcentralized political entity,²⁷ its solutions to overcentralization are essentially functional and, as this dissertation asserts, fails to address the influence and role of national identity in contemporary British politics.

The Tories, however, perceive the Union as sacrosanct because it is a political entity which has evolved piecemeal over the past three centuries. The Union for the Conservatives can be construed as how Danah Zohar defines her understanding of society as a

²⁵ Paul H. Scott, *Scotland in Europe: Dialogue with a Skeptical Friend* (Edinburgh: Canongate Press, 1992), 15-31.

²⁶ Paddy Ashdown, "Democratic Renewal," in Michael Foley, ed., *Ideas that Shape Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 199. See also Lindsay Patterson, *The Autonomy of Modern Scotland* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994).

²⁷ John McAllion, "Westminsterized," *Scottish Trade Union Review*, No. 63, March-April 1994, 18. For details on the proposed Scottish Assembly, see *Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Right* (Edinburgh: Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995).

a free-dance company, each member a soloist in his or her own right but moving creatively in harmony with the others.²⁸

Moreover, the analysis below highlights the various strands of thought which emerge within both the Tory Party and the SNP over the constraints and future possibilities of the UK's historic institutions and practices within Europe and Britain itself. Does the SNP's "Independence in Europe" campaign, for example, replace one centralized political entity with that of another? Is the devolution process an impediment or means to Scottish independence? The different strands of thought within the SNP and the Tory Party challenge, then, the *End of History* paradigm because they place cherished beliefs (like democracy, sovereignty, and the Union) under public scrutiny and assert them to be more important than "subsidiary" issues. This dissertation does not treat these ideas as abstract variables; rather, they are "ideas in motion," which reflect "the contemporary milieu of social drives, political movements and contemporary issues."²⁹

This dissertation outlines its argument in the following manner. This study is divided into three parts, of which the first part is its theoretical dimension. Chapter II, for example, is essentially a critique of Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm. This

²⁸ Danah Zohar and Ian Marshall, *The Quantum Society: Mind, Physics, and a New Social Vision* (New York: William Morow and Company, Inc., 1994), 21.

²⁹ Michael Foley, "Introduction," in Foley, *Ideas that Shape Politics*, 2.

chapter analyzes what Fukuyama means by the concept of "history" and what he perceives as the driving forces behind the historical process leading society in establishing liberal democratic institutions. This chapter also scrutinizes the literature by highlighting the general pitfalls to the *End of History* paradigm. It looks, for example, at the writings of the scholar Samuel P. Huntington and his alternative theories to those of Fukuyama's work.

The following chapter, chapter III, continues the dissertation's theoretical evaluation by comparing the *End of History* paradigm to the writings^{SP} of Mitrany and Haas. In particular, this chapter outlines Mitrany's reasoning for the development of functional international agencies. Chapter III highlights Mitrany's skeptical attitude to the system of states and how^{Re} functionalist approach might be suited to alleviating economic and social difficulties in the modern world. This chapter then outlines Haas' objections to Mitrany's functionalist approach. The essential criticism for Haas revolves around Mitrany's use of the technician and, more importantly, for eschewing a clear and concise approach as to how such institutions might emerge. As well, this chapter looks at the criteria Haas defines in the neo-functionalist approach as a way of ascertaining Europe's development of federal (or supranational) institutions.

Finally this chapter looks at some of the inadequacies of Haas' neo-functionalist approach. In

his later work, for example, Haas attempted to explain why the "spillover" effect fell short of neo-functional expectations.³⁰ Building upon the specific inadequacies of integration scholarship, this chapter looks at certain internal political and social difficulties and attempts to analyze the challenges that economic maximization fail to give sufficient weight to. It concludes by examining why political ideas continue to matter in West European politics.

The next two parts constitute the empirical aspect of this study. Chapter IV applies a macrolevel analysis to the tension of economic maximization and the role of ideas by highlighting a variety of political themes that have emerged in the European integration process since 1945 to the present day. This part demonstrates that themes related to the *End of History* paradigm have manifested themselves in the writings of Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli. Their writings highlight tensions between a "functional" approach and a "ideological" approach to European integration. The "functional" and "ideological" approach to European integration can also be found in the writings of Walter Hallstein which can then be compared to the intergovernmental approach of Charles de Gaulle and, later, Margaret Thatcher

Chapter IV also examines the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference which led to the EC member

³⁰ See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975).

states signing the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In particular, this chapter analyzes how the concept of subsidiarity can be perceived as a viable approach in alleviating the tension between the national interest of the member state and the development of EU's supranational institutions. By looking at a variety of essays, speeches, and memoirs, this dissertation can, more importantly, clearly demonstrate what was (and is) the mood of the West European political scene by understanding how certain politicians and statesmen perceived what impact the principles of integration would have on the political ideas which have been clearly part of the European political tradition as far back as 1789.

Chapters V and VI take up the microscopic dimension of this study. These chapters rely on a diverse number of primary sources in analyzing the different strands of thought in the SNP and the Tory Party regarding the devolution process and the future of the European Union. For example, SNP press releases and manifestos provided a general perception of the Party's "Independence in Europe" campaign and of its leadership's pragmatic (yet hesitant) analysis of Labor's devolution policy. The use of personal interviews and speeches of the SNP leadership provided specific information as to how they envisioned the growth of the EU and how Scotland would play a vital role in its development. Finally, the use of political polls from the *Scotsman* and *Glasgow Herald* provided a

sample of the electorate's aspirations as to how Scotland best be governed at the beginning of the next century.

In examining the diversity of opinion within the Tory Party, speeches presented provided a rich source of information in identifying the strain between the perceived "inevitability" of the European Union and the protection of parliamentary sovereignty by certain anti-European Tories. The use of personal interviews helped provide a clearer picture of the role of ideas in shaping the present institutions of British politics. Finally, political party manifestos, press releases, and policy papers were utilized in this study of the Conservative Party.

In conclusion, the goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate that even in liberal democracies there can exist clashes over fundamental issues. Fukuyama writes that the *End of History* can be seen as the end of great struggles.³¹ The late Russell Kirk, being a skeptic of *End of History*-like arguments, wrote that

[t]he best way to fight clear of dullness is to revive the great questions which ritualistic liberalism has longed ignored.... Is there something more to reality than this workaday world?...Is there something more to society than economic efficiency, and something more to politics than boob-bumping? If the serious reviews can begin to consider such questions once more, ... the Age of Discussion may not be over for awhile yet.³²

³¹ Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 18.

³² Russell Kirk, *Beyond the Dreams of Avarice: Essays of a Social Critic* (Peru, Illinois: Sherwood Sugden and Company, Publishers, 1991), 50.

CHAPTER II

A CRITIQUE OF THE END OF HISTORY

INTRODUCTION

The year of 1989 was an exciting one for political observers. While Western Europe celebrated the bicentennial of the French Revolution, it witnessed the downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe.¹ The collapse of the Berlin Wall rekindled hope in the possible (and eventual) unification of Germany.² With the fall of authoritarian regimes at the end of the twentieth century, an important question for historians and political scientists was (and continues to be) this: Where does History go from here?

Francis Fukuyama addressed this question in an article entitled "The End of History?"³ The advent of liberal democracy as a global phenomenon, Fukuyama

¹ For a western account of the fall of communism in eastern Europe read Timothy Garton Ash, *We the People: The Revolution of 1989 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague* (London: Granata Books, 1990) and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Scribners, 1989).

² In his memoirs, the former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt wrote, "I must admit that neither then or now have we abandoned the hope of living under one roof someday, even though we are aware that such a day lies in a far distant, unforeseeable future and that until then it is important to preserve the cohesiveness of the nation" (Helmut Schmidt, *Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective*, Translated from the German by Ruth Hein [New York: Random House, 1987], 18-19).

³ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989) : 3-18.

asserts, suggests that there exists no viable alternatives to democracy's "foundational principles."⁴ For Fukuyama, the *End of History* represents the end of the development of ideas.⁵ The pursuit of economics, Fukuyama further observes, will now preoccupy state policy-making.⁶ The question addressed in this study, however, is whether or not this is valid. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, twofold. First, it outlines Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm by highlighting its more important reasons for his assertion that politics can now be concerned with "subsidiary issues."⁷ This chapter then explores the literature by analyzing some of the more general critiques to Fukuyama's work and, thus, builds the argument that there is more to politics than the mere pursuit of economic activity.

ROLE OF HISTORY

A central theme to Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm is the role of History. Fukuyama, an apostle of the nineteenth century German philosopher GWF Hegel, concludes History has a specific destination, which Fukuyama defines to be as the "ultimate triumph of liberal democracy."⁸ Fukuyama perceives History to be

⁴ Interview with Francis Fukuyama at the RAND Corporation in Washington DC (USA), 16 December 1993. For a transcript of this interview, see Appendix A of this dissertation.

⁵ Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 4.

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: The Free Press, Ltd., 1995), xiii.

⁷ Interview with Fukuyama.

⁸ Fukuyama, "End of History?," 3. See also Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton, Ltd., 1992), xii-xiii.

progressive in which, as a dialectic process, it has "a beginning, a middle, and an end."⁹ Mankind goes through stages of economic and social development.¹⁰ Mankind has progressed from developing tribal and slave-owning societies to establishing domestic-egalitarian entities.¹¹ Fukuyama writes Hegel "believed that history culminated in an absolute moment --- a moment in which a final, rational form of society and state became victorious."¹²

Fukuyama analyzes Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* in which Hegel traced the *End of History's* rational form of society back to the Battle of Jena in 1806. For Hegel, Napoleon's victory at Jena signified a victory for the principles of liberal democracy which can trace its roots back to the French Revolution.¹³ Fukuyama defines the concept of liberalism as "a rule of law that recognizes certain individual rights or freedoms from government control."¹⁴ The "open society" allows for the establishment of political parties, interest groups and, moreover, a system of government "constituted so that bad rulers can be got rid of without bloodshed, without

⁹ Fukuyama, "End of History?," 4. For a critique of Fukuyama's understanding of Hegel read, Victor Gourevitch, "The End of History?," in Timothy Burns, ed., *After History? Francis Fukuyama and His Critics* (London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Ltd., 1994), 111-131; Gertrude Himmelfarb, "Response to Fukuyama," *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989): 24-26; and Alan Ryan, "Introduction," in Alan Ryan, ed., *After the End of History* (London: Collins and Brown, Ltd., 1992), 1-6.

¹⁰ Interview with Fukuyama.

¹¹ Fukuyama, "End of History?," 4.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 4-5;

¹⁴ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 42.

violence..."¹⁵ Leszek Kolakowsky writes that the judiciary branch should be independent of the executive branch; "the law acts as an autonomous mediating device between individual or corporate interests and the state, and is not an instrument of the ruling elites."¹⁶ This is not to say that there were no problems to alleviate after 1806. In the United States, for example, abolishing slavery and extending franchise to African Americans and women were further challenges to the universalization of liberal democracy.¹⁷ What Fukuyama asserts, however, is that the principles themselves could not be improved upon.¹⁸ The victory of liberalism," Fukuyama writes, "has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is yet incomplete in the real or material world."¹⁹ The Battle of Jena could be construed as the beginning of the *End of History*.

Fukuyama adapts Alexandre Kojève's interpretation of Hegel.²⁰ As Fukuyama explains, Kojève was part of an intellectual movement which concluded Hegel's writings were misinterpreted by Marxism.²¹ To begin with, Fukuyama

¹⁵ Karl Popper, "The Open Society and its Enemies Revisited," *The Economist*, 23 April 1988, 20.

¹⁶ Leszek Kolakowsky, "Uncertainties of a Democratic Age," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1990): 47.

¹⁷ For an excellent critique on this point, read Judith N. Shklar, *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

¹⁸ Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 5.

¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

²⁰ Ibid., 4-5. See also Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 65-67.

²¹ Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 4. Kojève taught political philosophy at *L'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes* in Paris. His seminars attracted rising French intellectuals of the time like Raymond Aron and Jean-Paul

writes that Karl Marx "believed that the liberal state failed to resolve one fundamental contradiction, that of class conflict, the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat."²² Marx, in other words, perceived the liberal state as a victory for the bourgeoisie and that, the universalization of freedom was incomplete.²³ "The Marxist end of history would come only with the victory of the true 'universal class,' the proletariat, and the subsequent achievement of a global communist utopia that would end class struggle once and for all."²⁴

With the apparent failure of Marxism in the twentieth century, Fukuyama explains, Kojève wished to restore Hegel's understanding of universal History.²⁵ Like Hegel, Kojève concluded the Battle of Jena to signify the beginning of the *End of History*, which would result in the formation of the "universal and homogeneous state."²⁶ As Fukuyama understood Kojève, all men are endowed with certain inalienable rights and the universalization of

Sartre. For more on the life and work of Kojève read, Allan Bloom, *Giants and Dwarfs: Essays 1960-1990* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 268-275 and Michael S. Roth, "A Problem of Recognition: Alexandre Kojève and the End of History," *History and Theory*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1985): 293-306.

²² Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 65.

²³ For more on this point read A.J.P. Taylor's Introduction to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1985), 7-48.

²⁴ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 65.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 5. See also Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 66.

the liberal democratic state would (or should) not exclude a specific class or group.

Kojeve believed that Western Europe reached the *End of History* at the end of the Second World War. "For these were societies with no fundamental 'contradictions' remaining: self-satisfied and self-sustaining, they had no further great political goals to struggle for and could preoccupy themselves with economic activity alone."²⁷ For Kojeve, the creation of the European Community was one of the *End of History's* great manifestations.²⁸ Believing History had fulfilled its course, Fukuyama explains, Kojeve relegated "the study of philosophy to the weekends" and worked on the problems of economics as an EC bureaucrat, until his death in 1968.²⁹

THE DRIVING FORCES OF HISTORY

²⁷ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 67.

²⁸ Ibid. In his book, Fukuyama refers to Kojeve's letters of correspondence with Leo Strauss of the University of Chicago in which they debated the question of the *End of History*. This interesting discussion can be found in Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny*, Revised and Expanded Edition, including the Strauss-Kojeve Correspondence, edited by Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth (New York: The Free Press, 1991). For a discussion and critique of Fukuyama's understanding of Kojeve, read Allan Bloom, "Response to Fukuyama," *The National Interest*, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 19-21; Tom Darby, "Technology, Christianity, and the Universal and Homogeneous State," in Burns, *After History?*, 197-217; and Joseph McCarney, "The End of History?," *Questions of Ideology*, 1 (June 1993): 1-21.

²⁹ Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, xiii. In following Kojeve's example Fukuyama writes, "In the light of this progression, it seemed only natural that I also should follow my own *The End of History and the Last Man* with a book about economics" (ibid.).

What directs History to the inevitable conclusion of liberal democracy? In *The End of History and the Last Man*, Fukuyama defines the driving forces of History as technological development and the struggle for recognition.³⁰ The first is based upon the work of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber.³¹ Modernization, Fukuyama asserts, "posited that industrial development followed a certain coherent pattern of growth, and would in time produce certain uniform social and political structures across different countries and cultures."³² In acquiring technology, Fukuyama argues, man is able to improve society's economic base and, as a result, he is able to obtain employment so to satisfy his consumer needs.³³

Fukuyama also asserts that technological progress leads to the modernization of the state.³⁴ Technological progress breaks down traditional forms of social organization (for example, tribal and sect) with urbanization and centralization. The building of roads, the development of mass communication "make possible an expansion in the size of markets, which in turn facilitate the realization of economies of scale through rationalization of the organization of labor."³⁵ It

³⁰ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, xiii.

³¹ For example, read Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1964) and Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, edited by Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).

³² Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 68.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., xiv-xv , 76-79.

³⁵ Ibid., 77

requires, Fukuyama argues, workers to be ready to relocate and learn new skills in a competitive economic market. "Such societies become increasingly linked with one another through global markets and the spread of a universal consumer culture."³⁶

Fukuyama writes that technological development does not necessarily result in the creation of the liberal democratic state.³⁷ Modern day Thailand and Singapore, while they are economically advanced, cannot be described says Fukuyama as paragons of the liberal democratic state.³⁸ "[E]conomic interpretations of history are incomplete and unsatisfying," Fukuyama explains, "because man is not simply an economic animal."³⁹

The second driving force of History is what Fukuyama refers to as the struggle for recognition. Man, as a rational being, has a conscious desire (or need) to be recognized as someone of value and worth and, thus, possesses certain inalienable rights which the state cannot suppress.⁴⁰ Fukuyama relates the concept of recognition back to the ancient Greeks in which they defined it as *thymos*, translated by Fukuyama to mean "spiritedness."⁴¹ The concept of recognition can be seen

³⁶ Ibid., xv.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., xvi.

⁴⁰ A powerful example of the concept of recognition can be found in Vaclav Havel's dramatic essay "Power of the Powerless," in Vaclav Havel, *Living in Truth*, Edited by Jan Vladislav (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1986), 36-123.

⁴¹ Fred Halliday points out that Fukuyama's understanding of *thymos* comes from Allan Bloom's translation of Plato's *The Republic*. See Fred Halliday,

as a basis for nationalism.⁴² Paul H. Scott, for example, observes that the recognition of Scotland as a nation in its own right is a strong manifestation of the principle of self-determination endorsed by the Charter of the United Nations.⁴³ Jim Fairlie, who was a member of the National Executive Committee of the Scottish National Party,⁴⁴ eloquently writes about the cultural and social dilemmas of Scotland living under British rule:

Nationalists of long standing have always felt slightly ambivalent about the nature of their pride in Scotland. We tend to be proud of the contribution that Scots have made to humanity particularly in the fields of engineering and medicine. Yet at the same time we feel angry and ashamed that so many of our people have failed to benefit from those contributions. There has always been a certain pride in the warm heartedness and generosity of Scots when it comes to raising money for charity -- especially English charities -- and anger at the way in which they have allowed themselves to be exploited.⁴⁵

In his book, Fukuyama links the concept of *thymos* to courage and self-esteem. As Fukuyama writes,

Conversely, when people fail to live up to their worth, they feel *shame*, and when they are evaluated correctly in proportion to their worth, they feel *pride*. The desire for recognition, and the accompanying emotions of anger,

"An Encounter with Fukuyama," *New Left Review*, no. 193 (May/June 1992): 93.

⁴² The struggle of recognition, as related to the concept of nationalism, is discussed in the text below. A fuller discussion of nationalism in Western Europe is discussed in Chapter III of this study.

⁴³ Paul H. Scott, *Scotland in Europe: Dialogue with a Skeptical Friend* (Edinburgh: Canongate Press, 1992), 15. This issue will be explored in Chapter V of this dissertation.

⁴⁴ For a brief biographical sketch of Jim Fairlie, see Chapter V of this dissertation.

⁴⁵ Jim Fairlie, "I Am Not a Nationalist, But...", in David Rollo, ed., *The Scotland We Seek* (Oban: Scots Independent (Newspapers) Limited, 1987), 8-9. (Emphasis added.)

shame, and pride, are parts of the human personality critical to political life.⁴⁶

Thymos, Fukuyama concludes, constitutes "the desire for recognition around which the historical transition to modernity can be understood."⁴⁷

FUKUYAMA'S CRITIQUE OF REALISM

Fukuyama writes that Hegel's *End of History* provided some optimism in the nineteenth century, even though it was a period of war and revolution. Man's general success in conquering the natural sciences reinforced that optimism. Mankind would be able to improve the quality of human life by obtaining a fuller control of poverty and disease through the progress of the natural sciences.⁴⁸ "Nature, long man's adversary, would be mastered by modern technology and made to serve the end of human happiness."⁴⁹ The spread of the ideal of the universal and homogeneous state, Fukuyama argues, would allow man to live freely. "Blind obedience to authority would be replaced by rational self-government, in which all men, free and equal, would have to obey no masters but themselves."⁵⁰ The nineteenth century, for Fukuyama, was seen as a time of man determining his own destiny. Rationalism would be the prevailing political and social thought.

⁴⁶ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, xvii.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 182.

⁴⁸ For a discussion on this point, read William H. McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1994), 217-269.

⁴⁹ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 4.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

In the twentieth century, however, Fukuyama observes that optimism had turned to pessimism. Man's progress in technology did not coincide with man's progress in morality. "Without the latter," Fukuyama writes, "the power of technology will simply be turned for evil purposes, and mankind will be worse off than it was previously."⁵¹ The use of technology to build weapons of destruction resulted in the devastating magnitude of the First World War.⁵² This sense of pessimism continued with the rise of Fascism in Europe in which Hitler's goal was to purify the Aryan race of human aberration.⁵³ The advent of Communism after Second World War in Eastern Europe placed into question whether or not History was a progressive phenomenon.⁵⁴

After the Second World War, the prevailing theory in international relations was (and continues to be) the Realist paradigm. Twentieth century Realists like Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger, Fukuyama asserts, adhered to the view that directional history - that is history resulting in the universal acknowledgment of man's

⁵¹ Ibid., 6. (Emphasis in original.)

⁵² For an interesting assessment on this point, read Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century* (New York: A Robert Stewart Book, 1993), 1-45.

⁵³ For example, read Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973) and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). 157 12

⁵⁴ For more on the nature and rise of Communism, read Vladislav Krasnov, "The Resumption of History," *Modern Age*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Fall 1991): 53-61 and Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 39-89.

inalienable rights - is a myth.⁵⁵ History is the story of struggle and conquest and insecurity is part of the global political framework.⁵⁶ "In the absence of an international sovereign," as Fukuyama writes in describing the Realist paradigm, "each state will be potentially threatened by every other state, and will have no other remedy for its security other than taking up arms in its own defence."⁵⁷

Realism, which can trace its origins back to the time of Machiavelli, explains the world as it actually is.⁵⁸ Power, as part of the actual world, is a measure of a state's influence in shaping international relations. "States seek to survive under anarchy," John J. Mearsheimer further writes, "by maximizing the power relative to other states..."⁵⁹ "Other forms of power such as natural resources or industrial capacity are important," Fukuyama also observes, "but primarily as a

⁵⁵ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 245. For example, read Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1977) and Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, edited by Kenneth Thompson, Sixth Edition (New York: Knoph, 1985).

⁵⁶ For background to the Realist paradigm, read William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, *International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation* (London: Harper Collins, 1991), 42-45.

⁵⁷ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man.*, 247.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 246. For background reading on Machiavelli's work, read George Bull's Introduction to Machiavelli, *The Prince*, translated by George Bull (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books., Ltd., 1981), 9-28 and Felix Gilbert, *Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

⁵⁹ John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Post Cold War World," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990): 12.

means of creating the military capabilities for self-defence."⁶⁰

The continued adherence to a pessimistic perspective of international relations, for Fukuyama, is an unwillingness to concede to the possibility of the end of ideological competition. "To assert that things cannot get better," Fukuyama writes, "is to undercut the hopes for better lives of the people who actually live in those countries [fighting against communism]."⁶¹ In particular, Fukuyama finds the Realist paradigm to be based upon two questionable foundations: "an impermissible reductionism concerning the motives and behavior of human societies, and failure to address the question of history."⁶²

For Fukuyama, the concept of self-preservation alone does not explain why states in the international system are belligerent. States go to war because of the struggle for recognition.⁶³ "Like giant thymotic individuals, [states] seek acknowledgment of their value or dignity on dynastic, religious, nationalist, or ideological grounds, and in the process force other states either to fight or submit."⁶⁴ For Fukuyama the struggle of ideas, however, has moved on. This is because, unlike what the Realist paradigm asserts, History is a progressive phenomenon. The Realist paradigm, on the other hand, understands

⁶⁰ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 249.

⁶¹ Francis Fukuyama, "A Reply to My Critics," *The National Interest*, 18 (Winter 1989/1990): 24.

⁶² Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 254.

⁶³ Ibid., 255.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

History to be "immune from the evolutionary processes taking place around it."⁶⁵ For Fukuyama, History is not a static entity because Man's behavior in, for example, international relations evolves. While a sceptic of the *End of History* paradigm⁶⁶, even John Lewis Gaddis notes the concept of integration as a growing trend in the post-Cold War world.⁶⁷

For Gaddis, the integration process manifests itself in many forms. Gaddis identifies three. The first form of integration is the communications revolution, "which has made it impossible for any nation to deny its citizens knowledge of what is going on elsewhere."⁶⁸ The communications revolution played a major role in bringing about the collapse of authoritarian regimes. It was impossible, for example, for the regimes of Eastern Europe not to be exposed to Western television or to evidence of a better way of life.⁶⁹ Gaddis concludes that the communications revolution set into motion a democratic domino effect, "in which the achievement of liberty in one country causes repressive regimes to topple, or at least to wobble, in others."⁷⁰

⁶⁵ Ibid., 258.

⁶⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/1993): 44-45.

⁶⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," in Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, eds., *The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 17.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ralf Dahrendorf, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe* (New York: Times Book), 25.

⁷⁰ Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," 17.

Gaddis also cites the integration of ideas.⁷¹ Through *glasnost* and *perestroika*, for example, Mikhail Gorbachev opened the door to the free exchange of ideas and to the opportunity of implementing economic and market techniques from the West.⁷² Communism could no longer control public dialogue. "Gorbachev's restraint on the use of force," Jeane Kirkpatrick also writes, "transformed the situation in Europe, opened the way for a democratic revolution and altered relations with the United States and Western Europe."⁷³ Dahrendorf cites the integration of ideas as the unification of language.⁷⁴ Europeans no longer require "ideological translation." Terms like "human rights" and "democracy" became synonymous in the European context. There is no longer an Orwellian doublespeak. "Conversation, discussion can actually change views. We have entered an era of change."⁷⁵

Finally, there is economic integration. In a global economy, it is difficult for a state (authoritarian or democratic) to isolate itself from the outside.⁷⁶ "As modern technology unfolds," Fukuyama writes, "it shapes national economies in a coherent fashion, interlocking

⁷¹ Ibid., 18.

⁷² Jonathan Steele, "The End of History," *Marxism Today*, November 1989, 27.

⁷³ Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1 (1990): 3.

⁷⁴ Dahrendorf, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe*, 14.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 15.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

them in a vast global economy."⁷⁷ What happens to one state's economy can then have a profound effect world-wide.⁷⁸ The importance of economic integration is most vividly seen in the western part of the European continent.⁷⁹ The Scottish National Party's "Independence in Europe" campaign, for example, is based on the fact that economic and political influence is shifting away from Westminster in London to the European Union (EU) in Brussels.⁸⁰ The government of Finland believes that EU membership will open to the Finnish people new markets in the western part of Europe. Lauri Korpinen, Finland's Minister on European Community affairs, stated:

...Finland's application was a logical continuation of our traditional policies of integration. For us, *it has always been indispensable to maintain close economic relations with other Western countries, to have access to capital, technology, and markets.*⁸¹

Like Finland, the state of Austria perceives EU membership to be a "means to diversify its relations with the other nations of Western Europe." Furthermore,

Open and unrestricted market access will undoubtedly provide us with new and interesting business

⁷⁷ Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, 3-4.

⁷⁸ Francis Fukuyama, "Against the New Pessimism," *Commentary*, (February 1994): 26.

⁷⁹ This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V of this dissertation.

⁸⁰ For example, read Jim Sillars, *No Turning Back: The Case for Scottish Independence within the European Community and How We Face the Challenge of 1992*. August 1988. This issue will be covered in Chapter V of this dissertation.

⁸¹ Lauri Korpinen, "Finland and the northern Extension of the European Union," Speech to the Scottish Branch of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, University of Aberdeen in Aberdeen Scotland (UK), 11 May 1994. (Emphasis added.)

opportunities, hopefully also in the field of agriculture --- an area where bilateral trade suffered greatly when Austria and Britain chose different European paths in 1973.⁸²

This sort of struggle for power, for Fukuyama, can be positive in the sense that "it is a sort of power struggle that can be pursued indefinitely by both countries to their mutual benefit, and to the benefit of the region as a whole which will have access to ever cheaper products."⁸³

The *End of History* paradigm, Fukuyama asserts, allows for the states of the international community to preoccupy more of their time in alleviating economic and social problems within the domestic sphere.⁸⁴ A liberal

⁸² Alois Mock, "Britain and Austria -- Common European Interests," Closing Statements to the Participants of the First Anglo-Austrian Forum in London, 15 April 1994.

⁸³ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 257.

⁸⁴ The problem here, however, is that not all states in the international community are *democratic*. This is because economic development, for Fukuyama, has limitations as to how homogenized societies can become (interview with Fukuyama), and, thus, lowers the expectations of whether or not all "countries are equally capable of sustaining stable democracies", in which a prime example is the Islamic world (Francis Fukuyama, "The Beginning of Foreign Policy, *The New Republic*, 17 August 1992, 30). Fukuyama notes that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism was the result of regional discontent with Western values and ideals (Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 14-18). Ali Mazrui cites the controversy over the publication of the *Satanic Verses* as a "dialogue of the deaf between the West and the world of Islam" (Ali Mazrui, *Cultural Forces in World Politics* [London: James Curry, Ltd., 1990], 83). As Samuel P. Huntington notes, the next century will witness a "Clash of Civilizations," in which conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations" (Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 [Summer 1993]: 22). What must be asserted, Gertrude Himmelfarb argues, is that "not all countries are disposed or committed to free institutions"

democratic state's duty, Fukuyama writes, is to eradicate the sort of social inequality which "is traceable to human convention..."⁸⁵ These forms of social inequality, Fukuyama observes, include castes, class by race, and gender.⁸⁶ "The dynamism of capitalist economics," Fukuyama observes, "tends to break down many conventional and cultural barriers to equality through its continuously changing demand for labor."⁸⁷ The variety of cultural and social attributes of a state, Fukuyama writes, will have to constantly adapt to the changing needs of a competitive international market which requires educated and skilled workers.⁸⁸ "Without universal literacy and education, without a high degree of social mobility and occupations open to talent rather than privilege, capitalist societies would not work, or could not work as efficiently as they could."⁸⁹

For Fukuyama, the *End of History* paradigm does not mean the end of *politics*.⁹⁰ This means that issues of recognition and the "struggles over the economic and the share of the pie" will continue to take place within the

(Gertrude Himmelfarb, "The Dark and Bloody Crossroads: Where Nationalism and Religion Meet," *The National Interest*, 32 [Summer 1993]: 60).

⁸⁵ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 289-290.

⁸⁶ Francis Fukuyama, "The Future of Equality," *The National Interest*, 38 (Winter 1994/95): 98.

⁸⁷ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 290.

⁸⁸ Fukuyama, "The Future of Equality," 100.

⁸⁹ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 290.

⁹⁰ Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 4.

confines of the principles of liberal democracy.⁹¹ In regard to the role of politics, as Fukuyama observes, there continues to be many fights over recognition which includes gay rights and race relations.⁹² There is also the advent of the "genderquake" in which, for example, women are fighting for equal representation in Labour and Scottish National Party politics.⁹³ The pursuit for gender equality, as Elizabeth Fox-Genovese notes, is based on "its convincing appeal to liberal values, notably equality (purported fairness) and individual rights."⁹⁴ While modern democracies have taken the responsibility of regulating business and redistributing income from the rich to the poor, Fukuyama further observes, how these economic and social problems are alleviated will differ from one liberal democratic state to the next.⁹⁵ The

⁹¹ Interview with Fukuyama.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Naomi Wolf coined the term "genderquake" in *Fire with Fire: The New Female Power and How it Will Change the 21st Century* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993), 29-40. For gender politics in the UK read, Catriona Burness, "Drunk Women Don't Look at Thistles: Women and the SNP, 1934-94," *Scotlands*, 2 (1994): 131-155; Joanne Robertson, "Women in Labour," *The Sunday Times -- Scotland*, 10 September 1995, 5-8; and Robert Tait, "Women Ready to Share in Bright New Dawn," *Evening Times* (Glasgow), 28 November 1995, 40. At a general level, read Betty Friedman, "Time to Transcend Sexual Politics," *Newsweek*, 4 September 1995, 16-17; A.A. Gill, "Sister Act," *The Sunday Times*, 23 January 1994, Sec. 3, 1-2; James Langton, "Nineties Feminists Do it by the Book," *The Sunday Telegraph*, 14 November 1993, 9; and Kenneth L. Woodward, "The Pope's Voice in Beijing," *Newsweek*, 4 September 1995, 56.

⁹⁴ Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, "Letters: The Real Clash," *The National Interest*, 38 (Winter 1994/95): 103. (Emphasis added.)

⁹⁵ Interview with Fukuyama.

responsibility for social welfare in the liberal democratic state "differs from Social Security and Medicaid in the United States to the more comprehensive welfare systems of Germany or Sweden."⁹⁶

CRITIQUE OF THE END OF HISTORY

In his work, Fukuyama discusses the concept of nationalism as a possible impediment to the *End of History* paradigm.⁹⁷ In this section, Fukuyama's observations are compared to what his critics have written on this possible obstacle to the paradigm's assertion that History has moved on to the economic realm. While there is evidence of integration, as Gaddis argues, there is also evidence of fragmentation in international relations in which the latter "forces have begun to manifest themselves with unexpected strength, just when it looked as though integration was about to prevail."⁹⁸ What is demonstrated here is that:

History has not ended but has become compressed. Whereas in the past, historical epochs stood out in relatively sharp relief, and could thus have a defined sense of historical progression, history today entails sharp discontinuities that collide with each other, condense our sense of perspective, and confuse our historical perceptions.⁹⁹

This section also looks at Fukuyama's argument and understanding of the *Last Man*. Economic activity,

⁹⁶ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 290.

⁹⁷ Fukuyama, "End of History?," 14-18. It should be noted here that the concepts of nationalism and state sovereignty in respect to the policies of the Scottish National Party and the British Conservative and Unionist Party will dominate the latter part of this dissertation.

⁹⁸ Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," 18.

⁹⁹ Brzezinski, *Out of Control*, ix-x.

Fukuyama explains, has turned man into "contemptible"¹⁰⁰ beings who are only interested in satisfying his consumer desires and needs. The battle of ideas, for the *Last Man*, has lost its significance. Again, is there more to politics than the sheer pursuit of economic and material gain? Or has the West, as John Galbraith laments, reached a "Culture of Contentment"?¹⁰¹

A. NATIONALISM

Nationalism may be seen as a recent political phenomenon tracing its roots back to the American and French Revolutions which brought forth the principles of liberal democracy.¹⁰² "Under the weight of nationalism," Fukuyama writes, "multinational empires of the Hapsburgs and Ottomans began to collapse."¹⁰³ Alliances and boundaries "became much more rigid, because nations and peoples could no longer be traded like so many chess pieces."¹⁰⁴ The industrial revolution, furthermore, required societies to become more egalitarian, homogeneous, and educated to compete. Fukuyama writes:

Rulers and ruled had to speak the same language because both were intertwined in a national economy; peasants moving from the countryside had to be made literate in that language and given sufficient education to enable them to work in modern factories and, eventually, offices.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ Stephen Holmes, "The Scowl of Minerva," *The New Republic*, 23 March 1992, 33.

¹⁰¹ John K. Galbraith, *The Culture of Contentment* (London: Sinclair-Steveson, 1992).

¹⁰² Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October 1992): 6-7.

¹⁰³ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 267.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 269.

Nationalism, as mentioned before, is a reflection of the struggle for recognition. However, there are forms of recognition which extend "only to members of a given national or ethnic group."¹⁰⁶ This type of illiberal nationalism has the potential, according to particular circumstances, to lead to conflict between groups seeking recognition.¹⁰⁷ In the twentieth century, as Fukuyama laments, nationalism has manifested an extreme form of *thymos* known as *magalothymia*. "Nationalism is therefore fully capable of replacing dynastic and religious ambition as a general ground for imperialism, and did precisely that in the case of Germany."¹⁰⁸

What are the contemporary reasons for the advent of this form of nationalism? The continent of Europe used to exist, Gaddis explains, in a bipolar environment.¹⁰⁹ Such an environment allocated political strength between the two superpowers -- the United States and the Soviet Union.¹¹⁰ Alliances were created to establish consensus and solidarity in foreign policy decision-making. The presence of nuclear weapons on the European continent

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 266.

¹⁰⁷ John Palmenatz, "Two Types of Nationalism," in Marc Williams, ed., *International Relations: A Reader* (London: MacMillan Education, Ltd., 1989), 48.

¹⁰⁸ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 266.

¹⁰⁹ Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," 19.

¹¹⁰ For a more detailed discussion of these points, read John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in Postwar International System," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., *The Cold War and After* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991), 1-45.

reinforced a credible balance of power.¹¹¹ Moreover, Gaddis argues, bipolarity suppressed long and tragic feuds in Europe. In Western Europe, the need to contain Soviet adventurism "moderated old animosities between the French and the Germans, or the Greeks and the Turks, or the British and everybody else."¹¹² The Warsaw Pact suppressed national rivalry between Hungarians and Romanians and between Czechs and Poles.¹¹³ Nationalism became a "historical curiosity" in Europe.¹¹⁴

With the end of the Cold War, Stephen Sestanovich argues, ethnic and national groups "whose animosities have festered in an illiberal setting, the freedom to speak up, organize, and assemble may present itself primarily as a long-sought opportunity to fight things out."¹¹⁵ Even Fukuyama notes that nationalism in Eastern Europe has become worse since 1989.¹¹⁶ Scholars debate whether this growing form of nationalism in Eastern Europe could bring back the type of conflict seen at the beginning of this century.¹¹⁷ Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic, for example, is fighting to maintain what is left of the

¹¹¹ John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No 3 (Summer 1993): 57.

¹¹² Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," 19.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Stephen Sestanovich, "Response to Fukuyama," *The National Interest*, 16 (Summer 1989): 33.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Fukuyama.

¹¹⁷ For example, read Istvan Deak, "Uncovering Eastern Europe's Dark History," *Orbis*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter 1990): 51-65; Daniel P. Moynihan, *Pandemonium: Ethnicity in World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Timothy L. Thomas, "Ethnic Conflict: Scourge of the 1990s," *Military Review*, December 1992, 15-27.

Yugoslav Republic.¹¹⁸ Henry Kissinger writes that the conflict between Russia and its former republics:

is now compounded by the fact that all republics are undergoing major economic and political crises which accentuate the tensions between them. The economic crisis is the legacy of decades of stagnation caused by the Stalinist central command system. Yeltsin has courageously tried to spur reform by freeing prices, gambling that decontrol will bring out hoarded goods and stimulate production. Most of the other republics have followed suit. But the question is whether the process can work before the resulting austerity wrecks the political system.¹¹⁹

All of this, Fukuyama writes, "has undercut for many the credibility of this claim of all universalistic ideologies to have superseded nationalism."¹²⁰

While intense national conflict will occur in the less developed areas of Eastern Europe,¹²¹ Fukuyama does not believe that "the model [of Eastern Europe's] future [is that] of Serbia."¹²² Instead, he sees the future model of that part of the world to be along the lines of the EC.¹²³ Pierre Haasner believes, for example, that ethnic tension is the result of economic and social problems. To alleviate this tension of ethnicity, there must be an attempt to bring Eastern Europe into the fold of the new

¹¹⁸ For example, read Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993): 81-97; Josef Joffe, "Bosnia: the Return of History," *Commentary*, October 1992, 24-29; and Sabrina P. Ramet, "Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic: A Profile," *Orbis*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter 1991): 93-105.

¹¹⁹ Henry Kissinger, "The New Russian Question," *Newsweek*, 10 February 1992, 12.

¹²⁰ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 268.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 273.

¹²² Interview with Fukuyama.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

European Union.¹²⁴ For reasons described above, the peoples of Eastern Europe yearn for economic efficiency and the freedom to articulate individual opinion.¹²⁵ Nationalism in Eastern Europe "will mature and ultimately undergo the same process of 'Turkification' as Western Europe."¹²⁶ "Nationalism," as Edward Mortimer analyzes Fukuyama's paradigm, "is a kind of growing pain of liberal democracy, which in its mature form, viz. the European Community, it can overcome."¹²⁷ Nevertheless, "Eastern Europe," Fukuyama observes, "will move towards Western Europe and not the reverse. The length of time that will take [,however,] will be quite a long time."¹²⁸

Unlike Eastern Europe, the concept of nationalism in Western Europe has lost its political strength as a "source of thymotic identification..."¹²⁹ As Fukuyama notes, West Europeans no longer "*struggle over whether or not [they] should be democratic, if they should be ruled by the throne or through popular election.*"¹³⁰ Instead, the West Europeans have devoted their efforts in the building of a European Union in which, as David Held observes, its member states are relinquishing some of their autonomy

¹²⁴ Pierre Haasner, "Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 1993): 57-58.

¹²⁵ Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, 279-288.

¹²⁶ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 274.

¹²⁷ Edward Mortimer, "End of History," *Marxism Today*, November 1989, 29.

¹²⁸ Interview with Fukuyama.

¹²⁹ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 270.

¹³⁰ Interview with Fukuyama. (Emphasis added.)

and the EU is establishing itself in the global market.¹³¹ As Fukuyama notes in his European travels, "the gains of the EC are fundamentally irreversible."¹³²

However, Fukuyama does express reservations of "whether the more ambitious goals of European federalism [could] ever be realized..."¹³³ In discussing and analyzing nationalism in Western Europe Fukuyama concentrates his efforts first of all in looking at the cultural and social differences between West Europeans.¹³⁴ For example, Fukuyama discusses how West Europeans lament over how the EU means that the "way [they] label [their] local wines is going to change, and [how] some bureaucrat in Brussels is going to tell [them] how long of a sausage [they] can create, and do [they] really want this."¹³⁵ The Germans are reluctant to relinquish the D-Mark for the ECU because, according to Fukuyama, the Germans are "fiscally tight fisted and they don't like inflation and they have the internal and social discipline to run a very tough anti-inflationary policy, whereas the Italians were never able to balance a budget in their national existence."¹³⁶

Fukuyama also examines how West Europeans perceive and understand the growing problems of nationalism in Eastern Europe. In his travels, Fukuyama found, for example, mistrust between French and Germans over the

¹³¹ David Held, "New Times: Farewell Nation State," *Marxism Today*, December 1988, 12-17.

¹³² Francis Fukuyama, "An American in Paris," *New Statesman and Society*, 6 March 1992, 15.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Interview with Fukuyama.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

EU's handling of the Yugoslav crisis by its (primarily German) insistence in the recognition of Croatia.¹³⁷ With the growing problems of the single currency and immigration, Fukuyama wonders "whether the more ambitious goals of European federalism would ever be realized, and whether Europeans themselves didn't prefer remaining a 'Europe of nations.'" ¹³⁸ As mentioned above, however, Fukuyama notes that the *End of History* does not mean the end of *politics* for there will always be points of disagreement over questions of foreign policy to "fill the pages" of *Foreign Affairs*.¹³⁹ As well, Fukuyama observes that these events described above simply point to what could be construed as a functional problem:

...[T]he whole world is in a broad transitional phase and it is very hard to understand what is going on. *I am not sure that within the terms of the principles of foreign policy that there is a greater degree of disagreement than in earlier times. There has always been this tension between realpolitik and a more idealistic one.... I think that it is a permanent tension in foreign policy that won't go away....It is just now finding what organizations are appropriate to deal with it.*¹⁴⁰

Fukuyama also notes that Europeans are reluctant to become involved in "foreign entanglements as they try to deal with pressing domestic economic problems."¹⁴¹ For Fukuyama, despite Franco-German mistrust over issues like Bosnia and Croatia, nationalism in Western Europe has appeared "to have lost much of its ability to stimulate

¹³⁷ Fukuyama, "An American in Paris," 15.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Fukuyama, "The End of History?" 4.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Fukuyama. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁴¹ Fukuyama, "Against the New Pessimism," 25-26.

Europeans to risk their comfortable lives in great acts of imperialism."¹⁴²

Fukuyama does not perceive that what he has alluded to above is a fundamental contradiction to the *End of History* because his paradigm rests on the premise that there exists no alternative principles to that of liberty and equality.¹⁴³ This dissertation asserts, however, that the history of western political thought has argued over many other issues which include the concepts of national identity and state sovereignty. And, as this study will demonstrate, these principles are facing a fundamental challenge from the growing economic and political emergence of the EU. In the UK, for example, the British Conservative and Unionist Party are fundamentally divided over the ramifications of the EU's federal agenda on the issue of parliamentary sovereignty.¹⁴⁴ The question is whether or not these issues can be described as merely being "subsidiary" ones.

B. DEMOCRACY AND THE ISSUE OF THE LAST MAN.

It is this dissertation's assertion that there is a critical need for the role of ideas because, as Samuel P. Huntington advocates, Fukuyama's thesis can be construed as a form of endism in which its central

¹⁴² Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 272.

¹⁴³ Interview with Fukuyama.

¹⁴⁴ For example, read David Baker, Andrew Gamble, and Steve Ludlam, "The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: Conservative Divisions and British Ratification," *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1994): 38.

premise is that "bad things are coming to an end."¹⁴⁵ With the advent of liberal democracy as a global phenomenon, the *End of History* paradigm perceives a pacific world order because democratic states, by nature, do not fight with one another.¹⁴⁶ Scholars point "to the historical absence of wars between democratic countries and [conclude] the multiplication of democratic regimes since 1974 as evidence that the probability of war [is] declining."¹⁴⁷ While this might very well be true, Huntington's essential criticism is that Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm "provides not a warning of danger but an illusion of well-being. It invites not concrete action but relaxed complacency."¹⁴⁸

Fukuyama summarizes the position of the end of the role of ideas in the following paragraph of his original essay which this dissertation wishes to challenge:

The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the world-wide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," *The National Interest*, 17 (Fall 1989): 3.

¹⁴⁶ For example, read Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986): 1151-1169 and John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

¹⁴⁷ Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," 3.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 4.

¹⁴⁹ Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 18.

This quotation describes the concept of the *Last Man*, which is the product of the Kojève-Hegel¹⁵⁰ universal and homogeneous state. The concept of the *Last Man*, which Brzezinski defines as "permissive cornucopia," "involves essentially a society in which the progressive decline in the centrality of moral criteria is matched by heightened preoccupation with material and sensual gratification."¹⁵¹

John Kenneth Galbraith defines this sense of self-gratification as the "culture of contentment." Making up the political mainstream, the content find themselves satisfied with the status quo. Because the content are not affected by democracy's side effects, there is little reason to promote remedies. In an age of contentment, society prefers short- rather than long-term solutions to economic, ecological, and social problems because the long-term never arrives.¹⁵² Long-term solutions require sacrifice such as higher taxes and the changing of life styles.¹⁵³ While long-term solutions will benefit future generations, the content are hesitant to support policies they might not enjoy or benefit from. The content rely on the hope that everything works out for the best in the end.¹⁵⁴ "The last man at the end of history," Fukuyama writes, "knows better than to risk his life for a cause, because he recognizes that history was full of pointless

¹⁵⁰ Fukuyama coined this phrase in *The End of History and the Last Man*, 144.

¹⁵¹ Brzezinski, *Out of Control*, 65.

¹⁵² Galbraith, *Culture of Contentment*, 20.

¹⁵³ Kolakowsky, "Uncertainties of a Democratic Age," 50.

¹⁵⁴ Galbraith, *Culture of Contentment*, 20.

battles in which men fought over whether they should be Christians or Muslims, Protestant or Catholic, German or French."¹⁵⁵

Fukuyama describes the *End of History* as the age of consumerism in which art, literature, and philosophy are set aside. Instead, the *Last Man* is "mesmerized" by a world of "fast music, fast computers, and fast food -- with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one commercially homogeneous global network..."¹⁵⁶ Man is "content with his happiness and is unable to feel any sense of shame in himself for being unable to rise above those wants."¹⁵⁷ The *Last Man* is losing a sense of that which Fukuyama believes is the driving force behind a successful economy: a civil society. For Fukuyama, the civil society is

a complex welter of intermediate institutions, including businesses, voluntary associations, educational institutions, clubs, unions, media, charities, and churches -- builds in turn, on the family, the primary instrument by which people are socialized into their culture and given the skills that allow them to live in broader society and through which the values and knowledge of that society are transmitted across generations.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 307. (Emphasis in original.)

¹⁵⁶ Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad v. McWorld," *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1992, 53. As a note of comparison, read Claes G. Ryn, *Democracy and the Ethical Life: A Philosophy of Politics and Community*, Second Edition, Expanded (Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press, 1990), 232-239 and Peter J. Stanlis, "The Erosion of Political Principles," *Modern Age*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Fall 1991): 69-73.

¹⁵⁷ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 307.

¹⁵⁸ Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtue and the Creation of Prosperity*, 4-5.

The *Last Man*, on the other hand, is interested only in himself. He is not interested in improving himself intellectually or otherwise. The last man "has been jaded by the experience of history, and disabused of the possibility of direct experience of values."¹⁵⁹

The challenge of the *Last Man* on the role of ideas takes on a philosophical perspective. While this does not fall entirely within the scope of this dissertation, a few words should be noted. Leszek Kolakowsky notes that economic prosperity has produced "a mentality of endless expectations."¹⁶⁰ There exists a mentality among those who enjoy the culture of contentment "that each of us is going to have more and more of everything in the indefinite future and to the firm belief that this is what each of us deserves."¹⁶¹ In a speech to the Institute of Socio-Economic Studies Margaret Thatcher noted that "in some respect, the concepts of social responsibility have turned sour in practice."¹⁶² While liberal democracy provides the rule of law, the establishment of rights, Fukuyama argues, its fundamental flaw is that it has "arrived at an impasse unable, to come to a consensus on what constitutes man and his specific dignity, and consequently unable to define the rights of man."¹⁶³

¹⁵⁹ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 306.

¹⁶⁰ Kolakowsky, "Uncertainties of a Democratic Age," 49.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 49-50.

¹⁶² Margaret Thatcher, *The Revival of Britain: Speeches on Home and European Affairs*, Compiled by Alistar B. Cooke (London: Aurum Press, Ltd, 1989), 3.

¹⁶³ Fukuyama, *the End of History and the Last Man*, 337.

Society, Gertrude Himmelfarb writes, must "develop a more effective system of incentives and disincentives, both economic and moral."¹⁶⁴ At Hillsdale College, Thatcher made the following point:

It is important to understand that the moral foundations of a society do not extend only to its political system; they must extend to its economic system as well... Capitalism is not, contrary to what those on the left have tried to argue, an amoral system based on selfishness, greed and exploitation.¹⁶⁵

"Unless we restore and guard it," Thatcher notes, "the rule of law will generally fall into disrespect."¹⁶⁶

The success of democracy, as this dissertation wishes to explore, does not "preclude conflicts within liberalism."¹⁶⁷ For example, Anthony Hartley argues that the issue of the environment should not be treated as merely as a subsidiary issue because it is in flux with the idea of liberalism in which "green" values could "wreck" "the industrial base which supports consumerism itself."¹⁶⁸ The states of the international community might have to take firmer measures in the allocation of resources to alleviate "damages already inflicted on our environment and to warding off further calamities."¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ Gertrude Himmelfarb, "The Value of Victorian Virtues," *The Sunday Times*, 16 April 1995, 8.

¹⁶⁵ Margaret Thatcher, "The Moral Foundations of Society," *Imprimis*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (March 1995): 4. For more on this point, read Joseph Baldacchino, *Economics and the Moral Order*, Introduction by Russell Kirk (Washington, DC: National Humanities Institute, 1989).

¹⁶⁶ Thatcher, *The Revival of Britain*, 75.

¹⁶⁷ Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," 9.

¹⁶⁸ Anthony Hartley, "On Not Ending History," *Encounter*, September/October 1989, 72. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁶⁹ Kolakowsky, "Uncertainties of a Democratic Age," 50.

These types of measures might require the polity to sacrifice its freedom of movement and rights to property.¹⁷⁰ "The amount of frustration, irrational rage, and aggressiveness that these imperatives are going to cause," Kolakowsky argues, "will be enormous, and will affect the poor and rich alike."¹⁷¹ The issue of multiculturalism tends, for example, "to elevate obscure leaders of minority groups to a level of importance equal to that of the founding fathers."¹⁷² At times, this American predicament has led to violence for "to a believer the heretic is worse than the nonbeliever."¹⁷³ "New challenges to human well-being will emerge," Huntington concludes, "and people will develop new concepts, theories, and ideologies as to how those new challenges should be met."¹⁷⁴

In particular, this dissertation's challenge of the *Last Man* on the role of ideas takes on an institutional perspective. This dissertation will examine how the British Conservative and Unionist Party perceive and

¹⁷⁰ Ellen Wood, "A Tale of Two Democracies," *History Today*, May 1994, 54-55.

¹⁷¹ Kolakowsky, "Uncertainties of a Democratic Age," 50.

¹⁷² Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993): 190.

¹⁷³ Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," 9. For more on the debate of multiculturalism, read Reed Dasenbrock, "The Multicultural West," *Dissent*, Vol. 38 (Fall 1991): 550-555 and Russell Kirk, "The Fraud of Multiculturalism," *The Heritage Lectures*, # 396 (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1992).

¹⁷⁴ Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," 9. (Emphasis added.)

understand Britain's relationship to the EU.¹⁷⁵ For certain segments of the Tory Party, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) is seen as detrimental to the sovereignty and historic institutions of the United Kingdom. As Bill Walker observes, the United Kingdom was not, unlike the European Union, imposed on the people of Britain; rather, it was (and is) a political Union that has evolved in the past three hundred years.¹⁷⁶ For traditional conservatives, the development of political institutions is a piecemeal process based on pragmatism.¹⁷⁷ As Edmund Burke once wrote:

[Society] is to be looked on with other reference; because it is not a partnership in all things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.¹⁷⁸

"The permanence of a society," the late Russell Kirk noted, "is formed by those enduring interests and convictions that give us stability and continuity; without that permanence, the foundations of the great deep are broken up, society slipping into anarchy."¹⁷⁹

In Western Europe, the issue of nationalism is challenging the *status quo* of governing institutions in

¹⁷⁵ See Chapter V of this dissertation.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Bill Walker at Constituency Office in Blairgowrie, Scotland (UK), 18 August 1995.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. See also Lord Hugh Cecil, *Conservatism* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), 13-14.

¹⁷⁸ Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, edited with an Introduction by Conor Cruise O'Brien (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), 194-195.

¹⁷⁹ Russell Kirk, *The Politics of Prudence* (Bryn Mawr: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1993), 25.

certain states of the EU. In some instances, it has taken on the extreme form of racism and xenophobia.¹⁸⁰ While Fukuyama is correct in asserting that those upholding this type of nationalism are in the minority of public opinion,¹⁸¹ there are nationalist groups in Western Europe who are calling for a greater degree of self-rule. These type of nationalist groups include the Basques in Spain and the Flemings and the Walloons in Belgium.¹⁸²

One of the issues that this dissertation will focus is on the SNP's platform of democratic renewal by analyzing its radical alternative to statecraft in the UK.¹⁸³ In analyzing the SNP, however, it becomes clear that there are factions fighting for the heart and soul of the Party. The question addressed in this study is whether or not the quest for Scottish statehood should be based upon the fact that Scotland has oil or that, for better or for worse, Scotland has a right like other states of the world community to exercise its own sovereignty over its own affairs? The SNP's disagreements over these issues, as this study will show, demonstrate a clear example of the continuing clash between economic maximization and the role of ideas at the end of the twentieth century.

CONCLUSION

¹⁸⁰ John Bunzl, "National Populism in Austria," *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 26, No. 1&2 (1992): 28-37; Hans Magnus Enzensberger, *Civil War* (London: Granata Books, 1993), 9-73; and "Violence Wins, the Police Blush," *The Economist*, 29 August 1992, 27.

¹⁸¹ Fukuyama, "Against the New Pessimism," 27.

¹⁸² James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1991), 87-94.

¹⁸³ See Chapter V of this dissertation.

Francis Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm is an interesting perspective to the empirical examination of the study of international relations. As the analysis demonstrated, Fukuyama's general premise is that the principles of liberal democracy have prevailed as the dominant ideology around the world. Fukuyama also asserts that international politics is much more manageable at the *End of History* since historical evidence suggests that liberal democratic states are non-belligerent with one another.¹⁸⁴ "Britain and Germany," Keohane and Nye writes, "no longer feel threatened by each other. Intense relationships of mutual influence exist between these countries, but in most of them force is irrelevant or unimportant as an instrument of policy."¹⁸⁵

In his work, Fukuyama also concedes that the world is still a dangerous place and that nationalism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is still a force to be reckoned with. In bringing Eastern Europe into the European Union, Haasner believes that such an approach would be appropriate because the European Union's goal is to bring about a bureaucratic organization which attempts to bring about a modern social framework. The European Union, according to Hassner, is based upon building an economic and political framework, but not at the sacrifice of national and

¹⁸⁴ For an interesting commentary on this point, read Fareed Zakaria, "Is Realism Finished?" *The National Interest*, No. 30 (Winter 1992/93): 21-33.

¹⁸⁵ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, Second Edition (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1989), 27.

cultural identity.¹⁸⁶ While nationalism has taken extreme forms (for example, fascism), the concept of nationalism "seems to be a necessary stage through which human societies have to pass."¹⁸⁷ For Fukuyama, the concept of nationalism is a political process in which "communities have liberated themselves from non-democratic forces of authority to take control of their destinies."¹⁸⁸ In Western Europe, however, Fukuyama believes that this process has come to an end and that, therefore, the concept of nationalism has lost its ability to inspire peoples to fight for the *fatherland*; instead, their interests are in creating a global consumer culture.

In the next chapter, this dissertation explores the writings of Ernst B. Haas and David Mitrany. The purpose here is to demonstrate that one can find precedents to Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm. Both Haas and Mitrany explore politics at the *End of History* and attempt to construct a new international environment which replaces the sovereignty of the state with that of international institutions. As the next chapter also demonstrates, however, there are other forces which impede the assertion that economics should now preoccupy political behavior at the end of the twentieth century.

¹⁸⁶ Hassner, "Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism," 59.

¹⁸⁷ Ernst B. Haas, "Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1993): 545.

¹⁸⁸ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History is Still Nigh," *The Independent*, 3 March 1992, 21.

CHAPTER III

FUNCTIONALISM AS A VARIATION TO THE *END OF HISTORY* AND
THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONALISM AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN
WESTERN EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

There is an interesting parallel between Francis Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm and David Mitrany's functionalist approach which can trace its origins back to the 1930s. Like Fukuyama, Mitrany asserts that the democratic principles of liberty and equality cannot be improved upon. As well, the functionalist approach can be seen as "a new ideology of international relations, deriving its inspiration partly from old ideals, but indicating a new approach to international and economic problems."¹ Unlike Fukuyama, however, the functionalist approach does not place much faith in the international system of states because, as R.A.. Harrison writes, the international community is "broken up into self-identifying, self-centered communities, whose jealous rivalry erupts occasionally into violence."² A change in structural transformation, is, for the functionalist, paramount in developing a more peaceful world order.³

¹ Piotr S. Wandycz, "The Theory of International Relations," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1955): 200.

² R.J. Harrison, *Europe in Question* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1974), 27.

³ The World Order Models Project (WOMP), for example, has further explored alternative world order models. Originating in the 1960s, WOMP advocates four

In advocating the change of structure in the international system of states, Mitrany's functionalist approach attempts to construct an international system of agencies which are designed to implement practical solutions to economic and social problems common between states. In exploring Mitrany's analysis this chapter highlights two problems to his approach. First, functionalism eschews establishing a descriptive framework of agencies because, for Mitrany, it would limit the ability of the functionalist to amend the process. The greater difficulty to Mitrany's work is that he does not invest much thought as to how states change their *weltanschauung*, particularly in regards to the transformation of the international system. The scholar Ernst B. Haas recognized, for example, the important role of interest groups and political parties in changing the thinking of the state in implementing

values: minimization of violence; maximization of social and economic well-being; maximization of social and political justice; and maximization of ecological quality. However, WOMP has never been able to arrive at a consensus regarding an optimum world order. WOMP books include Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: The Free Press, 1975) and Saul Mendlovitz, ed., *On the Creation of a Just World Order* (New York: The Free Press, 1975). For a critique of WOMP and the concept of world order in general read Richard A. Falk, *Explorations at the Edge of Time: The Prospects for World Order* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); Stanley J. Michalak, "Richard Falk's Future World: A Critique of WOMP-USA," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (January 1980): 3-18; Cornelius F. Murphy, *The Search for World Order* (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 145-184; and Nicholas G. Onuf, "International Legal Order as an Idea," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 73, No. 2 (April 1979): 244-266.

the solving of economic and social problems by building functional agencies at (at least) the regional level.

As Harrison writes the integration process is

evidently a process of political but also farreaching, social transformation. The integration process which has interested modern theorists and the one to which the six are ostensibly committed by the Rome Treaty may be further, though still loosely, defined then, as the attainment within an area of the bonds of political community: of central institutions with binding decision making powers and methods of control determining the allocation of values at the regional level and also of adequate complementary consensus-formation mechanisms.... Within the terms of this stipulative definition, successful integration means a balanced development of all these elements.⁴

In examining the European integration process, Haas assumed (as Fukuyama later did) that concepts like nationalism and sovereignty were becoming anachronistic among the states of Western Europe. At the end of the Second World War, the West Europeans no longer asked themselves if they wished to be democratic states; instead, Haas believed that they would preoccupy themselves in searching for the optimal way in integrating, for example, coal and steel. The integration of coal and steel, Haas later asserted, would then "spillover" into other economic (and, in particular, political) functions of the state.

In the economic realm, Haas' "neo-functionalist" approach has been quite accurate.⁵ The states of Western Europe, for example, have been able to move

⁴ Harrison, *Europe in Question*, 14.

⁵ Jeppe Transholm-Mikelson, "Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in Light of the New Dynamism of the EC," *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 1991): 1-22.

from the creation of a Common Market in the 1950s to the creation of the single market in the 1990s, with the hopes of establishing a single currency at the end of the twentieth century.⁶ Haas came to realize, however, that there were (and are) political forces which can obstruct the whole integration process. The advent of Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s (and, later with the British Conservative Party in the 1980s and 1990s) was a fundamental manifestation of such an impediment to the advent of a fully established supranational network.⁷

While there is clear evidence of economic integration in Western Europe, certain states in the European Union (EU) remain dubious of the present initiative for political unity. The argument developed here is that there is a fundamental clash between economic maximization and the role of ideas because, as Anthony D. Smith writes,

[states] grope in some confusion towards a new type of social order, yet are afraid to let go of the old. They wonder whether the new structures and identities that may be forged will answer to their needs and interests as well as the habitual and familiar ones.⁸

The issue of state sovereignty makes, for example, the fifteen states of the European Union dubious about their role in foreign policy in the 1990s. While the

⁶ For more on this point, read Chapter IV of this dissertation.

⁷ The advent of Charles de Gaulle and his views on the building of a united Europe are also discussed in Chapter IV of this dissertation.

⁸ Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity," *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 1 (1992): 56.

Treaty on European Union of 1992 created a common foreign and security policy, building upon twenty years of European political cooperation, there continues to be uncertainty and a lack of political consensus among the EU states.⁹ Moreover, the issues of national identity and self-determination are affecting the internal governing framework of certain members of the EU.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines Mitrany's functionalist approach. This study compares and contrasts Mitrany's line of thinking to that of Fukuyama's and how Mitrany wished to take an *End of History*-like environment a step further in the establishment of international functional agencies. The second section looks at how Haas amended Mitrany's line of thinking and the assumptions he took for granted in assessing the creation of an integrated Western Europe. The last section seeks to understand why certain states (like the United Kingdom) in Western Europe are confronting a clash between economic maximization and the role of ideas in the EU. The ideas that are in flux (such as in the UK) include the challenges of nationalism and the preservation of state sovereignty.

FUNCTIONALISM

⁹ Trevor C. Salmon, "Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992," *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (1992): 233.

Mitrany's most important works on functionalism include *The Progress of International Government* (1933), *A Working Peace System* (1943), and *The Functional Theory of Politics* (1975).¹⁰ In *The Progress of International Government*, Mitrany discusses two branches of political thought. The first branch concerns itself with the progress of international relations and the second aspect concerns itself with the governing principles of the municipality. In relation to the first aspect of political theory, Mitrany observes that the state, which is the current manifestation of the political community, is a fundamental concept in international relations.¹¹ Modern international law, articulated in the treaties of the League of Nations and United Nations, holds sacrosanct the legality of the state.¹² At the end of the Second World War, for example, the European colonies of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East strived for statehood, and in the past fifty years there has been a

¹⁰ David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933); David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943); and David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London: Martin Robertson and Company, Ltd., 1975).

¹¹ David Mitrany summarizes the development of the state as a "fundamental concept" in *The Progress of International Government*, 15-57.

¹² David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World Organization," *International Affairs*, (1948): 351. For more on the issue of international law in relation to the sovereignty of the state, read Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of World Order* (London: MacMillan, 1977).

remarkable increase in the number of newly independent states.¹³

Municipal political thought, Mitrany asserts, raises another fundamental issue for the state: its relationship to its citizenry. It is here where one can find remarkable similarities between the writings of Fukuyama and Mitrany. The relationship between citizenry and state pertains to the rights and duties of citizens living within the body politic. Like Fukuyama, for example, Mitrany traces the origins of this relationship from the times of the ancient Greeks to the era of the Enlightenment.¹⁴ Unlike the first branch of political thought, Mitrany explains, there

has been [much] progress [concerning] the idea of individual equality in the municipal branch of political theory. In this field it did not break through until much later, in the seventeenth century, and did not flow strongly until the eighteenth. *But with the French Revolution and the subsequent rise of representative government it spread triumphantly over the whole of the civilized world.*¹⁵

Political ideas such as common citizenship, constitutional law, and national independence "dominated the age" of the French Revolution.¹⁶ The revolutionaries of the period also believed that it was their responsibility to propagate their concept of

¹³ James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1989), 56.

¹⁴ Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government*, 16-18. See also Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 55-70.

¹⁵ Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government*, 19. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁶ Felix Gilbert, *History: Politics or Culture? (Reflections on Ranke and Burkhardt)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 5.

statecraft around Europe and the world.¹⁷ While Edmund Burke warned his late eighteenth century readers of the many dangers the European continent would encounter as a consequence of the revolution in France,¹⁸ "the Revolution was also a turning point; it signified a development toward national states could no longer be halted."¹⁹ "Their purpose," Mitrany concludes, "was to limit or to break down despotic rule; and they found philosophical justification for their stand point in the idea of a natural law, from which they derived the principle of the original equality of all men as of all political communities."²⁰

Like Fukuyama, Mitrany asserts that "the essential aspects and issues of government, *in so far as they*

¹⁷ Carlton J.H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968), 38-39. See also Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism in the First World: The Present in Historical Perspective," in Milton J. Esman, ed., *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 20-21

¹⁸ For more on Edmund Burke's writings and his times, read Fred Halliday, "International Society as Homogeneity: Burke, Marx, Fukuyama," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1992): 447-451; Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, 88-95 and 43-84; and Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot*, Seventh Revised Edition (Washington, DC: Gateway Editions, 1986), 12-72.

¹⁹ Gilbert, *History: Politics or Culture?*, 5.

²⁰ Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government*, 18. For more on the history and the principles of natural law, read Russell Kirk, "Burke and Natural Rights," *The Review of Politics* Vol. 13, No. 4 (October 1951): 441-457; Claes G. Ryn, "Universality and Uniformity?," *Modern Age*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 1988): 45-51; and Leo Strauss, *Natural Rights and History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953).

concern the relations of citizens to their State, have been worked out already by the Greek philosophers and their followers with a depth of intuition which has almost given them *finality*."²¹ As John Eastby explains, Mitrany believes that the great questions of social and political equality have been fully dealt with and that "the meaning of life and death as a question has been in part answered because a man's life is a part of a continuous community life and in the other part answered because personal salvation... is an individual not a political affair."²² In line with Fukuyama's political thought, Eastby further observes that Mitrany asserts that the issues of international relations "are basically beyond the great philosophical questions, which have been answered, and have merely pragmatic life to get on with."²³

Mitrany laments, however, that the "crisis through which our institutions of government are passing

²¹ Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government*, 16. (Emphasis added.) As a note of comparison, see Francis Fukuyama, "Reflections on *The End of History*, Five Years Later," in Timothy Burns, ed., *After History? Francis Fukuyama and His Critics* (London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994), 239-259.

²² John Eastby, *Functionalism and Interdependence*, with a Preface by Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), 11. Fukuyama also writes that "Religion has been relegated to the sphere of the *private life* -- exiled, it would seem, more or less, permanently from European political life, except on certain narrow issues like abortion" (Fukuyama, *End of History and the Last Man*, 271 [emphasis added]).

²³ Eastby, *Functionalism and Interdependence*, 11. (Emphasis added.) As a means of comparison, see Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 4.

springs precisely from that divorce between the two fields of municipal and international political theory and practice."²⁴ As Richard A. Falk comments, the

... failures of the modern world are here overwhelmingly associated with artificial and constraining boundaries on *imagination* and *community*, which then becomes the springboards for conflict, inducing violence and massive suffering. The most menacing of these artificial boundaries are undoubtedly the borders of the sovereign state and the refusal of larger, more ambitious states to respect the autonomy of smaller, more vulnerable states. But additional false boundaries interact and intensify the forms of conflict associated with the state itself: those of race, religion, ideology, gender, language, age, civilization.²⁵

Eastby comments that Mitrany's functionalist approach asserts that "it is a mistake to equate the political community with the modern national state."²⁶ While the concepts equality and liberty should be upheld by government, the "form of the community to which rights and duties are related neither need be, nor historically has been, eternal."²⁷ It is here where Mitrany takes an *End of History*-like paradigm a step further. For Mitrany, the state is an inadequate structural form of political community to solve the practical problems of international politics because since, at least, the aftermath of the Second World War there has been "a social surge and a scientific eruption that is moving beyond man's foresight and

²⁴ Mitrany, *Progress in International Government*, 20.

²⁵ Falk, *Explorations at the Edge of Time*, 6.

²⁶ Eastby, *Functionalism and Interdependence*, 3.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

control."²⁸ The development of economic, ecological and social problems "on a regional or global scale," Charles Pentland writes, "present irresistible pressures toward international cooperation and ultimate political unity."²⁹

Mitrany would agree with Fukuyama that the advent of technological development is a global phenomenon for "no country and no region can insulate itself against their effect."³⁰ Unlike Fukuyama, however, Mitrany notes that this

universal social revolution ... is hardening every state into something more truly 'organic' than anything known before.³¹

Mitrany would also agree with Fukuyama that the rise of technological development increases the demands and expectations of the body politic to solve various economic and ecological problems in the world today.³² "We have reached a stage when the State," Mitrany warns, "is in danger of breaking down under the strain of the functions and in consequence of the powers

²⁸ David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective," *International Affairs* Vol. 47 No. 3 (July 1971): 532.

²⁹ Charles Pentland, *Integration Theory and European Integration* (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1973), 64.

³⁰ Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective," 532. See also Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, xiv-xv.

³¹ David Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 2 (December 1965): 123. (Emphasis added.)

³² As a note of comparison, read Fukuyama, "The End of History?" 18.

imposed upon it by the community which it serves."³³ Given the extent of modern problems (for example, AIDS, environment, third world hunger, terrorism, etc.), the economic and social costs may prove to be too heavy a debt for the state to honor.³⁴ Eastby writes

In short, whatever its value in meeting the needs of previous generations, the era when the nation state served as a useful agent to political community and to human happiness has passed.³⁵

In putting aside the already "answered" questions of municipal political theory, Mitrany concludes, international relations must take pragmatic steps and concentrate in creating a new form of political institutions so to help commence the practical process of alleviating the world wide social and technical problems.

There are five stages to Mitrany's functionalist approach to the development of international agencies.³⁶ In the first stage, the states of the international community come to "recognize" that certain functions are "more effectively performed through international cooperation."³⁷ State functions such as telecommunications or the monitoring of certain type of

³³ Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government*, 19.

³⁴ For example, read Leszek Kolakowski, "Uncertainties of a Democratic Age," *Journal of Democracy* 1 No. 1 (1990): 47-50 and John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Culture of Contentment* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, Ltd., 1992).

³⁵ Eastby, *Functionalism and Interdependence*, 3.

³⁶ See Mark F. Imber, "Re-reading Mitrany: A Pragmatic Assessment of Sovereignty," *Review of International Studies* Vol. 10, No. 2 (1984): 105-106.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 105.

diseases are good examples of "activities which by their intrinsic nature, technological or otherwise, are beyond the scope of national, territorial provision."³⁸

Mitrany emphasizes that the transfer of functions from the state to the international level is based upon

the *common index of need*. There are many such needs which cut across national boundaries, and an *effective* beginning could be made by providing joint government for them. On such lines, the emergence of so many new national states, which politically adds to our difficulties, might even be put into service of international unification. If they are to achieve a promising social foundation for their political independence, they need many things in the way of material and technical help and service which are beyond their means and experience...³⁹

An important characteristic of the functionalist approach is that it eschews prescription.⁴⁰ For Mitrany the centralized planning of problem-solving can be "restrictive" for not "only do the number of functions which need to be carried out change; their character is apt to change even more rapidly."⁴¹ As Mitrany notes

Any scheme for a new international order must be able not only to contain and guide all present currents, under their given conditions, but must be capable of adapting its working to whatever fresh issues may come up as scientific ingenuity is pitted against old political ways and inhibitions.⁴²

In an age of pragmatism, Mitrany notes, the functionalist approach can only develop on an *ad hoc*

³⁸ Ibid., 107.

³⁹ Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World Organization," 356.

⁴⁰ Paul Taylor, "Functionalism: The Approach of David Mitrany," in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, eds., *Framework of International Cooperation* (London: Pinter Publications, Ltd., 1990), 126.

⁴¹ Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World Organization," 356.

⁴² Mitrany, "the Functional Approach in Historical Perspective," 533.

basis for it "scorns rules and restrictions."⁴³ The functionalist approach, Paul Taylor writes,

[emphasizes] the importance of allowing interrelationships and interdependencies to *emerge* according to the requirement of the function. Indeed, the theory was based upon the assumption that to isolate, as with nationalism and its various constitutional appendages, was to reduce, to trap or to limit; while to allow interdependence according to function was to add, to complete, to generate.⁴⁴

As Mitrany summarizes:

*Functionalism in essence means just that: a direct attack on problems, mutual problems, as such; in the process building up, sector by sector, effective positive rules of international government...*⁴⁵

"In this community," Pentland writes, "there is the perfect elasticity of structures: they develop, as in Lamarck's Third Law, according to 'felt need' and die out with that need."⁴⁶

The second stage of the functionalist approach pertains to the allocation of responsibilities among the variety of international agencies. In *A Working Peace System*, for example, Mitrany outlines a basic scheme of how to structure a functionalist system of agencies. A railway system, for example, would be organized at a *continental* level. This approach would alleviate the burdens of bureaucracy and "gives the logical administrative limit of co-ordination."⁴⁷

⁴³ Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World Organization," 356.

⁴⁴ Taylor, "Functionalism: The Approach of David Mitrany," 126. (Emphasis added.)

⁴⁵ Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective," 543. (Emphasis added.)

⁴⁶ Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, 70. (Emphasis added.)

⁴⁷ Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, 33.

Shipping would best be served at an *international* level. "A European union could not solve the problem of co-ordination without the co-operation of America and of certain other overseas states."⁴⁸ Aviation, broadcasting, and postal service would best be implemented at a *universal* level because of world-wide use.

The second stage of the functionalist approach also deals with the issue of representation in controls. In the allocation of functions, states join organizations which best serve their particular practical needs. After all, Mitrany acknowledges that

not all interests are common to all, and that the common interests do not concern all countries to the same degree.⁴⁹

As Mitrany suggests, states would implement the organization's day to day activities. A state does not, however, have "the right" to lead in a functional agency; for "while it is understandable that all countries wish to have a voice in control, that would be really to hark back to the outlook of political sovereignty."⁵⁰ The state's ability to administer the functional agency would be determined by

certain ... solid [and practical] merits: (i) Any claim to a share in control would have to be *justified by a corresponding and evident capacity of performance*; (ii) by that test smaller states could also qualify and the *participants in control would vary, thus avoiding an exclusive accumulation of influence by a few countries*;

⁴⁸ Ibid., 33.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 38-39.

...[iii] and the performance would be practical and measurable, with a periodical balance-sheet.⁵¹

In the "process" of solving economic and social problems, Taylor writes, individual and groups experience the practical value of cooperation and are "increasingly involved in an international cooperative ethos, creating interdependencies, pushing for further integration, undermining the most important bases of the nation state."⁵² In such an environment, Mitrany asserts, the functional international agency develops a "detached" civil service which is not loyal to any particular state but is "largely technical and permanent and is likely to develop both a professional pride and a vested interest in good performance."⁵³ Such a scheme, Mitrany notes, would grant the functional international agency "all freedom for practical variation in the organization of the several functions, as well as in the working of a particular function as needs and conditions alter."⁵⁴

The third stage of the functionalist approach pertains to how the various international agencies enhance or widen their scope of authority. The functionalist approach, as Imber notes, "suggests that through the progressive implementation of that organization's original mandate, its powers will be enhanced vis-a-vis the residual rights of the member

⁵¹ Ibid., 39. (Emphasis added.)

⁵² Paul Taylor, "Introduction," in Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, x.

⁵³ Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, 39. (Emphasis added.)

⁵⁴ Ibid., 33. (Emphasis added.)

states."⁵⁵ "This enhancement," Imber writes, is "measurable with respect to the creation of treaty law and agreements conferring upon the organization the right to undertake activities previously reserved to the state..."⁵⁶ What is important to emphasize, however, is that with the development of a new cooperative and practical ethos (as Taylor described, above), the allocation of a particular task from the state to a specific functional agency would be implemented out of need for, as Mitrany asserts,

Sovereignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively through a formula, *only through a function*. By entrusting an authority through with a certain task, carrying with it command over the requisite powers and means, a slice of sovereignty is transferred from the old authority to the new; and the accumulation of such partial transfers in time brings about a translation of the true seat of authority.⁵⁷

For Mitrany the transfer of "sovereignty through a function" has no time frame. Instead, as Mitrany writes, the functionalist alternative is a "gradual transfer of sovereignty for the ruler to the people, the people in their turn gradually entrusting its exercise to a central authority."⁵⁸

Fourth, Mitrany asserts that a functional organization must have the legal right to impose sanctions on its member states. This is an important stage because Mitrany's functionalist approach asserts,

⁵⁵ Imber, "Re-reading Mitrany: A Pragmatic Assessment of Sovereignty," 105.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, 128. (Emphasis added.)

⁵⁸ Ibid.

as mentioned before, that if it is to be lasting, the progress of international political thought must catch up with the progress of municipal political thought. "To try to set up an authority while refusing it to enforce the law," Mitrany reasons, "is to create a law without authority."⁵⁹ As Mitrany explains, an international organization's primary duty, if it is to be effective at all, is to organize for the member state's security.⁶⁰ Without such an arrangement, Mitrany concludes, an international organization lacks the authority to impose sanctions and other measures.⁶¹ Within the Grotian context of international law, security does not only pertain to the protection of a state's territory but also to the protection of its interests.⁶² Domestic society, Stanley Hoffmann writes, "has laws that aim at deterring or punishing reprehensible behavior. International law tries to do the same insofar as national behavior is concerned."⁶³ Mitrany's task, therefore, is ambitious because he

⁵⁹ Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government*, 143. See also Bertrand Russell, *Has Man a Future* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1961), 84.

⁶⁰ Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, 128.

⁶¹ Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government*, 142-147.

⁶² For more on this point, read Richard A. Falk, *Normative Initiatives and Demilitarization: A Third Systems Approach*, Working Paper No. 13 of the World Order Models Project (New York: Institute for World Order, Inc., 1982).

⁶³ Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 17.

challenges the whole concept of security of the Westphalian system. Mitrany writes:

What we are trying to do now [therefore] is ... revolutionary. Three centuries ago it was decided that only a sovereign ruler could use force. We are now trying to gain acceptance for the view that only sovereign society may do so.⁶⁴

In creating a new sovereign society, Mitrany wished to set up agencies that not only provided services to its member states, but, more importantly, "to impose penalties upon states breaking their rules..."⁶⁵

Mitrany writes that economic technical agencies,

by their very nature, could be preventive in a way in which military agencies can never be. Just as it would be their function to give service wherever it was needed, so it would clearly be their duty to deny service where it was obviously not needed and might be abused; and they would have the means to do so without using force."⁶⁶

A functionalist economic agency, for example, would have the ability to deny to a member state the building of a railway system "which would have a strategic rather than economic purpose."⁶⁷

At the fifth stage of the functionalist approach, Mitrany asserts that the creation of an international community makes the need and use for sanctions less relevant because of the gradual (but eventual) erosion of state sovereignty. International sanctions, thus, would "become as much as an anachronism as they would be in the United States, where the individual States no

⁶⁴ Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government*, 149.

⁶⁵ Imber, "Re-reading Mitrany: A Pragmatic Assessment of Sovereignty," 106.

⁶⁶ Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, 183.

⁶⁷ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

longer think in terms of self-defence among themselves."⁶⁸ Functionalism weeds out social attributes which provoke human confrontation by changing the structure of the international system. Functionalism

would use, through a natural social selection, every prospect of linking together the life of peoples in particular serving unities, removing as many sections of international life as possible from the ambit of confrontation to the ambit of co-existence; whereas from long experience a general political appeal has tended to draw out competitive-aggressive traits -- and from the same people, in the same time and from the same devotion to a common weal.⁶⁹

The functionalist's goal is not only to eradicate the causes of war, which include scarcity of resources and depriving the citizenry of basic human needs.⁷⁰ "To think of international peace as only the prevention of violence is to ignore the factors of social unity and growth, of social life, and to concentrate on what is an occasional disturbance of it."⁷¹ Moreover, the importance of the functionalist alternative to the issue of world order is the "the process of dealing with such deficiencies within organizations which, it is believed, produced the new dynamic of peace."⁷² As was noted before, the functionalist alternative establishes gradually a new practical "ethos" in

⁶⁸ Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government*, 171.

⁶⁹ Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective," 540.

⁷⁰ Taylor, "Functionalism: The Approach of David Mitrany," 129.

⁷¹ Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, 181.

⁷² Taylor, "Functionalism: The Approach of David Mitrany," 129. (Emphasis added.)

cooperation between states working in international agencies. In such a setting, Taylor writes

They become more involved in questions which relate to the broadest sense to welfare: the question of whether or not to hand over the responsibility for defence or foreign policy, for instance, to a common institution is bypassed because *it has become irrelevant. The substantive issues of politics, even high politics, have changed.*⁷³

Mitrany's application of functionalism could be seen as an attempt to separate the concept of the *nation* from the *state*. The "state," as mentioned above, is the legal manifestation of the political community; the "nation" represents the cultural and social characteristics of a group of people.⁷⁴ It is not the purpose of functionalism to disturb the cultural, national, or religious identity of the state. The functionalist approach does not seem to suggest that the cultural or religious identity of a nation need to clash with the solving of common economic and social problems of the modern age.⁷⁵ What is important for the functionalist is that the various international agencies set up a *pragmatic source of implementation in problem solving*. But "[u]ntil states are willing or coerced to surrender their sovereignty to international organizations," Michael Haas warns, the "effects of

⁷³ Ibid., 132. (Emphasis added.)

⁷⁴ The concept of the nation and its relevance to the issue of sovereignty will be dealt with later in this chapter.

⁷⁵ For example, read David Mitrany, "Should Christianity Count in International Relations," *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XLVI, No. 2 (1948): 160-163. For an interesting comparison, read Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-50.

international institutions will not transform the world polity."⁷⁶

NEO-FUNCTIONALISM: HAAS' RESPONSE TO THE FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH

The functionalist "strategy" inspired Haas to look at the establishment of European unity at the end of the Second World War.⁷⁷ In examining the course of European unity, Haas also shared Fukuyama's belief that post-War Europe existed in an "end of ideology."⁷⁸ His efforts resulted in the publication of his *The Uniting of Europe* (1958), which is essentially an extensive analysis of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).⁷⁹ After the Second World War the key goal for Europeans was to build a Europe which eschewed the political ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.⁸⁰ The ECSC, established between 1951-1952,

⁷⁶ Michael Haas, "A Functional Approach to International Organization," *Journal of Politics*, Vol 27, No. 3 (August 1965): 500-501.

⁷⁷ R.J. Harrison, "Neo-functionalism," in Groom and Taylor, *Framework for International Cooperation*, 139.

⁷⁸ Ernst B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, ed., *International Regionalism* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1968), 150. At the time Haas was writing *The Uniting of Europe*, Daniel Bell wrote *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960). It should be noted that most of the material in Bell's book pertained to the political culture in the United States.

⁷⁹ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968). In this new edition's Preface, Haas explores some of the difficulties that neo-functionalism has encountered in the 1960s (*ibid.*, xi-xxx). Some of these difficulties will be explored later in this chapter.

⁸⁰ Volkmar Lauber, "From Growth Consensus to Fragmentation in Western Europe: Political Polarization over Redistribution and Ecology," *Comparative Politics*,

was in part an attempt to neutralize the economic and political threat of West Germany.⁸¹ By uniting the European states of France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy in this economic joint venture, the ECSC hoped to serve as an instrument in soothing ancient phobias and building a structure of trust and cooperation.⁸²

The "neo-functionalist" approach strengthens (or elaborates upon) the basic tenets of Mitrany's work. While the functionalist approach does not, according to Lindberg and Scheingold, make a direct attack on the state,⁸³ the first major issue that the neo-functionalist approach confronts is Mitrany's understanding of the concept of political community. In the spirit of perceiving economic and social issues in a "mechanical" fashion, Mitrany defines the concept of the political community as being "the sum of the functions carried out by its members."⁸⁴ Haas finds this

Vol. 15 (1983): 332. See also Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 270.

⁸¹ William Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, *Understanding the European Communities* (New York: Philip Allan, 1990), 8.

⁸² The European statesmen Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman were responsible for helping bring about the ECSC. Their line of reasoning will be looked at in Chapter IV of this dissertation.

⁸³ Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), 7.

⁸⁴ Quoted in Harrison, *Europe in Question*, 37. The actual quote can be found in Mitrany's *International Congress on Mental Health, Proceedings on the International Conference on Mental Hygiene* (London: Lewis and Co., 1948), IV, 84.

definition nebulous because it "leaves in doubt whether 'members are individuals, voluntary groups, or functional agencies, and begs the question of the nature of the functions involved, for Mitrany surely cannot mean all functions, including waging war, that at present are within the scope of political communities."⁸⁵

In his writings, Haas dissects the traditional understanding of the political community which, as earlier identified, is the state. For Haas, there are certain *environmental* conditions which foster (or encourage) the progress of integration between political communities. Haas seems to emphasize the need for the members of a political community to demonstrate loyalty "to a set of symbols and institutions when it habitually and predictably over long periods obeys the injunctions of their authority and turns to them for the satisfaction of important expectations."⁸⁶ Haas identifies the political community as a "process" in which its members (such as specific groups and individuals) demonstrate more allegiance

to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space.⁸⁷

In the political community, Haas also identifies the need for pluralism. The political communities that make up Western Europe, for example, are pluralistic

⁸⁵ Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 22.

⁸⁶ Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, 5.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

because "[a]rticulate voluntary groups, led by bureaucratized but accessible elites, compete with each other more or less rationally for political power and social status."⁸⁸ While these various groups compete for power,⁸⁹ the political communities that make up Western Europe are described by Haas as enjoying an "index of ideological homogeneity" because

the parties are, very roughly, the same among all the countries in the cluster, [and] the principles professed and the concrete socio-economic interests represented by the parties are roughly analogous on both sides of a frontier.⁹⁰

Finally, the political communities of Western Europe are advanced economies which "correlated" with industrialization, Haas finds, a "usual high degree of urbanization and evergrowing demands for government services and durable consumer goods."⁹¹ In this economic and political climate, the individual members of the West European political communities, through a democratic process, are "mobilized and participat[e] in this process through affiliation with mass organizations."⁹²

For Haas, Mitrany's functionalist approach emphasizes the technical side of international politics by "identifying those aspects of human needs and

⁸⁸ Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," *International Organization* XV (1961): 374.

⁸⁹ Ernst B. Haas, "The United States of Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 63 (1948): 530-532.

⁹⁰ Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," 374.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

desires that exist and clamor for attention outside the realm of the political."⁹³ In the functionalist approach, Mitrany believes that

[i]nternational conflict is best tamed by entrusting the work of increasing human welfare to experts, technical specialists, and their professional associations. *Being interested in tasks rather than power, they can be expected to achieve agreement where statesmen will fail...*⁹⁴

"Step-by-step schemes of material cooperation, evolving in an unplanned fashion," Haas also observes of the functionalist approach, "will eventually work themselves out in the direction of a world-wide system of cooperation."⁹⁵ Haas, however, asks this fundamental question:

...Do people "learn" to think in non-national terms because of a pattern of technical cooperation? This is indeed the central issue in the functionalist theory of change. At first, it seems to be only the experts and managers who learn. They become habituated to consulting with their opposite numbers from other nations about technical problems, and eventually they come to see all problems from the perspective of mankind as a whole.⁹⁶

The neo-functionalist takes the functionalist approach a step further. In ascertaining the process of integration, Haas asserts that in bringing about its implementation,

... others beside experts, managers, and civil servants will participate and undergo the same process, particularly by way of greatly increased work and responsibility on the part of international voluntary groups. Learning becomes a species of group therapy.⁹⁷

⁹³ Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, 6.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 11. (Emphasis added.)

⁹⁵ Ibid., 20.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 13.

⁹⁷ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

It is through the influence of interest groups and political parties that states "look at ways in encouraging the further progression of integration."⁹⁸ "[T]he successful realization of such a program," Haas reasons, "depends on continuing [support of] supranational activity; it cannot be terminated with the publication of a single decree or ruling."⁹⁹

For Haas, the "essence" of the integration process "lies in the tendency for economic and social decisions to 'spillover' into the realm of the political[...]"¹⁰⁰ The two important levels to the spillover process are functional spillover and political spillover.¹⁰¹ Functional spillover refers to the idea "that some sectors within the industrial economies are so interdependent that it is impossible to treat them in isolation."¹⁰² Harrison also notes that "the sector [or function] chosen [to begin the integration process] must be important and controversial, but not so controversial that the vital interests of the states are immediately affected, nor so that their power and vested interests are seriously

⁹⁸ Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, 287.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Haas, *Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe*, 152.

¹⁰¹ Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-Functionalism and the EC," 4-6. Tranholm-Mikkelsen's typology of spillover is based upon Stephen George, *Politics and Policy in the European Community* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), in note 7, 21-28. George categorizes cultivated spillover as "the role of the commission."

¹⁰² Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-functionalism and the EC," 4.

threatened."¹⁰³ For Harrison, political parties and interest groups perceive integration as a viable option because in Europe, for example, its governments face "problems which stem from increasing interdependence, and from the new burdens not fully matched by new capacity."¹⁰⁴ In integrating the economic market, for example, Lindberg and Scheingold write that it "makes systematic coordination of economic policy for the entire area possible, thus enhancing stability and adding continuity of economic growth."¹⁰⁵

Neo-functionalist scholars define political spillover as an education process in which interest groups and political parties develop "the perception that their *interests* are better served by seeking *supranational rather than national solutions*."¹⁰⁶ In other words, Haas perceives integration to be a process where states "shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."¹⁰⁷ "Such reorientation will lead to calls for further integration, hence providing the process with political impetus."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ Harrison, *Europe in Question*, 76.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 12.

¹⁰⁵ Lindberg and Scheingold, *Europe's Would Be Polity*, 9.

¹⁰⁶ Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-functionalism and the EC," 5. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁰⁷ Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," 366-367.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

In shifting economic and social issues to the political realm, integration "is taken to mean the deliberate creation of institutionalized cooperation among states."¹⁰⁹ After all, Haas does not advocate the neo-functionalist approach to be a teleological one.¹¹⁰ For Haas, neo-functionalism does not emerge because it is the next "scientific" step in the progress of international political theory. In his writings, Haas asserts that "the possible integrative consequences of interdependence are based on political acts that are not predicted by the theory."¹¹¹ Neo-functionalism is a process insofar as interest groups and political parties of member states make a *conscious* effort in influencing the integration process. Haas writes:

In terms of a social process based on rational human perceptions and motives, no mere concept "calls for" or "needs" anything: a discrete set of group motives, converging with motives of cognate groups from across the border, results in a certain pattern of policy; the aims and the policy reflect demands born from the environment, and the later policies may well change the environment in a wholly unintended fashion. Only in this sense, then, does industrial urbanism favor integration. Because the modern "industrial-political" actor fears that his way of life cannot be safeguarded without structural adaptation, he turns to integration; but by the same token, political actors who are neither industrial, nor urban, nor modern in their outlook usually do not favor this kind of adaptation, for they seek refuge in national exclusiveness.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Brigid Laffan, "European Integration," in Michael Foley, ed., *Ideas that Shape Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 111. (Emphasis added.)

¹¹⁰ Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," 375.

¹¹¹ Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-functionalism and the EC," 9.

¹¹² Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," 375.

Neo-functionalism replaces ideological dogma with the organization of central institutions on a *regional* (rather than *international*) scale which would develop and implement social programs. Neo-functionalism is built upon particular circumstances and attempts to create, in the long run, a new structural framework in which citizen allegiance to a regional government would replace allegiance to state government. For Haas, the establishment of supranational institutions:

*symbolizes the victory of economics over politics, over that familiar ethnocentric nationalism which used to subordinate butter to guns, reason to passion, statistical bargaining to excited demands.*¹¹³

The neo-functionalist is aware that a regional collection of states is a complex edifice of heterogeneous interests and values.¹¹⁴ Political spillover can only be achieved when the role of the regional government is preferred to the role of the national government in solving a particular problem. The case of "unanimous national opposition to supranational action could be considered incompatible with community sentiment."¹¹⁵ The important challenge to the neo-functionalist approach is to establish, in the short run, a procedure which reconciles a plethora of competing interests and values. Member states, through a supranational entity, "channel their objections

¹¹³ Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe," 159. (Emphasis added.)

¹¹⁴ Haas, "The United States of Europe," 230.

¹¹⁵ Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, 9.

through the legal avenues provided instead of threatening or practising secession."¹¹⁶

THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONALISM AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN WESTERN EUROPE

Haas and Mitrany explore in their writings the theme of the end of ideological conflict in international relations. At the time of their writings, Haas and Mitrany perceived that the international community was arriving at a consensus regarding the optimal relationship between state and citizen. Because of that ideological consensus, both Mitrany and Haas concluded that the international system could now preoccupy themselves with economic and social issues. For Haas and Mitrany, this preoccupation with economic activity would shift certain functions from the state to either the global or regional level. Reflecting the spirit of both schools of thought, Nicholas G. Onuf writes

Only if political theory reaches beyond, the casual sequence of authority, law, and order, which is at its heart and searches for the origins and limits of each do we have a chance of explaining international order.¹¹⁷

Both Haas and Mitrany also observe the need for international relations to evolve beyond the state as the principal foci of political power and the international political system.¹¹⁸ For example, John

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 10.

¹¹⁷ Onuf, "International legal Order as an Idea," 245.

¹¹⁸ For example, read Edmund Fawcett, "Francis Fukuyama: The End of History and the Last Man," *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 21,

Stoessinger argues that the advent of the global economic market is making the concept of sovereignty (the legal basis for the state) less salient in international politics.¹¹⁹ This is because the state itself is losing much of its autonomy over certain functions which were considered before to be domestic.¹²⁰ In an interdependent environment, the state finds itself tangled in a "seamless web" of "diverse relationships."¹²¹

According to Fukuyama, the concept of national identity in Western Europe also appears to be losing its salience. For Fukuyama, the aspiration of an ever closer European Union would result in transforming national identity into a depoliticized entity, and simply become a parochial concern in West European political culture.¹²² Fukuyama writes that the empirical evidence suggests that national identity in Western Europe has been "Turkified;" that is, "no modern European nationalism any longer defines itself in terms of rule over other nations."¹²³ As Fukuyama and Haas

No. 1 (1992): 206 and Fred Halliday, "An Encounter with Fukuyama," *New Left Review*, no. 193 (May/June 1992): 86-96.

¹¹⁹ John Stoessinger, "The Anatomy of the Nation-state and the Nature of Power," in Richard Little and Michael Smith, eds., *Perspectives on World Politics*, Second Edition (London: Routledge, 1992), 25-26.

¹²⁰ David Held, "New Times: Farewell Nation-State," *Marxism Today*, December 1988, 12-17.

¹²¹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 4.

¹²² Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 271.

¹²³ Francis Fukuyama, "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1991): 663.

seem to suggest the modernization of communication and technology is creating the world (and for Western Europe, in particular) into a more integrated environment to live.¹²⁴

As described above, the political communities of Western Europe possess the essential prerequisites in implementing political integration. However, Haas, in his later writings, became dubious as to whether or not neo-functionalism was (and is) a viable explanation of West European politics. In the late 1960s, for example, Western Europe experienced difficulties in its establishing and implementing institutions to promote European unity at the political level.¹²⁵ "Disintegration and national *immobilismo*," a frustrated Haas writes, "appear to dominate, rather than the advance of regional government."¹²⁶ Haas writes,

Converging economic goals embedded in the bureaucratic, pluralistic, and industrial life of modern Europe provided the crucial impetus. The economic technician, the innovating industrialist, and trade unionist advanced the movement -- not the politician, the scholar, the poet, or the writer.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ For a review, read John L. Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkroph, eds., *The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 17-18.

¹²⁵ Donald J. Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. X (March 1972): 270.

¹²⁶ Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe," 150.

¹²⁷ Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, xix. (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, integration, writes Haas, was a "conservative impulse."¹²⁸ West Europeans, after the Second World War, had no desire to create a "new society"; rather, "each sought only to safeguard an existing way of life given a new birth through victory in World War II."¹²⁹

In this final section, this chapter takes a theoretical examination of the concepts of national identity and state sovereignty. Nationalism is discussed here because, as this dissertation will examine later, it reflects one of the two fundamental ideas in contemporary British politics. This chapter sets the stage in its attempt to understand why a certain segment of the Scottish population hold aspirations for Scotland to assert its independence from the rest of the UK. The concept of state sovereignty represents the second fundamental idea in contemporary British politics because there are those, for example, in the British Conservative Party who perceive the European Union as a fundamental threat to the UK's historic institutions and traditions. Before embarking in examining the British case-study of this dissertation, however, it is necessary to define how

¹²⁸ Ibid., xviii

¹²⁹ Ibid. See also James E. Cronin, "The End of an Era in British Politics," *Current History*, November 1991, 363-367; John Fenske, "France's Uncertain Progress Towards European Union," *Current History*, November 1991, 358-362; John Lukacs, "The Stirrings of Europe," *Harper's*, August 1990, 41-48; and Marlise Simons, "Hella Haasse: The Return of History," *International Herald Tribune*, 23 March 1993, 20.

this study perceives and understands national identity and state sovereignty.

A. DEFINING ETHNICITY, NATION, AND STATE.

The concept of nationalism is a far more potent force in contemporary West European politics than the mere sense of *patriotism*. George Orwell defines the latter as "devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force upon other people."¹³⁰ Patriotism, Orwell writes, is not defensive (culturally or otherwise) in nature.¹³¹ Nationalism articulates the norms of the *nation* or *national consciousness*. The latter is a form of cultural and political identity which, as will be demonstrated in the Scottish case, allows nationals "to compare their own achievements and capacities with those of others."¹³²

The concept of nationalism is the political expression of the nation.¹³³ There is, however, much disagreement over what the latter means. Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, for example, understands the nation to be a

¹³⁰ George Orwell, *Collected Essays* (London: Martin Secker and Warburg, Ltd., 1961), 282.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² John Plamenatz, "Two Types of Nationalism," in Marc Williams, ed., *International Relations in the Twentieth Century: A Reader* (London: MacMillan Education, Ltd., 1989), 45. See also Chapter V of this dissertation.

¹³³ Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, "Nationalism," in Feliks Gross, ed., *European Ideologies: A Survey of Twentieth Century Political Ideas*, with an Introduction by Robert M. MacIver (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), 542.

specific group of people who live within defined territorial borders and believe their cultural society to be distinct.¹³⁴ Anthony D. Smith writes that while ethnicity determines the origins of a nation,¹³⁵ the nation, as he describes it, is a *modern* concept with

a named human population sharing an *historic territory*, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and *common legal rights and duties for all members*.¹³⁶

F. H. Hinsley refers to the nation as a "state of mind in which the supreme loyalty is felt to be owed to the nation or the nation-state."¹³⁷

The nation, according to Connor, pertains to "a group of people who *believe* they are ancestrally related. It is the largest grouping that shares that belief."¹³⁸ The nation, in other words, is a *social* concept which pertains to ethnic loyalty.¹³⁹ *Ethnies*, or ethnicity, are

constituted , not by lines of physical descent [that is, race], but by the sense of continuity, shared memory and collective destiny, [that is] *by lines of cultural affinity embodied in distinctive myths*,

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1991), 41-42.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 14. (Emphasis added.)

¹³⁷ F. H. Hinsley, "The Impact of Nationalism," in Brian Porter, ed., *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics (1919-1969)*, with a Foreword by H.R.H. Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 186.

¹³⁸ Walker Connor, "From Tribe to Nation," *History of European Ideas*, Vol. 13, No.1/2 (1991): 6.

¹³⁹ Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," *World Politics*, Vol. 24 (April 1972): 334. (Emphasis added.)

memories, symbols and values retained by a given cultural unit of the population.¹⁴⁰

While the issue of language is important for those who advocate independence, for example, in Quebec¹⁴¹, Smith's definition of ethnicity eschews this particular issue. At a general level, Smith does not perceive the subject of language as an important element in the formation of an ethnic group because what is important is that the ethnic group in question *is able to trace a common history and culture*. Ethnic historicism, as Smith defines it, is to establish a "particular ethnic atmosphere, unique to that community, and the provision of moral qualities (and heroic embodiments) particular to the group."¹⁴² In Scotland, as mentioned before in the Introduction to this study, *there is precisely this sense of common history and culture which includes their own sense of what it means to be sovereign* (Declaration of Arbroath, 1320) *and of their own*

¹⁴⁰ Smith, *National Identity*, 29. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁴¹ This issue is discussed in Steven K. Holloway, "Canada without Quebec," *Orbis*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Fall 1992): 531-545 and David Milne, "Whither Canadian Federalism? Alternative Constitutional Futures," in Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon, eds., *Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 206-211.

¹⁴² Anthony D. Smith, "Introduction," in Anthony D. Smith, ed., *Nationalist Movements* (London: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1976), 17.

education and legal system.¹⁴³ James Halliday, of the Scottish National Party¹⁴⁴ believes that without

...that history, and without that heritage it would be exceedingly difficult to make a case for Scottish identity and then for Scottish independence. If Scotland had never been, it would be almost impossible to create it, starting now, from scratch. The wrongs which we endure; the indignities and humiliations to which we are exposed, are wrongs and indignities precisely because they are inflicted upon a national community. Because we have a past our grievance has to it an extra dimension. We can look at our plight and ask, 'Need these things be?'... Our past gives us an extra political option and an alternative solution to our problems, which would not be available to us if Scotland had to be created by some act of will here and now. Our former existence gives to our present claims a special justice and an extra urgency.¹⁴⁵

For Smith, then, the decisive characteristic for an ethnic group is its ability to trace a distinct historical and cultural past. Such an awareness, as Smith writes, is the essence of ethnicity "for they can indicate much about the likelihood of ethnic consciousness *developing* into ethnic nationalism and, hence, into a secessionist movement."¹⁴⁶

A main concern with contemporary scholarship of the study of nationalism is that it defines nation as

¹⁴³ Interview with Dr. Robert D. McIntyre at his residence in Stirling, Scotland, 24 March 1995. See also his maiden speech in Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 5, Fifth Series, Session 1944-1945, 1 May 1945, cols. 1299-1303.

¹⁴⁴ For a biographical sketch of Halliday, see Chapter V of this dissertation.

¹⁴⁵ James Halliday, "Scotland the Separate," *Heritage of Scotland: The Historical Basis and Characteristics of Nationalist Aspirations in Scotland*, 1. (Emphasis added.) See also Alasdair Gray, *Why Scots Should Rule Scotland* (Edinburgh: Canongate press, 1992).

¹⁴⁶ Smith, "Introduction," 49. (Emphasis added.)

loyalty to the state.¹⁴⁷ The state, for Frankel, is a legal concept.¹⁴⁸ While the state is made up of a group of people who may or may not be homogeneous,¹⁴⁹ it is concerned with legal (and political) issues such as the formation of government and the protection of sovereignty.¹⁵⁰ The state also has the specific duty to maintain domestic order.¹⁵¹ Joseph Frankel writes:

[States] have the monopoly of political organization at its highest level and the monopoly of territory[.] States have also the near-monopoly of force -- they determine the degree of freedom or constraint applicable to the inhabitants of their territories and they determine the ultimate issues of international peace and war.¹⁵²

B. PROBLEM OF NATIONAL IDENTITY WITHIN THE NATION STATE

Another concern of contemporary scholarship is that scholars underestimate the impact of the concept of national identity in West European politics. This is because the occidental understanding of nationalism is based upon the principle of *nation-building* which is the political assimilation of ethnic (or national) groups into a single nation.¹⁵³

The assimilation of ethnic groups into a single nation requires the latter acquiring a certain degree

¹⁴⁷ Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," 335.

¹⁴⁸ Joseph Frankel, *International Politics: Conflict and Harmony* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1973 [1969]), 38.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 37.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 37-38. See also Hinsley, "The Impact of Nationalism," 188-189.

¹⁵¹ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1983), 4.

¹⁵² Frankel, *International Politics*, 35.

¹⁵³ Connor, "Ethnonationalism in the First World: The Present in Historical Perspective," 20.

of political participation. Such participation finds meaning in the rule of the state. Tracing this political concept back to the time of the French Revolution, the concept of state rule is not determined by divine authority; instead all citizens

were endowed with individual liberties and with national obligations. Government was by all and for all; it was to be democratic as well as national. For political democracy and humanitarian nationalism were born together in France; they were twins; they were different but simultaneous of the same humanitarian parentage.¹⁵⁴

As will be shown in the analysis of the British Conservative Party's attitude to the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,¹⁵⁵ the assimilation of English, Scots and Welsh under a single parliamentary framework has brought about "diversity within unity."¹⁵⁶ Smith's definition of the modern nation blends the nation with the state^{as} can be seen in Great Britain in which it

is depicted as one great family, the members as brothers and sisters of the motherland or fatherland, speaking their mother tongue. In this way the family but evokes similarly strong loyalties and vivid attachments. Even where local allegiances are tolerated and real families given their due the language and symbolism of the nation asserts its priority and, through the state and citizenship, exerts its legal and bureaucratic pressures on the family, using similar kinship to justify itself.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, 35-36.

¹⁵⁵ See Chapter VI of this dissertation.

¹⁵⁶ Ian Lang, *The Fulfilled Society* (Edinburgh: Scottish Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1993), 14. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁵⁷ Smith, *National Identity*, 79. (Emphasis added.)

As mentioned before, Fukuyama writes that the Industrial Revolution also encouraged (but is not the sole criterion of) the process of nation-building.¹⁵⁸ The nation state "could not become really unified political entities until there was sufficient improvement of the mechanical arts to admit of swift intercommunication of persons and ideas within a wide area."¹⁵⁹ The increase in technology "establishes a uniform horizon of economic production possibilities."¹⁶⁰ Groups of people are inevitably brought together to create a larger community of common interests and values. This process replaces "traditional" group formations (e.g. tribe, sect, etc.) "with economically rational ones based on function and efficiency, and provide[s] for the universal education of their citizens."¹⁶¹ As a result, the nation state becomes an "elaborate" system of division of labor.¹⁶²

At the end of the twentieth century technology has shifted from the era of the industrial to the era of the microchip. Zbigniew Brzezinski defines post industrial society as the "technetronic" era, in which the latter is "shaped culturally, psychologically, socially, and economically by the impact of technology and electronics -- particularly in the area of

¹⁵⁸ See Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 134 and Chapter II of this dissertation.

¹⁵⁹ Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, 233.

¹⁶⁰ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, xiv.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., xv.

¹⁶² Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 4.

computers and communications."¹⁶³ Reflecting the attitude of Haas and Mitrany, Brzezinski asserts that the impact of the technetronic era on the nation state is that it is "altering the mores, the social structure, the values, and the global outlook of society."¹⁶⁴

In the technetronic era the sovereignty of the nation state is, for Brzezinski, "no longer the vital subject... of dynamic processes."¹⁶⁵ He observes that the technetronic age requires the nation state to be involved in regional and global cooperation in order to fulfill its interests.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, as Arend Lijphart critiques, the technetronic age encourages the end of ideology which

*implies not only the end of ideological politics but of all other types of politics, including ethnic politics, that are not purely pragmatic. In an age and in a world in which ideology is coming to an end, the resurgence of ethnic conflict seems unthinkable.*¹⁶⁷

West European bankers, industrial associations, trade unions, and other technocrats help shape the new Europe

¹⁶³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1970), 9. Brzezinski also spells out his understanding of the technetronic era in "America in the Technetronic Age: New Questions of Our Time," *Encounter*, January 1968), 16-26.

¹⁶⁴ Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages*, xiv-xv.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ Arend Lijphart, "Political Theories and the Explanation of Ethnic Conflict in the Western World: Falsified Predictions and Plausible Postdictions," in Esman, *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*, 51. (Emphasis added.) See also Bell, *The End of Ideology*, 393-407.

by encouraging joint ventures in areas such as telecommunications.¹⁶⁸ Leonard R. Sussman writes:

Everyone will have immediate access, at home or at the workplace, or through a nearby communal telephone, to a vast volume of diverse information -- a volume such as even the world's finest libraries or news services cannot provide today. The cultures of even the smallest, least familiar peoples will be preserved, and made accessible to everyone, everywhere. New communications technologies will induce the human mind to think more clearly, to test new possibilities, to gain confidence and even exhilaration from the process of idea-discovery.¹⁶⁹

Modernization, however, is not a universal panacea because it cannot by itself guarantee a more pacific political environment.¹⁷⁰ According to Lijphart, modernization works well in the early stages of social development, but not in the later stages.¹⁷¹ In the early stages, groups of people are forced to redirect "loyalties from the traditional influences of the family and the immediate community to larger groups and more cosmopolitan symbols."¹⁷²

Modernization can bring about within the ethnic groups what Milton Gordon refers to as "liberal

¹⁶⁸ See, for example, Wayne Sandholtz, "Institutions and Collective Action: The New Telecommunications in Western Europe," *World Politics* Vol. 45 (January 1993): 242-270.

¹⁶⁹ Leonard R. Sussman, "The Information Revolution: Human Ideas and Electronic Impulses," *Encounter*, November 1989, 60.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹⁷¹ Lijphart, "Political Theories and the Explanation of Ethnic Conflict in the Western World," 48.

¹⁷² Cyril E. Black, "Challenges to an Evolving Legal Order," in Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black, eds., *The Future of the International Legal Order: Trends and Patterns*, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 5.

expectancy;"¹⁷³ that is, ethnic groups, unlike Smith's definition of national identity asserting their historic and cultural identity, develop certain expectations from the state. Ethnic groups' main concern is not cultural identity, but the attainment of economic, political, and social status in the state. This point reflects the attitude of economic nationalists in the Scottish National Party like Jim Sillars and Alan Macartney.¹⁷⁴ Their belief, as will be discussed later in this dissertation, is that Scotland's membership of Great Britain is an anachronistic phenomenon because of the growing influence and economic power of the European Union.¹⁷⁵ For Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, then, ethnic groups become (as a result of liberal expectancy) cognizant of their (perhaps supposed) social inequalities.¹⁷⁶ Modernization "intensifies the gulf in

¹⁷³ Milton M. Gordon, "Toward a Theory of Racial and Ethnic Group Relations," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., with the assistance of Corinne Saposs Schelling, *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 84-111.

¹⁷⁴ For a brief biographical sketch of Sillars and Macartney, see Chapter V of this dissertation.

¹⁷⁵ For example, read Allan Macartney, *The New Politics for Independence*, SNP Conference Issue (1995): 5-6 and Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 836, Fifth Series, Session 1971-1972, 3 May 1972, cols. 531-540.

¹⁷⁶ Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, "Introduction," in Glazer and Moynihan, *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, 6-7. See also Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," 54.

the material condition of mankind even as it contracts mankind's subjective tolerance of that disparity."¹⁷⁷

A central question addressed in this study is whether or not Britain (or the rest of Western Europe for that matter) has reached the end of ideology. This study agrees with Lijphart that the latter term implies "a misleading hyperbole and only means the decline of ideology."¹⁷⁸ The term itself "does not mean the gradual disappearance of ideology, but the convergence of existing ideologies and to the growth of an ideological consensus -- that is, the appearance of a new, generally accepted ideology."¹⁷⁹ Moreover, Lijphart writes

... the ideologies that the theory, at least in its original and most authoritative formulations, was concerned with were the radical *weltanschauungen* of the left and the right -- Marxism and doctrinaire *laissez faire* -- instead of the whole range of value and belief systems that can be subsumed under the more or less loosely defined concept of ideology.¹⁸⁰

The technetronic age has, for Connor, made groups of people all the more aware of their uniqueness.¹⁸¹ "As formal education and globe-girdling communications have spread," Connor notes, "the likelihood of people becoming cognizant of historic and contemporary self-determination movements has also spread."¹⁸²

¹⁷⁷ Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages*, 52.

¹⁷⁸ Lijphart, "Political Theories and the Explanation of the Ethnic Conflict in the Western World," 51. (Emphasis in the original.)

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁸¹ Connor, "Ethnonationalism in the First World: The Present in Historical Experience," 29.

¹⁸² Ibid., 32.

C. THE PROBLEM OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN WESTERN EUROPE

F.H. Hinsley discusses the concept of sovereignty in relation to the principle of power.¹⁸³ As another fundamental idea in the history of political thought, Hinsley explains how sovereignty has evolved in the history of European politics. While at one time, for example, sovereignty in Britain rested in divine authority, it now rests in a parliamentary framework in which it "has the unlimited authority recognized by the courts, to make any law or amend any law already made. In consequence, no other body has the right to overrule or set aside its legislation."¹⁸⁴ From a democratic perspective, sovereignty, Ghia Nodia argues, rests with those who make up the state.¹⁸⁵ In this respect, the principle of sovereignty rests upon legitimacy from the state, in which "the government actually represents the political life of its people."¹⁸⁶ The state, as a political institution, is distinct in respect as to how one organizes power between government and the body politic.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸³ F. H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1.

¹⁸⁴ From Vernon Bogdenor, *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions*. Quoted in Geoffrey Howe, "Sovereignty and Interdependence: Britain's Place in the World," *International Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 4 (1990): 677

¹⁸⁵ Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October 1992): 8.

¹⁸⁶ Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1980): 214.

¹⁸⁷ Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, 3.

In respect to this dissertation's British case study, the concept of sovereignty is based upon what Alan James defines as its basic component: *state practice*.¹⁸⁸ In this respect, sovereignty, as James understands it, has the three following components: legal, absolute, and unitary. Sovereignty is legal because the state's constitution grants the latter's central government ~~predominant~~ law-making power.¹⁸⁹ The state is absolute because no other component of the state can legislate or enact laws above the central government. As will be shown in the UK model, the state is the legal expression of the body politic; "it represents a certain territorial area of the globe and the people who live within it."¹⁹⁰ Moreover, sovereignty is, such as in the UK, unitary because the constitution grants the central government of the state the capacity to engage in international activity. James writes that sovereignty is unitary because:

The exercise of particular powers in the name of a sovereign state is not to be confused with the existence of the state as the kind of territorial entity which is called sovereign. In the one case there are many powers and many exercising them. *In the other there is a single state in a condition which is unitary in the sense that it cannot be divided into entirely separate compartments. The state's sovereign powers are a reflection of its sovereignty or constitutional standing.*¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society*, Key Concepts in International Relations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 22-31.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 49.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 40-1.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 51. (Emphasis added.)

Sovereignty, as J.D.B. Miller notes, grants the state a distinguished identity; that is, "this identity enables a state to play a role going well beyond that which might have appeared to play before it became sovereign."¹⁹² Unlike James, Miller identifies the source of sovereignty in *international law*. International law, argues Miller, is a form of authority which acknowledges the state to be sovereign. Without the acknowledgment of international law the state's "opportunities for intercourse with other communities are restricted, and the likelihood that it will retain its positions is remote, unless influential states give its support."¹⁹³ James, on the other hand, perceives sovereignty to come from the state's constitution. International law is simply, for James, a body of rules which gives the state certain duties and rights. Sovereignty, James, does not originate from international law.¹⁹⁴

The state, Hedley Bull writes, is (or can be) an active partner in international society by upholding common interests, rules, and values through the working of common institutions.¹⁹⁵ James concurs by noting that while the state is a sovereign entity, it does not have the autonomy to engage *carte blanche* in international

¹⁹² J.D.B. Miller, "Sovereignty as a Source of Vitality for the State," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (April 1986): 84.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 80.

¹⁹⁴ James, *Sovereign Statehood*, 40.

¹⁹⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 13.

activity.¹⁹⁶ David Held, for example distinguishes the difference between a state's autonomy and sovereignty. A state's sovereignty refers to its "legal and actual control over the determination of the direction national policy."¹⁹⁷ Autonomy, on the other hand, refers to a state's ability to achieve goals independently from the outside world. States no longer possess that luxury "because in an interdependent world all instruments of national policy may be less effective."¹⁹⁸ Its scope of political engagement, for Held, is limited through the growing influence of international organizations.¹⁹⁹ For pro-Europe Austrians, for example, the issue of neutrality (which has been part of Austria's national identity since the end of the Allied occupation in 1955) has become an anomaly in the post-Cold War world. Alois Mock, in his speech before the First Anglo-Austrian Forum in London, asserted that the Yugoslav crisis demonstrated the need of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and

it has also demonstrated the need that European and American security interests must remain firmly linked with the framework of a dynamic Atlantic Alliance.²⁰⁰

The development of international institutions such as the European Union serve as a useful instrument to help

¹⁹⁶ James, *Sovereign Statehood*, 165-195.

¹⁹⁷ David Held, "New Times: Farewell Nation State," *Marxism Today*, December 1988, 12.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Alois Mock, "Britain and Austria -- Common European Interests," Closing Statement to the Participants of the First Anglo-Austrian Forum in London," 15 April 1994, 3-4.

encourage interstate co-operation.²⁰¹ Geoffrey Howe, who served as Margaret Thatcher's Foreign Secretary, notes that sovereignty within the European Union context maximizes the state's political ability to influence world events.²⁰² For Howe, the concept of sovereignty implies an infinite number of "transactions" between states, which is based upon establishing consensus and accepting compromise.²⁰³

Nevertheless, there is the continuing role of the national (or state) interest in the politics of Western Europe.²⁰⁴ The concept of national interest, according to James Rosenau, "serves as a means of justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies."²⁰⁵ The national interest, continues Rosenau, reflects "what is based for a nation in foreign affairs."²⁰⁶ The national interest can be seen to be "value laden."²⁰⁷ According to Joseph Frankel, there are three essential ways to categorize national interest: aspirational,

²⁰¹ Paul Johnson, "Wanted: A New Imperialism," *National Review*, 14 December 1992, 29. See also Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 71, No. 1 (1992): 32-35.

²⁰² Geoffrey Howe, "Sovereignty and Interdependence: Britain's Place in the World," *International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1990): 678.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 679.

²⁰⁴ Henry Kissinger, "Foreign Policy is about the National Interest," *International Herald Tribune*, 25 October 1993, 5.

²⁰⁵ James Rosenau, "National Interest," in David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 11 (New York: The MacMillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), 34.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

operational, and explanatory and polemical.²⁰⁸ The scholar (or policy maker) defines aspirational approach as outlining goals which the state would like to achieve. This can be defined as long-term goals. The operational approach refers to short-term goals, "capable of achievement within the foreseeable future."²⁰⁹ The explanatory and polemical approach explains or criticizes foreign policy.

In examining the supranational framework, Haas seems to assume in his earlier work that the formation of aspirational and operational goals would shift from the state level to the regional level. As Fulvio Attina perceives the spillover process, there are two forms of supranationality: norms and decisions supranationality. Norms supranationality occurs when community values prevail over those of national institutions.²¹⁰ "The latter exists when the decision pattern is different from traditional diplomacy."²¹¹ The integration process progresses on an even keel when these two forms of supranationality mature (or develop) at the same time.²¹² As will be demonstrated in the next chapter it was assumed by the integrationist scholars that integration was "*motivated by pragmatic calculations of economic advantage on the part of politicians,*

²⁰⁸ Joseph Frankel, *National Interest* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), 31-36.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 32.

²¹⁰ Fulvio Attina, "The European Community Political System: Paradigms and Democracy," *Paradigms* Vol. 5, No1/2 (1991): 125.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

bureaucrats, and interest groups."²¹³ Lauber writes that at the time of the end of the Second of World War, that in politics

this was the time of the 'end of ideology.' Conflicting views about economics were settled in favor of a mixed economy relying not only on the market but also on macroeconomic management plus an extensive system of transfer of payments intended to make an efficient system responsive to social concerns. *This consensus established the major structure. To be sure, it did not mean the end of all distributional conflicts; but because of the consensus on the fundamentals, the social partners "could safely afford to bicker."*²¹⁴

The neo-functional approach, as Haas laments, "neglected" to monitor the ongoing change of "conditions and expectations prevailing at the time a union is set up, as well as new aspirations and expectations that develop after the initial experience."²¹⁵ The assertion of the next chapter is that France (led by Charles de Gaulle) demonstrated "the emergence of a new style of leadership at the national level..."²¹⁶ De Gaulle, a nineteenth century style nationalist, "thwarted the ambitions of the Commission [norms supranationality], provided the member states with a veto on 'vital' issues and put a temporary brake to further extension of the scope of the Community."²¹⁷

²¹³ Lijphart, "Ethnic Conflict in the Western World," 51. (Emphasis added.)

²¹⁴ Lauber, "From Growth Consensus to Fragmentation in Western Europe," 332. (Emphasis added.)

²¹⁵ Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, xiv.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-functionalism and the EC," 7.

The member states of the European Union are concerned with economic problems such as employment, management of inflation, and the improvement of the quality of life for their own citizenry.²¹⁸ There are scholars who perceive this form of national interest to be a "benign" form of isolationism and not an aggressive form of conduct in international politics.²¹⁹ For Haas, however,

The fundamental logic that leads from national frustration to economic unity and eventually to political unification presupposes that national consciousness is weak and that the national situation is perceived as gloomy and the outside world unpromising. To be sure, the situation may improve. If integration has gone very far by then, no harm to the union; but in Europe it had not gone far enough before the national situation improved once more, before self-confidence rose, thus making the political healing power of union once more questionable.²²⁰

Anthony Lewis writes that those who worked for European Union "hoped that [the EU] would arrive eventually at a stage where it commanded the allegiance of all Europeans."²²¹ Instead, Lewis laments, "Britons and Frenchman and Germans look primarily to their own parliaments."²²²

²¹⁸ James Caporaso, "What is the New Nationalism? Or is There a New Nationalism?" in Werner Link and Werner J. Feld, eds., *The New Nationalism: Implications for Transatlantic Relations* (New York: Pargamon Press, 1979), 7.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, xxvii. (Emphasis added.)

²²¹ Anthony Lewis, "What is 'Europe' Worth That Won't Help Bosnia," *International Herald Tribune*, 30 March 1993, 10. See also F.S. Northedge, "The Nation State and the Coordination of Foreign Policies," in Link and Feld, *The New Nationalism*, 25-45.

²²² Lewis, "What Is a 'Europe' Worth That Won't Help Bosnia?," 10.

The member states of the European Union combine domestic politics with foreign policy goals for the analysis of the national interest.²²³ While Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the Union, Norway, for example, did not. Much of the debate in Norwegian political circles revolves around fishing rights.²²⁴ While Norway has retained exclusive fishing rights off their shores there are trade unionists who believe that membership to the European Union will result in higher unemployment for Norway.²²⁵ As well, there is a historical element (eg, 400-year union with Denmark and hundred year political relationship with Sweden before independence in 1905) in Norwegian public opinion which eschews the idea of relinquishing sovereignty to any form of political unity.²²⁶

CONCLUSION

This chapter attempted to do the following. There are similarities between Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm and Mitrany's functionalist approach. As was demonstrated in this chapter, both thinkers perceive a

²²³ Frankel, *National Interest*, 39.

²²⁴ "Norway: Growing with Bruntland," *The Economist*, 4 September 1993, 33.

²²⁵ John Burton, "New Nordic Euros," in Dudley Fishburn, ed., *The World in 1992* (London: The Economist Publications, 1991), 54.

²²⁶ "Norway Not Hooked," *The Economist*, 22 May 1993, 41. See also Frederick Studemann, "Austrians Split Down the Middle on the European Club," *The European* 3-9 June 1994, 5; Ilkka Suominen, "Finland, the European Union, and Russia," *The World Today*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (January 1994): 12-14; and Robert Taylor, "Nordics Know What's Best," in Dudley Fishburn, ed., *The World in 1993* (London: The Economist Publication, 1992), 55-58.

world where there are no longer any viable alternatives to the principles of liberty and equality. In believing that municipal political thought has reached its final stages of development, both theorists envision a world where the international community becomes preoccupied in the solving of social and economic problems. Where Fukuyama and Mitrany differ, however, is over the progress of international political theory. Unlike Fukuyama, Mitrany believes that the concept of the state is an anomaly in the solving of social problems. Echoing Mitrany's concerns, the political theorist John Dunn sadly notes:

The disruptions [between states] will often continue to accelerate, sometimes uncontrollably and devastatingly. In the tightly linked global economy and ecology within which we now live, no one can know even whether it is in principle possible for human beings to learn to understand the overall consequences of their actions fast enough to rein them in...²²⁷

The establishment of international functional agencies, Mitrany reasons, would depoliticalize problem-solving. Problems, in the age of the end of ideology, would be looked at from a mechanical and practical viewpoint.

As demonstrated in this chapter, Haas also assumes an *End of History* environment. Looking at the integration process in Western Europe, Haas asserted in his early writings that West Europeans had moved on from ideological rivalry to the pursuit of establishing institutions which supersede state authority. Haas'

²²⁷ John Dunn, *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 134.

Uniting of Europe demonstrated the West Europeans' willingness to integrate their coal and steel production. Moreover, there is clear evidence, as the next chapter will show, of the general success of economic integration. Haas' later writings, however, lament over the failure of the neo-functionalist approach not spilling over into political integration.

This then leads this dissertation to the next chapter. In this piece of work, this study takes an empirical examination to Haas' work and its pitfalls. In looking at economic integration, the following chapter examines how the integration process moved from the establishment of a common market to that of a single market, with aspirations in setting up a common currency and a central bank at the end of the twentieth century. Haas' essential pitfall is highlighted with the advent of Charles de Gaulle to power in France. The next chapter also serves as a strong reminder of Haas' observation that the integration process can be held hostage by states (like France and the UK) who perceive the importance of politics as protecting their historic institutions and traditions from supranational activity.

CHAPTER IV

EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN
WESTERN EUROPE, 1945-1992

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is an empirical examination of a fundamental struggle between proponents of European integration and those who wish to preserve the concepts of national identity and state sovereignty in Western Europe since 1945.¹ The principle advocates for a supranational (or federal) Europe were the statesmen Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli. Monnet and Spinelli are important to analyze because they were two of the earlier advocates of European integration to assess political concepts such as nationalism and state sovereignty as archaic in the modern West European political world. Monnet, for example, wrote

The Europeans had to overcome the mistrust born of centuries of feuds and wars. The governments and the peoples of Europe still thought in the old terms of victors and vanquished. Yet, if a basis for peace in the world was to be established, these notions had to be eliminated. Here again, one had to go beyond the nation and the conception of national interest as an end in itself.²

Monnet and Spinelli understood that if the history of international relations in Western Europe was to be revolutionized, it was necessary to proceed with the

¹ Chapter III of this dissertation explored the theoretical aspects of these ideas.

² Jean Monnet, "A Ferment of Change," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1962): 205. (Emphasis added.)

development of a federal union.³ Such a framework, Spinelli argued, would

*create institutions which [would] frame and enforce an international law against the pursuit of aims that profit one nation at the expense of others.*⁴

While the collapse of authoritarianism was a reason for celebration, Monnet believed that a more peaceful Europe lay in confronting the "practical" problems of the "morning after" the War.⁵ This included restoring economic stability, alleviating mistrust between France and Germany, and overcoming political national self-assertiveness.⁶ Like Mitrany's approach to the building of functional agencies, Monnet believed that the goal of European federalism had to be based upon "patience and direction [rather than on] speed and [on] the construction of false timetables."⁷ Mitrany referred to Monnet's approach to European unity as "federal functionalism;"⁸ that is, a federation built upon the successes of small functional initiatives.

³ Altiero Spinelli, "The United States of Europe and the Various Political Trends, 1941-2," in Walter Lipgens, ed., *Documents on the History of European Integration, 1939-1945* Vol. 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1985), 485.

⁴ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

⁵ Monnet, "A Ferment of Change," 205.

⁶ Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, Translated by Richard Mayne (London: William Collins Sons and Co., Ltd., 1978), 288-318.

⁷ Roy Jenkins, "Foreword," in Monnet, *Memoirs*, 12. See also Brent Nelson's and Alexander C-G Stubb's introduction to Monnet, "A Ferment of Change," Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G Stubb, ed., *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, 17.

⁸ David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London: Martin Robertson and Company, Ltd., 1975), 76.

The development of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951-1952 is an example of functional federalism because the ECSC started off integrating a small segment of Europe's industrial base and attempted at motivating its member states⁹ to work in building a deeper European union. Spinelli, on the other hand, believed that there was something more profound at issue. For Spinelli, European integration was not simply about reconciling Franco-German rivalry through the integration of their coal and steel industries. Rather, the advocacy of European integration, for Spinelli, symbolizes a critical rethinking of how to govern the different peoples of Western Europe, for such a process aspires that

the political institutions of a democratic Europe be constructed first, taking certain powers of initiative, deliberation, decision and execution from the national executives, parliaments, and judiciary and confiding them to a European executive, parliament, and judiciary. The institutions would derive their legitimacy from the consent directly expressed by European citizens without interference from the member states in matters of federal competence. Their models are little Switzerland and the great United States.¹⁰

For Spinelli, Monnet "made the first steps easier to obtain but he made the later steps much more difficult."¹¹ This is because the functionalist

⁹ The founding member states of the ECSC were Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy.

¹⁰ Altiero Spinelli, *The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the European Community*, translated by C. Grove Haines (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 11.

¹¹ Interview with Spinelli, 14 February 1985, cited in Michael Burgess, *Federalism and European Union: Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the*

federalists were caught up in solving "practical" problems. The solving of practical problems is not enough in advancing the need for a federation because it also requires, Spinelli argued, the creation of a "new political society."¹²

Other West Europeans, such as Charles de Gaulle and, later, Margaret Thatcher, asserted that the federalist dimension of European integration was a fundamental danger to the traditional understanding of statecraft in Western Europe. Unlike Monnet and Spinelli, de Gaulle and Thatcher advocated that European unity should be intergovernmental. Juliet Lodge writes that the advantage to the intergovernmental approach (for politicians like de Gaulle and Thatcher) assumes *the state to be a major actor in the integration process*.¹³ "At any point in the process of either launching integration or in pursuing it," Lodge further writes, "they can brake it or accelerate it."¹⁴ Stanley Hoffmann refers to the state as the "gatekeepers" of the integration process.¹⁵ On a

European Community, 1972-1987 (London: Routledge, 1989), 60.

¹² Spinelli, *The Eurocrats*, 12. (Emphasis added.) See also Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, 43-64.

¹³ Juliet Lodge, "Preface: The Challenge of the future," in Juliet Lodge, ed., *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), xxi. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, ed., *International Regionalism* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, Ltd., 1968), 177-230. See also Chapter III of this dissertation.

more positive note, however, Margaret Thatcher believed the intergovernmental approach involve the "willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states" and saw it as "the best way to build a successful European Community."¹⁶

While the intergovernmental approach to European unity was construed by Thatcher as viable in advancing free competition and trade¹⁷, there continues to be something more profound at issue. The intergovernmentalists, such as those found in the British Conservative Party,¹⁸ believe that the federalists' understanding of European unity was (and continues to be) a revolutionary concept to the governing of Western Europe. This type of process, argue Euro-skeptic Tories like Sir Teddy Taylor,¹⁹ both cannot be allowed to occur, and most particularly allowed to be implemented behind closed doors of Brussels. Politicians like Thatcher and Taylor would argue that the supranational agenda requires political

¹⁶ Margaret Thatcher, "Britain's Policies Towards Europe, Trade, and Defence," Speech to the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, 20 September 1988, *British Information Services*, No. 50/88. (Emphasis added.) See also Trevor C. Salmon and William Nicoll, *Building the European Union* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, forthcoming)

¹⁷ Margaret Thatcher, *The Path to Power* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1995), 622. See also Richard P. Ashlstorm, "The European Community Faces 1992," *Current History*, November 1991, 374-378 and Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993): 44-79.

¹⁸ See Chapter VI of this dissertation.

¹⁹ Ibid.

scrutiny from the member states' parliaments because of the EU's unwelcomed direction. They also remind Westminster that the Maastricht Treaty is a fundamental rethink of governance because it calls for the issuing of a single currency and the establishment of an independent Central Bank.²⁰ Thatcher believes that such a revolutionary departure from the issuing of the pound sterling is a fundamental breach of parliamentary sovereignty. In her memoirs, Thatcher reasons that if such a crucial break were to take place it would require the consent of the people of the UK through a referendum.²¹

Like Thatcher, ^{1/4} de Gaulle's opposition to the European initiative of integrationists such as Monnet and Hallstein was based upon the fundamental view that such a system of international organization would impede (or obstruct) France's national aspirations to be a major player in international affairs. De Gaulle's opposition to the federalist understanding of European unity was highlighted in the debate over the Fouchet proposals and over the issue of majority voting which resulted in the Luxembourg Compromise in January 1966. This chapter examines de Gaulle's beliefs because he was, as Thatcher reflects in her memoirs, one of the earlier statesmen in Europe to grasp the political

²⁰ See Articles 105a and 106 of the TEU.

²¹ Thatcher, *The Path to Power*, 480. See also Chapter VI of this dissertation.

ramifications of the federalists' understanding of European unity.²²

This part of the study ends with ^{an} analysis of the significance of the Single European Act of 1986 and the Treaty on European Union of 1992. In both cases, there was a compromise between the intergovernmentalists and the supranationalists over the scope of institutional reform. The compromise between the two groups can also be seen in how the EU was to handle the issues of subsidiarity and common citizenship. In looking at these issues, this chapter highlights how some states like Denmark and Great Britain perceive the continuing importance of self-determination as a basic right in the practice of state sovereignty. These differences of fundamental beliefs between both groups over the future of statecraft in Western Europe further encourages this dissertation to question the *End of History* paradigm. This is because the issues discussed in this chapter are not merely a dispute over the mechanics of government, but about the very nature of European unity and its overall direction.

EUROPEAN UNITY: HALLSTEIN, MONNET, SPINELLI AND THE SUPRANATIONAL APPROACH

For proponents of the integration process, the goal of European unity can be construed as the conscious development of international institutions which supersede the authority of the traditional system

²² Ibid., 126-127.

of states.²³ Walter Hallstein, who served as the President of the European Commission, asserted the integration process is

... trying to replace one political prejudice that has for centuries past swayed human beings in Europe, that has made the political map of Europe -- what it is today -- the national prejudice -- by a better attitude, a European attitude -- provided you do not take it as a piece of cynicism, I would even say: by a better, a European prejudice.²⁴

After two world wars an integration structure, as Monnet asserted, should be understood as the first step in bringing about a more peaceful and prosperous Europe.²⁵ Without the establishment of permanent political institutions, "all efforts to overcome the European chaos can be nothing more than ephemeral expeditions."²⁶

Both Monnet and Spinelli shared similar views on the need for European unity. They agreed, for example, that European federation had to be built at a time of immediate crisis.²⁷ The "immediate crisis" for both of

²³ See Walter Hallstein, "The True Problems of European Integration," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. XXXI, No. 15 (May 15, 1965): 459 and Brigid Laffan, "European Integration," in Michael Foley, ed., *Ideas that Shape Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 111.

²⁴ Hallstein, "The True Problems of European Integration," 459.

²⁵ Jean Monnet, "Men and Nations Must Learn to Control Themselves," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. XXVII, No. 19 (July 15, 1961): 579.

²⁶ Reginald Lang, "European Federalism," in Feliks Gross, *European Ideologies: A Survey of Twentieth Century Political Ideas*, with an Introduction by Robert M. MacIver (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), 965-966.

²⁷ Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, 56. See also Jenkins, "Foreword," 12.

them was finding the optimal approach in reconciling those old tensions between states and, moreover, achieving common solutions to common problems.²⁸ Both Monnet and Spinelli also perceived the ending of the Second World War as an opportunity to build a federal union because the concept of nationalism had lost its political zeal.²⁹ James B. Conant, who served as the US High Commissioner for Germany at the time, reported that the German people were no longer nostalgic for their past; instead, Conant writes:

...[T]he eyes of the Germans today are focused not on the past but on the future; and this future they envisage as something different from anything in their past. If one defines a progressive as a man who looks toward a new and better future and a reactionary as one who looks longingly to the past, then I think it would be fair to say that the prevailing attitude in the German Federal Republic today is a progressive attitude. Certainly there are few reactionaries who are longing to turn back the clock of history.³⁰

Unlike Spinelli, however, Monnet's approach to European integration fell along a practical approach. Monnet believed that the establishment of a European federal union "could not be built at a stroke."³¹ Monnet's essential problem with previous federal

²⁸ Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, 44. See also Chapter III of this dissertation.

²⁹ Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, 48. See also the new Preface to his 1968 edition of Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), xi-xxx.

³⁰ James B. Conant, "The Foundations of a Democratic Future for Germany," *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 30, No. 777 (May 17, 1954): 752. (Emphasis added.)

³¹ Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, 53.

initiatives was that they were too drastic in scope.³² In other words, Monnet believed that previous federal initiatives attempted to do too much too quickly.³³ In comparison to Mitrany, Monnet asserted that the integrationist's immediate task is to get states to feel comfortable working with one another beyond (in Monnet's case) the inter-governmental sphere.³⁴ While the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) helped facilitate "economic efficiency and growth"³⁵ it did not, for Monnet, move beyond "mere co-operation between Governments."³⁶ Monnet shares Mitrany's skepticism of the intergovernmental approach because

all our major problems go beyond national frontiers. The issues raised by nuclear weapons, the underdeveloped areas, the monetary stability of our countries and even their trade policies, all require joint action by the West. *What is necessary is to move*

³² Ibid., 52-53. For more on the history of other European federal projects, read Andrew and Frances Boyd, *Western Europe: UNA's Guide to European Recovery* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1948) and R.N. Coudenhove-Kalgeri, *Europe Must Unite*, Translated by Andrew McFadyean (Glarus: Paneurop Editions, Ltd., 1939) and Ernst B. Haas, "The United States of Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 63 (1948): 530-532.

³³ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 367.

³⁴ Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, 53. Compare to David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument of the Functional Development of International Organization* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), 33.

³⁵ Brigid Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 30. The OEEC served as an administrative body which acted as a distributor of Marshall Plan (or European Recovery Program) aid. Laffan also writes that a total of \$12.5 thousand million "in grants flowed into Western Europe during the four years of the program" (ibid.).

³⁶ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 271-272.

*towards a true Atlantic Community in which common institutions will be increasingly developed to meet common problems.*³⁷

Monnet appears to follow a mechanical approach at achieving European integration because Monnet, throughout his *Memoirs*, reminds the reader of his pragmatism. As a problem fixer, Monnet placed his trust in "practical men" such as bankers, industrialists, and lawyers. Through the help of the banker and the lawyer, Monnet asserted that such a practical approach would bring about "*limited achievements establishing de facto solidarity, from which a federation would gradually emerge.*"³⁸

Monnet's line of practical reasoning regarding the creation of European unity had to be based upon the building of institutions.³⁹ While working with lawyers and bankers is necessary, Monnet also believed that "when people accept the same rules and the same institutions to make sure that they are applied, their behavior towards each other changes. This is the process of civilization itself."⁴⁰ As Monnet eloquently wrote in his *Memoirs*:

³⁷ Monnet, "Men and Nations Must Learn to Control Themselves," 579. (Emphasis added.) This skepticism, however, did not lead Monnet and Mitrany to the same conclusion as to how to solve economic and social problems. See Chapter III of this dissertation and David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective," *International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (July 1971): 543.

³⁸ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 271-272. (Emphasis added.) See also Chapter III of this dissertation.

³⁹ Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, 48.

⁴⁰ Monnet, "Men and Nations Must Learn to Control Themselves," 579.

The union of Europe cannot be based on goodwill alone. Rules are needed. The tragic events we have lived through and are still witnessing may have made us wiser. *But men pass away; others will take their place. We cannot bequeath them our personal experience. That will die with us. But we can leave them institutions. The life of institutions is longer than that of men: if they are well built, they can accumulate and hand on the wisdom of succeeding generations.*⁴¹

Monnet's first European institution was the ECSC.⁴² The ECSC, which was founded by the Treaty of Paris signed on 18 April 1951,⁴³ "was the beginning of sectorial integration involving a restricted number of states."⁴⁴ The Schuman Declaration of 1950 appears to take on a practical element when Schuman noted Europe "will be built through *concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.*"⁴⁵ The practical goal of the ECSC, Schuman further observed, was "to make war not

⁴¹ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 384. (Emphasis added.)

⁴² Monnet, "Men and Nations Must Learn to Control Themselves," 579.

⁴³ Chapter I of the Treaty provided for the establishment of a High Authority which would serve as the ECSC's supranational organ. The High Authority would take decisions through weighted majority and "its resolutions would be binding on all member states" (Amitai Etzioni, "European Unification and Perspectives on Sovereignty," *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol. 92, No. 3 [Summer 1963]: 500). In administering Europe's coal and steel industries, the ECSC set prices, production standards, and investment and social conditions (British Iron and Steel Federation, *Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community* [London: British Iron and Steel Federation, 1954], 32-34). For a description of the ECSC negotiations see Monnet, *Memoirs*, 288-318.

⁴⁴ Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 32.

⁴⁵ "The Schuman Declaration" (9 May 1950) in European Parliament, *Selection of Texts Concerning Institutional Matters of the Community from 1950-1982* (Luxembourg: Committee of Institutional Affairs, European Parliament, 1982), 47. (Emphasis added.)

merely unthinkable but materially impossible."⁴⁶ In a letter on the Schuman Plan, Monnet wrote:

The Schuman proposals provide a basis for the building of a new Europe through the concrete achievement of a supranational regime within a limited but controlling area of economic effort[...]. The indispensable first principle of these proposals is the abnegation of sovereignty in a limited but decisive field and [...], in my view, any plan which does not involve this indispensable first principle can make no useful contribution to the solution of the grave problems that face us.⁴⁷

Monnet concentrated on the practical problems of European integration because, as demonstrated earlier, the states of Western Europe (at the end of the Second World War) were no longer involved in an ideological debate about whether or not to be democratic.⁴⁸ As scholars like Francis Fukuyama and Ernst B. Haas asserted later in their writings, the ideologies of Fascism and authoritarianism were no longer relevant to the West European political thought of 1945.⁴⁹ What was therefore important for Monnet was to get the states of Western Europe to feel comfortable working with one another. Monnet's ECSC served as a prototype of European integration in which (in the short term) it offered the optimal route (or important first step) to

⁴⁶ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

⁴⁷ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 316. (Emphasis added.)

⁴⁸ See Chapters II and III of this dissertation.

⁴⁹ See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton, Ltd., 1992), 270 and Ernst B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, ed., *International Regionalism* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 150.

Franco-German reconciliation by merging their coal and steel industries.⁵⁰

As Laffan notes, however, the ECSC "was more than simply a functionalist organization à la Mitrany."⁵¹ For Hallstein, the Treaty of Paris also perceived the ECSC as a means to a greater European unity "for politics always means change, the conscious changing of what we already have, achieved by the use of collective power."⁵² The question here is whether or not a federalist structure can be built solely on economic problem solving. This is an important question for this dissertation because the conflict between the ideologies of fascism and communism and liberal democracy may have well passed, but the conflict over ideas remained. The crucial debate in Western Europe over the next forty years (and perhaps beyond) was between the ideas of integration and federalism on the one hand, and intergovernmentalism and the importance of sovereignty and self-determination on the other.

While Hallstein noted that the Preamble to the ECSC described a Europe with a "future common destiny,"⁵³ there were no guarantees for success.⁵⁴ Like

⁵⁰ George W. Ball, "Introduction," in Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett, eds., *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity* (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1991), xii.

⁵¹ Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 32.

⁵² Hallstein, "The True Problems of European Integration," 459. (Emphasis added.)

⁵³ Walter Hallstein, *United Europe: Challenge and Opportunity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 13.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

Haas, Burgess notes that the key to successful integration is that it is "conscious, energetic and purposive."⁵⁵ Burgess also asserts:

It incorporates both normative and empirical propositions about the nature of human beings and society, and it is organized behavior which relies upon political movements, groups and parties for realizing its aims. Accordingly federalist activity is ideological activity.⁵⁶

As Hallstein summarizes:

Such choice and such decisions were needed before the process of European integration could begin. In order that it may continue, they are needed at every step of the way. And in order that an integrated Europe may make its full contribution toward solving the crucial problems that face us all, further political choice and political decisions will have to be made, not only by the European Community, but also by its friends, allies, and partners in the free world as a whole.⁵⁷

As noted earlier, Haas believed that the establishment of European unity required the transfer of loyalties from the state level to the supranational level.⁵⁸ The establishment of a federal Europe requires, as was suggested by Spinelli, the creation of a new political society which goes beyond the confines of state sovereignty. European integration, as will be demonstrated below, requires a wider sense of political purpose.

⁵⁵ Michael Burgess, "Federalism as Political Ideology: Interests, Benefits, and Beneficiaries in Federalism and Federation," in Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon, eds., *Comparative Federalism and Federation* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 102.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 102-103. (Emphasis added.)

⁵⁷ Hallstein, *United Europe: Challenge and Opportunity*, 58-59. (Emphasis added.)

⁵⁸ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 287. For more on this discussion, read Chapter III of this dissertation.

Spinelli, who was very much influenced by the federalist writings of Luigi Einaudi,⁵⁹ accepted the creation of the ECSC and the other European institutions as living political entities.⁶⁰ There are, however, three important differences between Spinelli's and Monnet's understanding of the integration process. First of all, Spinelli finds Monnet's approach falls essentially into the realm of the functional in which its essential outlook is "to confine the administration of certain concrete public activities to a suitable European administration."⁶¹ For Spinelli, Monnet's approach is like Mitrany's approach in which European institutions would be involved merely in solving technical problems and in which

[t]he proper ordering of men's daily lives is what is fundamental; therefore, the role of European union, for a long time, will not be the ephemeral, superficial, and inconclusive political struggle but the slow, progressive coagulation of customs and interests around an integrated European bureaucracy which is more

⁵⁹ Einaudi was a prominent figure in the anti-Fascist Resistance. In addition to his own work, Einaudi also provided the young Spinelli with British and American writings on federalist political thought in which, argues Burgess, "confirmed [Spinelli's] view of the anachronistic nature of the modern state and of the dangers of aggressive nationalism, and it convinced him that federalism provided the solution to these causes of war" (Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, 133). Spinelli worked with Einaudi to establish the Movimento Federalista Europeo in 1943. For a sample of his federalist writings, read Luigi Einaudi's *La Guerra e L'Unità Europea*, Milan 1950. A portion of this work can be found in Walter Lipgens and Wilfried Loth, eds., *Documents on the History of European Integration, 1945-1950*, Vol.3 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1988), 167-171.

⁶⁰ Spinelli, *The Eurocrats*, 29 and Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, 57.

⁶¹ Spinelli, *The Eurocrats*, 11. (Emphasis added.)

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*farsighted and rational than the national bureaucracies.*⁶²

The problem with the ECSC and the EEC, for Spinelli, is that Monnet's institutions produced a new species the Eurocrat who

put [his or her] administrative abilities at the disposition of the growing supranational community and could look at the European problem with technocratic indifference toward political institutions but with great faith in the power of administrative institutions.⁶³

According to Spinelli's understanding of the European integration process, Monnet's approach failed to organize power at a European level.⁶⁴ In an article for *West European Politics*, for example, Spinelli compared Monnet's approach to that of nation building in which functional federalism assumes, Spinelli argues, to be "a continuing process."⁶⁵ Spinelli continues the argument by asserting that the functional federalist thought that at "a certain point quantity would become quality: the originally functional institution would become a fully-fledged political power."⁶⁶ Spinelli further explained that Monnet's approach (like Mitrany) assumed the following:

This vision of a Europe united by a bureaucracy was based on the hypothesis that there would exist between

⁶² Ibid., 13. (Emphasis added.) As a note of comparison, read Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, 39.

⁶³ Spinelli, *The Eurocrats*, 16.

⁶⁴ Interview with Spinelli, September 1983 and 14 February 1985, European Parliament Strasbourg in Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, 58.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Altiero Spinelli, "Reflections on the Institutional Crisis in the European Community," *West European Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (February 1978): 79-80.

*the Council and the Commission a convergence of views on European unity similar to that which had existed between Kings and their commis about suprafederal unity.*⁶⁷

As Burgess observes, Spinelli's concern with Monnet's approach to federal Europe is that Monnet's scheme lacked a King; that is, Monnet's approach to European unity lacked a European mindset.⁶⁸ This is because as Burgess writes:

The machinery of the nation states provide only a system of reciprocal brakes which paralyze the European Community and furnish no basis for fostering the common elaboration.⁶⁹

Spinelli argued that for years the people of Western Europe "were exposed to a methodical and mounting nationalistic brainwashing through the schools, the military services, public life, the press, the radio, and in other ways."⁷⁰ This form of "brainwashing," Spinelli continues, was an impediment to progress towards European unification because "there were lacking the traditions, the institutions, and a common political language, that is to say, the very instruments which are necessary to transform sentiments into the substance of politics."⁷¹ The ending of the Second World war, however, produced, for Spinelli, particular circumstances which "greatly reduced the habitual respect of citizens for their states and their

⁶⁷ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

⁶⁸ Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, 59.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Spinelli, *The Eurocrats*, 4.

⁷¹ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

myths and opened the way to the united European transformation."⁷²

The third essential difference between Monnet and Spinelli was that for Spinelli the establishment of a supranational entity must deal with the issue of high politics as well. Spinelli asserted that a supranational political institution must be capable of of deciding and carrying out economic, military and foreign policy. By themselves, the Communities are simple treaties of very advanced economic liberalization; but the power to rule, to make laws and to enforce them still rests exclusively and absolutely in the hands of the several national governments.⁷³

For Spinelli, the success of full European unity depends on whether or not the member states "end up [...] bending and subordinating themselves to the European community creation [. This is] still an open problem, one which will be decided not by discussion but by political struggle."⁷⁴

In that political struggle, European unity entails the creation of a common army, a common currency, and a common legislature.⁷⁵ In establishing a European army, for example, the European Defence Community (EDC)⁷⁶

⁷² Ibid., 5. (Emphasis added.)

⁷³ Alteiro Spinelli, "Atlantic Pact or European Unity," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (July 1962): 546.

⁷⁴ Spinelli, *the Eurocrats*, 10. (Emphasis added.)

⁷⁵ Spinelli, "The United States and the Various Political Trends," 485.

⁷⁶ French Foreign Minister Renee Plevin introduced the EDC to the French National Assembly in 1950. Like the ECSC, the EDC would have an Assembly, a common budget, and, more importantly, the "final organization which will replace the present provisional organization should be so conceived as to be able to constitute one of the elements in a subsequent federal or confederal

provided for a single executive authority and for a common system of military training.⁷⁷ The EDC served as the best way forward in "the creation of integrated arms forces obeying no neo-nationalist command."⁷⁸ While the EDC Treaty provided a solution to the issue of German rearmament,⁷⁹ the EDC moreover provided the idea of European unification with the potential of becoming "a very real and doctrinal fact, a blueprint of political action which can offer an interpretation of, and a solution to, the problems of a Europe in misery and a Europe in affluence..."⁸⁰

Unlike Spinelli, however, Monnet did not perceive that European unity could be created with states attempting to integrate issues of "high" politics (such as defence and foreign policy) first.⁸¹ As mentioned before, Monnet believed that it is important first for states to get used to the idea of working with one

structure, based on the principle of the separation of powers and, in particular, a two-chamber system of representation" ("The European Defence Community Treaty," in *Selection of Texts*, 53). The EDC's functions would be to establish a European army drawn from national divisions and serve as an "acceptable formula" for West German rearmament (William C. Cromwell, *The United States and the European Pillar: The Strained Alliance* [London: MacMillan, Ltd., 1992], 7).

⁷⁷ George W. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1982), 92.

⁷⁸ William Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, *Understanding the European Communities* (New York: Philip Allan, 1990), 9.

⁷⁹ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1994), 26.

⁸⁰ Spinelli, *The Eurocrats*, 7. (Emphasis added.)

⁸¹ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 338.

another. This would be accomplished *by* starting with states attempting to integrate issues of "low" politics such as coal and steel.⁸² As Monnet understood it, Europe was simply not prepared at this point to take such a huge step like the EDC.⁸³ As Burgess notes, the EDC did not reflect Monnet's piecemeal approach.⁸⁴ For Monnet, the EDC project was "forced upon him" and, therefore, was required to take "short cuts" which would interrupt the piecemeal momentum of his vision for European unity.⁸⁵ Monnet makes, however, this point in his *Memoirs*:

I had never believed that we should tackle the problem of Europe via defence. Although this would no doubt be one task for the future federation, it seemed to me by no means the most powerful or compelling motive for unity. *But if circumstances were to accelerate or reverse the course of events -- well, then, that would be another matter.*⁸⁶

In other words, Monnet accepted that the establishment of European institutions had to be built around particular circumstances.⁸⁷ In this case, circumstances required Monnet to deal with the political predicament of German rearmament.⁸⁸ In its historic context, proponents of European unity were under considerable pressure from the United States (because of the military demands from the Korean War) to bring West

⁸² Monnet, "Men and Nations Must Learn to Control Themselves," 579.

⁸³ Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, 54.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 338. (Emphasis added.)

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ball, "Introduction," xviii.

Germany under a common military structure.⁸⁹ It was believed at the time that if the Germans could be reindustrialized under the ECSC, then they could be remilitarized under the EDC.⁹⁰

In 1954, however, the French National Assembly failed to ratify the EDC Treaty. While the issue of German rearmament was eventually resolved by integrating the Federal Republic of Germany into the NATO Alliance in 1955,⁹¹ the EDC initiative was riddled with political difficulties. Ball, for example, cited the political uproar of the French Communist Party in opposition to the EDC.⁹² Those on the Left (as well as on the Right) of the National Assembly turned the vote on the EDC into a referendum on German rearmament,⁹³ causing "[the West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer to doubt France's commitment to Franco-German reconciliation and European integration."⁹⁴

More importantly, the failure of the EDC "had resulted from the ambitious nature of the proposals and from their overt call for substantial secessions of national sovereignty."⁹⁵ In an interview with C.L.

⁸⁹ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 26-27.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 27.

⁹² Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 92.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 27.

⁹⁵ Martin E. Elling, *The European Community: Its Structure and Development* (Washington DC: The Congressional Research Office, Library of Congress, 1988) CRS Report for Congress, August 31, 1988: 7. (Emphasis added.)

Sulzberger of the *New York Times*, for example, Charles de Gaulle asserted that the EDC project was an "error, a stupidity."⁹⁶ While he advocated the need to incorporate West Germany into Europe, de Gaulle was concerned with the need to maintain French sovereignty and self-determination. De Gaulle noted:

But we must incorporate Germany into the West. I have always said that. How? By a very wide European arrangement -- Britain, France, Germany, Scandinavia, all of free Europe in an alliance, a confederation, in which each would safeguard its own individuality. You cannot suppress nationalities. Within such an organization you can have common arms.... But it is an absurdity, a dream, a fantasy to think that you can suppress France and French nationality.⁹⁷

It is fair to note, then, that de Gaulle's objections to the EDC rested "on his hostility to sharing sovereignty over sacrosanct national defence policy..."⁹⁸ For de Gaulle, however, the EDC "was not only absurd from a national, an international and military point of view," but that those French politicians who "invented" this European military structure "weren't [acting] French."⁹⁹ De Gaulle did not want France to "suffer the fate of those nations that once made history and now only observe it."¹⁰⁰ De Gaulle, as will be seen below, had a vision for France

⁹⁶ C.L. Sulzberger, *Seven Continents and Forty Years: A Concentration of Memoirs* (New York: Quandrangle/New York Times Book Company, Inc., 1977), 169.

⁹⁷ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

⁹⁸ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 28.

⁹⁹ Sulzberger, *Seven Continents and Forty Years*, 169. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁰⁰ Richard Nixon, *Leaders* (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1982), 64.

*"which he held out to the nation to try to raise and exalt its spirit."*¹⁰¹

EUROPEAN UNITY: DE GAULLE AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH

Charles de Gaulle's battle over the ratification of the EDC was simply a prelude for later fundamental objections to the creation of a supranational understanding of European unity. De Gaulle's assertion of France's role in West European politics, as Haas noted in his later writings¹⁰², established that doubts *"on [European] union are recognizably political in nature and spring from the fear that nations will no longer be fully masters of their own destinies."*¹⁰³ No one like De Gaulle, the late Francois Mitterand once noted, *"could speak the language of State as he could."*¹⁰⁴ De Gaulle had political aspirations for France. In his eyes, France was a great nation with a great past. In his memoirs de Gaulle wrote that France has taken on an enduring character which makes each generation of Frenchmen dependent on their forefathers and pledged to their descendants. Unless it falls apart, therefore, this human amalgam, on this territory, at the heart of this world, comprises a past, a present and a future that are indissoluble. Thus the State, which is answerable to France, is in

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 65. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁰² Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, xi-xxx. For a fuller discussion, see Chapter III of this dissertation.

¹⁰³ Walter Hallstein, "The European Economic Community: Some of Our 'Faux Problems,'" *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. XXXI, No. 11 (March 15 1965): 332. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁰⁴ Francois Mitterand, *The Wheat and the Chaff*, with an Introduction by William Styron (New York: Seave Books, 1982), 8.

charge, at one and the same time of yesterday's heritage, today's interests, and tomorrow's hope.¹⁰⁵

For de Gaulle, France's national identity was healthy and vibrant. Despite the turmoil of the Second World War, France was "alive, sovereign and victorious."¹⁰⁶ Unlike Monnet's prognosis of the demise of national identity, de Gaulle wished to mould and influence France's national aspirations. In his New Year Day Speech (1965), de Gaulle nostalgically asserted his hopes for France in the mid-twentieth century:

Now, life is life, in other words it is a struggle, for a nation as well as for man. There are, there will be, always and everywhere, difficulties to be surmounted, efforts to be made, trials to be withstood in order to move forward with dignity, justice and fraternity. But together, we are a nation wherein, through modern evolution, solidarity among its people is, for better or for worse, becoming stronger every day. What this nation accomplishes determines our individual fate.¹⁰⁷

De Gaulle believed that with her established traditions France had the mandate to lead Europe.¹⁰⁸ "There was

¹⁰⁵ Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor*, translated by Terrence Kilmartin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 3.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 163.

¹⁰⁷ Charles de Gaulle, "France 1965: Nationalism and Cooperation," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. XXXI, No. 7 (January 15, 1965): 213. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁰⁸ For that matter, de Gaulle was also adamant over the future of France's role as an international player because he perceived a Europe divided by the superpowers as a result of the Yalta Conference of 1945 (Charles de Gaulle, "The Independence of France: The Third World Power," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. XXXI, No. 17 [June 15, 1965]: 515). William C. Cromwell dismisses, however, this point on the significance of the Yalta Conference over the division of Europe in post-war period in "Yalta at Forty," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* (1985): 259-266. It is also interesting to note that Sir Winston Churchill shared the same sentiments regarding Great Britain because of its historic institutions and past. See, for example, Winston Churchill, "The United States of Europe," *The*

nothing, therefore, to prevent her now from doing what she intended to be and doing what she wished to do."¹⁰⁹

De Gaulle asserted his political (and historic) argument against Monnet's vision of the European Community because the founder of the ECSC was attempting to develop centralized political institutions that would supersede the authority of the state.¹¹⁰ De Gaulle, Desmond Dinan observes, "despised the Brussels bureaucracy, dismissing the Commission officials as stateless and denationalized."¹¹¹ In particular, de Gaulle described in his memoirs the EC Commissioner Hallstein as

ardently wedded to the thesis of the super-State, and bent all of his skillful efforts towards giving the Community the character and appearance of one. He made Brussels, where he resided, into a sort of capital. There he sat, surrounded with all the trappings of sovereignty, directing his colleagues, allocating jobs among them, controlling several thousands officials who were appointed, promoted and remunerated at his discretion, receiving the credentials of foreign ambassadors, laying claim to high honors on the occasion of his official visits, concerned above all to further the amalgamation of the Six, believing the pressure of events would bring about what he envisaged.¹¹²

In maintaining the integrity of the state, de Gaulle advocated an intergovernmental approach to the political dimension of European unity.¹¹³ De Gaulle's

Saturday Evening Post Vol. 202, No. 13 (Feb. 15, 1930); 25-51 and Chapter VI of this dissertation.

¹⁰⁹ De Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, 163.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 184.

¹¹¹ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 55.

¹¹² De Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, 184. (Emphasis added.)

¹¹³ Charles de Gaulle, "The Future of France: Its Aims and Ideals," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. XXX, No. 6 (January 1, 1964) 197 and Maurice Couve de Murville, "French Foreign Policy: The Common Market,

vision of European unity was that of a loose economic and political association which "would be limited to the technical aspects of the Treaty of Rome."¹¹⁴ By limiting cooperation between the member states on "technical" questions like the Common Agricultural Policy,¹¹⁵ de Gaulle wished "to limit further the Treaty of Rome's restricted supranational provisions."¹¹⁶ De Gaulle articulated his intergovernmental vision of Europe through the Fouchet Committee.¹¹⁷ The Fouchet Plan, wishing to create a European confederation which would cooperate on educational and scientific matters, would put together an institutional framework that

Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXXI, No. 4 (December 1, 1964): 101-105.

¹¹⁴ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 49.

¹¹⁵ In January of 1962, the European Economic Community established the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The main task of the CAP was (and continues to be) "to ensure uniform prices throughout the [Western Europe] on most agricultural products and to guarantee farm workers a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed by workers in other sectors of the economy" (Elling, *The European Community: Its Structure and Development*, 13). Laffan notes that the CAP was a compromise between France and Germany. "France," Laffan explains, "was willing to face German competition in the industrial arena provided there was a protected market for agricultural products" (Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 34).

¹¹⁶ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 55.

¹¹⁷ Richard J. Barnet, *The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan, Makers of the Post War World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 215. The Fouchet Committee was organized by the Six in July 1961. The Committee was named after the French ambassador to the Netherlands, Christian Fouchet, who chaired the negotiations.

included, among other things, "a consultative assembly of *delegated national parliamentarians*."¹¹⁸

The first draft produced by the Fouchet Committee was very much an intergovernmental document.¹¹⁹ In Article I, for example, the draft called for the legal establishment of a Union of States. Article I of the draft also asserts that the Union is

*based on respect for the individuality of the peoples and of the Member States and for equality of rights and obligations. It is indissoluble.*¹²⁰

The Council, the main political organ of the Union, would take decisions by unanimous vote and its decisions would be binding on its members.¹²¹ The decision, however, would not be binding on those states who were absent or abstained from voting. Article VI also stated the member states "may endorse it at any

¹¹⁸ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 49. (Emphasis added.)

¹¹⁹ It should be noted that Britain's Prime Minister Harold MacMillan expressed his government's interest in the Fouchet Plan's intergovernmental outlook. De Gaulle recognized that states like Britain would want to join such a confederation because "*these countries, like ourselves, do not wish to lose their sovereignty*" ("De Gaulle Speaks," *European Community* [October 1965]: 3 [Emphasis added.]). The only crucial difference between France and Britain was over foreign and security policy. Britain emphasized Europe's need to maintain the Atlantic Alliance. As MacMillan wrote in his memoirs: "*Nevertheless, I was always conscious that the very feelings of tradition which led him to oppose the federalist dream were instinctive cause of his reluctance to accept British membership, which might even develop into British leadership*" (Harold MacMillan, *At the End of the Day: 1961-1963* [London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1973], 112 [Emphasis added.]).

¹²⁰ "Negotiations on the Draft Treaty for the establishment of a Political Union," in, *Selection of Texts*, 112. (Emphasis added.)

¹²¹ Article VI in *ibid.*, 113. (Emphasis added.)

time. From the moment they endorse it, the decision will be binding on them."¹²² Foreign policy, according to Article II of the Fouchet Report, would be cooperation between States on issues of common interest.¹²³

In December of 1961, however, the European Parliament adopted the Plevin Report which commented and made recommendations regarding the first Fouchet draft. For the federal proponents of the EC the purpose of the Committee was that in

the name of the peoples of Europe whom it represents by virtue of the Treaties, [to express] the hope the Governments will move ahead as far as possible along the road of European political union.¹²⁴

It was therefore not surprising when de Gaulle's European partners (like Belgium and the Netherlands) explicitly disagreed with the Fouchet Committee's first draft for it failed to make any progress to

give shape to the will for political unity already implicit in the Treaties establishing the European Communities, and this purpose to organize their cooperation, to provide for its development and to secure for it the regularity which will progressively create the conditions for a common policy and will ultimately make it possible to embody in institutions the work undertaken.¹²⁵

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Article II in *ibid.*, 112. (Emphasis added.)

¹²⁴ "Plevin Report," in *Selection of Texts*, 116. (Emphasis added.) See also Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970*, Translated from the French by Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), 347.

¹²⁵ "Final Communique of the Meeting of the Six Heads of State or Government of European Community held in Bonn, 18 July 1961," in *Selection of Texts*, 107. See also Barnett, *The Alliance*, 215.

The Plevin Report, which criticized Fouchet's first report for eschewing a supranational framework,¹²⁶ stressed that the draft should in no way be "a step back from the Treaties establishing the ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM."¹²⁷

The Plevin Report also expressed "concern about the excessive rigidity involved in the absolute rule by which every decision has to be taken unanimously."¹²⁸ The Plevin Report suggested "that certain sectors, stages and conditions in which decisions should be taken by a qualified or simple majority should be defined."¹²⁹ Finally, the Plevin Report also disagreed with describing a prospective European union as that of an organization of *States* because that term merely suggested an association of governments rather than the further development of a supranational entity.¹³⁰ Despite these recommended changes the second Fouchet draft of the 18 of January 1962 failed to appease the political wrath of France's European partners because the Plan was still very much intergovernmental in

¹²⁶ Cromwell, *The United States and the European Pillar*, 31.

¹²⁷ "Plevin Report," 116.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* The Report also recommended that the Council "be empowered to give a ruling on questions of procedure by an absolute majority of the Member States. Every decision as to whether a question is of a procedural nature or not would be taken under the same conditions" (*ibid.*).

¹³⁰ Christopher Johnson, "De Gaulle's Europe," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1962): 160.

nature.¹³¹ For example, the second draft still called for a Union of *States* rather than *Peoples*.¹³² Like the first report, the second draft articulated an independent European foreign policy in which decisions are taken unanimously.¹³³

The battle over the Fouchet Plan documents gave further incentive to European federalists in working towards creating a supranational structure. In working towards that direction, the European federalists looked towards budgetary reform of the EEC as a necessary step. According to Article 200 of the Treaty of Rome, for example, the EEC (and EURATOM) were "financed by national contributions which the member states vote in their own national budgets."¹³⁴ In bringing about further harmonization between the member states over the establishment of the Common Market, however, Article 201 of the Treaty of Rome asserted that the Commission would

study the conditions under which the financial contributions of Member States provided for in Article 200 may be replaced by other resources of the Community itself, in particular, by revenue accruing from the common customs tariff when the latter has been definitely introduced.¹³⁵

¹³¹ Cromwell, *The United States and the European Pillar*, 31.

¹³² "Second Fouchet Report," in *Selection of Texts*, 119

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Nicoll and Salmon, *Understanding the European Communities*, 25.

¹³⁵ Paul Minet, *Full Text of the Rome Treaty and an ABC of the Common Market* (London: Christopher Johnson, 1961), 201-202.

In other words, the Community perceived an independent source of funding of its own affairs and programs would be the next logical step (or in effect an example of spillover) in the development of a supranational Europe.¹³⁶ The Commission would take over funds which were collected by the member states and treat the funds collected as "independent revenue."¹³⁷ The Commission would then have a budget, which according to Article 199 of the Treaty of Rome, would have to be kept balanced. The Commission further proposed that the European Parliament have joint budgetary authority with the Council.¹³⁸ The Commission would outline a budget and send a copy to the Council which "acting by *qualified majority*, shall establish the draft budget and shall then transmit it to the Assembly."¹³⁹ The Assembly will have the power to amend the budget by absolute majority; it is sent back to the Commission and the Council.¹⁴⁰ The Council, by a majority of five of its members, can adopt provisions "differing both from the Assembly's amendment and from the Commission's

¹³⁶ Nicoll and Salmon, *Understanding the European Communities*, 25-26.

¹³⁷ "Proposal of the Commission of the Communities for the Introduction of Own Resources," in, *Selection of Texts*, 128.

¹³⁸ Article 2 of *ibid.*, 130.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.* (Emphasis added.) Article 2 also asserts that if the Council does not agree with the preliminary draft of the budget, it will "consult with the Commission and, where appropriate, the other institutions concerned" (*ibid.*).

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

proposal."¹⁴¹ This fundamental proposal, which was articulated by Hallstein, was "ahead of its time."¹⁴²

In addition to his stern opposition to the European Parliament's joint budgetary authority with the Council, de Gaulle voiced his reservations regarding the expansion of supranationalism in which, for example, "a large number of Council decisions [effective 1 January 1966] were to come under the rule of majority voting."¹⁴³ De Gaulle insisted on preserving unanimity in which "any nation could unilaterally veto Community legislation[.]"¹⁴⁴ While the other member states understood de Gaulle's fears, they "argued that important national interests were unlikely ever to be ignored," and, moreover, explicitly "refused to renegotiate one of the treaty's few supranational provisions."¹⁴⁵ The tension between de Gaulle and the rest of the Community over this fundamental issue forced the French government to boycott the meetings of the Council of Ministers.¹⁴⁶

The deadlock was not reconciled until January of 1966. De Gaulle returned to ~~the~~ negotiating table after he had "failed to obtain a sufficient majority in the first round of the presidential elections."¹⁴⁷ At

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Nicoll and Salmon, *Understanding the European Communities*, 26.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 57.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Nicoll and Salmon, *Understanding the European Communities*, 26.

Luxembourg, the French government wanted to review all outstanding problems such as agricultural reform and, in particular, majority voting in the Council.¹⁴⁸ In Luxembourg, the Six agreed to disagree, a result known as the Luxembourg Compromise. In the Luxembourg Compromise, the Commission would retain the right of initiative. However, before showing the proposals to the European Parliament, the Commission had to present the legislation to the member states for consultation. Moreover, the Luxembourg Compromise put on hold the issue of majority voting in the Council of Ministers. The Six agreed that

Where in the case of decisions which may be taken by a majority vote on a proposal of the Commission very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the Members of the Council will endeavor, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council, while respecting their mutual interests and those of the Communities, in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty.¹⁴⁹

The critical point at this historic juncture revolved around the question of how best to govern Europe. For the federalists, the quest for European unity needed constant nurturing and progress. Like the debate over the Fouchet reports, the federalists' deliberation over the issue of majority voting was not about "politics as usual," but about impeding a Gaullist vision of Europe which would setback European political unification.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Kulski, *De Gaulle and the World*, 223.

¹⁴⁹ "Extraordinary Meeting of the Council in Luxembourg," in, *Selection of Texts*, 132.

¹⁵⁰ Barnet, *The Alliance*, 215.

For de Gaulle, European unification, under an intergovernmental framework, could only work if France took the lead.¹⁵¹ By doing so, De Gaulle hoped France would recover its "sense of 'grandeur.'"¹⁵² "Once having been the star," as Barnet further commented about de Gaulle's vision of Europe, "Frenchmen were uninterested in playing a 'walk-on' part."¹⁵³ De Gaulle's objection to majority voting, more importantly, manifested his continuing determination not to "support a system of voting that implied a diminution of national sovereignty."¹⁵⁴ The Luxembourg Compromise was a major landmark for the EC's member states because its "practical effect" was to give the members of the Council of Ministers the right of veto on Community legislation.¹⁵⁵ De Gaulle's insistence on a right of veto made the EC's member states more aware of their national interests.¹⁵⁶

EUROPEAN UNITY: CLASH BETWEEN SUPRANATIONALISTS AND INTERGOVERNMENTALISTS, 1969-1979

While the Gaullist period of the 1960s demonstrated Haas' point that European integration "would be neither smooth nor automatic,"¹⁵⁷ the period between 1969 and 1979 clearly illustrated the resolve

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 122.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 51. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 58.

¹⁵⁷ Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 53. (Emphasis added.) See Chapter III of this dissertation.

of federally-minded EC member states to make piecemeal progress towards the development of a supranational Europe.

At the Hague Summit of 1969, for example, the federalists attempted to complete, deepen, and enlarge the European Community.¹⁵⁸ As the Hague Summit asserted, completion pertains to the issue of the single market in which the EC member states, for example, would lift remaining trade barriers. As well, the Hague Summit asserted

Entry upon the final stage of the Common Market not only means confirming the *irreversible nature of the work* accomplished by the Communities, but also means paving the way for a United Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission.¹⁵⁹

The Werner Report, which came out in October 1970, elaborated on the practical details regarding the transition member states would have to undertake to establish economic and monetary union.¹⁶⁰ Economic unity meant, however, not only dealing with the technical issues of such an endeavor, but also recognizing that the member states of the EC would "cease to follow independent economic policies, and at least would

¹⁵⁸ Georges Pompidou, "The 'Summit Conference' at the Hague," *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1970), 34.

¹⁵⁹ "The Hague Summit," in, *Selection of Texts*, 136. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁶⁰ Christian Franck, "New Ambitions: From the Hague to Paris Summits," in Roy Pryce, ed., *The Dynamics of European Union* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 139.

follow coordinated policies."¹⁶¹ The Werner Report asserted what effect monetary policy would have on the issue of sovereignty:

[Monetary policy] implies inside its boundaries the total and irreversible convertibility of currencies, the elimination of margins of fluctuations in exchange rates, the irrevocable fixing of parity rates and the complete liberation of movements of capital.¹⁶²

"To ensure the cohesion of economic and monetary union," the Werner Report further noted, "transition of responsibility from the national to Community plane will be essential."¹⁶³

The supranational understanding of the European Community would also "deepen" or "extend" its "competence beyond existing policies and activities."¹⁶⁴ This would include the development of a Social Fund and, as

regards the technological activity of the Community, they reaffirmed their readiness to continue more intensively the activities of the Community with a view to coordinating and promoting industrial research and development in the principal sectors concerned, in particular by means of common programs, and to supply the financial means for the purpose.¹⁶⁵

The Davignon Report, which was submitted in May 1970, took a pragmatic assessment of this political endeavor. "Europe," the Davignon Report asserted, "must prepare

¹⁶¹ Stephen George, *Politics and Policy in the European Community*, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 167.

¹⁶² "The Werner Report," in, *Selection of Texts*, 166. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁶³ Ibid., 166. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁶⁴ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 74.

¹⁶⁵ "Communique Issued by the EEC Heads of State, 2 December 1969," in Richard Vaughan, ed., *Post-War Integration Europe* (London: Edward Arnold, Ltd., 1976), 182.

itself to discharge the imperative world duties entailed by its greater cohesion and increasing role."¹⁶⁶ The Davignon Report also called for the "harmonization of views, concentration of attitudes [but] joint action when it appears feasible and desirable."¹⁶⁷ The supranationalist~~s~~ asserted that European unity would give Europe "the means to its development and of its influence which [would] enable it to make its voice heard in all areas of world politics."¹⁶⁸

Supranational developments were further made at the Paris Summit of 1974. For example, the member states of the EC agreed to direct elections to the European Parliament. While there were disagreements as to when the direct elections should take place there was a belief among the EC states that such an endeavor would be "associated with the achievement of European unity" and that the

*competence of the European [Parliament] [would] be extended, in particular by granting it certain powers in the Communities' legislative process.*¹⁶⁹

In an interview with Hugo Young, the then British Prime Minister Edward Heath, who was (and continues to be) an ardent federalist in the British Conservative Party,¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ "Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification," in, *Selection of Texts*, 147.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 148. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁶⁸ Pompidou, "The 'Summit Conference' at the Hague," 34.

¹⁶⁹ "Communique Issued after the Paris Meeting of the Heads of State, 10 December 1974," in Vaughan, *Post-War Integration*, 196. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁷⁰ See Chapter VI of this dissertation.

summarized what a "full" community would mean for the states of Western Europe:

we would develop not only the open market and remove all obstacles to the market, but we would also develop the social and economic fund, we would have a common currency, and a common central bank. [Furthermore,] [w]e would develop a European parliament with the full powers of a parliament, and a political unity which would embrace foreign and defence policy, and that would all be done by 1980.¹⁷¹

At the Paris Summit of 1974, the EC states also called for the development of a common foreign policy which reflected

a view to progress towards European unity, the Heads of Government reaffirm their determination *gradually to adopt common positions and coordinate their diplomatic action in all areas of international affairs which affect the interests of the European Community.*¹⁷²

The Tindemans Report, which came out in 1975, suggested that the member states of the EC clearly spell out a common foreign policy which should coordinate policies during a period of transition.¹⁷³ However, if European unification is to take on a federal structure, the practice of foreign policy must "make way for common policies, which means that within the framework of the European union, our States must be able together to draw up a policy and to enact it."¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Hugo Young, "No, Prime Minister," *Marxism Today*, November 1988, 16. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁷² "Communique Issued after the Paris Meeting of the Heads of State, 10 December 1974," 194. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁷³ Leo Tindemans, "European Union: Report to the European Council," *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1/76 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities), 15.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.* (Emphasis added.)

Finally, the concept of enlargement was defined as opening the European Community to new members in Europe.¹⁷⁵ In maintaining the progression of European unity, potential members had to accept the present accomplishments of the Community. Furthermore, potential member states can make transitional arrangements, "but their purpose was solely to allow for the adhering states to adjust to the conditions of membership."¹⁷⁶ The Tindemans Report only accepted the use of national interest by member states as an impediment in complying with Treaty provisions up to a certain point. The Tindemans Report was pragmatically aware that it is

impossible at the present time to submit a credible program of action if it is deemed absolutely necessary that in every case all stages should be reached by all the States at the same time.¹⁷⁷

Those who were not ready to forge ahead towards the completion of the single market, then, would not do so. However, this was not to say that the Tindemans Report advocated a Europe *a la carte*;¹⁷⁸ the Tindemans Report was not prepared to see progress on EC development rolled back because, according to the Report, "each country [is to be] bound by the agreement of all as to

¹⁷⁵ In 1973, the European Community welcomed Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom as new members.

¹⁷⁶ Nicoll and Salmon, *Understanding the European Communities*, 29.

¹⁷⁷ Tindemans, "European Union: Report to the European Council," 20.

¹⁷⁸ Jacques Vandamme, "The Tindemans Report (1975-1976)," in Pryce, *The Dynamics of European Union*, 161.

the final objective to be achieved in common; it is only the timescales for achievement which vary."¹⁷⁹

The harmonization of foreign policy tasks among the EC member states, however, would not be an easy endeavor. Despite the "adamant" claims for a common foreign policy, certain states of Western Europe were still working from the perspective of *L'Europe des Patries*.¹⁸⁰ For example, the Middle East crisis did very little in the EC to create a common foreign policy because each of the member states were scrambling for bilateral oil arrangements.¹⁸¹ The member states of the EC, which received about 80% of its oil supplies from the Middle East and North Africa,¹⁸² "did little to help the Netherlands in 1973 with an Arab oil boycott."¹⁸³ With the rise of oil prices, Laffan further argues, the member states faced a serious recession and higher unemployment.¹⁸⁴ While the EC attempted to counter the crisis with a common energy policy, "differences between oil producers such as Britain and the oil-consuming states limited effective unity."¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁹ "European Union: Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans," 19-20. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁸⁰ John Palmer, *Europe without America? The Crisis in Transatlantic Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 132.

¹⁸¹ Cromwell, *The United States and the European Pillar*, 89.

¹⁸² "... And Now, the Oil Crunch," *Time*, 22 October 1973, 9.

¹⁸³ Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 53.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Palmer, *Europe without America?*, 143.

The member states achieving economic unity also proved to be difficult. In 1971, for example, the member states of the European Community witnessed the breakup of the dollar-dominated monetary system which "marked the end of the earlier Atlantic consensus enshrined in the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944."¹⁸⁶ For the EC member states, this economic and monetary crisis "had the unfortunate but predicable impact of fueling inflation."¹⁸⁷ In addressing the theme of this dissertation, however, there was something deeper at stake. In France, for example, Pompidou came under political "pressure from his orthodox Gaullists, who were appalled at the conclusions of the Werner Report"¹⁸⁸ for it would inevitably "involve fiscal and monetary management at the European level."¹⁸⁹ There were those on the British Left in the 1970s who objected to the supranational (and pro-capitalist) dimension of the Common Market.¹⁹⁰ In a pamphlet issued

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 11.

¹⁸⁷ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 83. In April of 1972, the optimal option for the member states of the EC at the time was to establishing the "snake in the tunnel," in which the latter was "an arrangement of for approximating the exchange rates [within a 2.5% fluctuation] of member currencies one to another while holding their value jointly in relation to the US dollar" (George, *Politics and Policy in the European Community*, 168).

¹⁸⁸ "That Elusive European Currency," *The Economist*, 19 December 1970, 68. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁸⁹ "Willy Pays His Price in the West for the Deal in the East," *The Economist*, 30 January 1971, 27.

¹⁹⁰ Unattributable interview with a former Labour MP at his residence in Edinburgh, Scotland (UK), 25 October 1994.

by the British Trade Union Congress in May 1975, for example, it ^{was} asserted that being

in the Common Market means that the British people no longer have the final say in the way their country is run. Democracy in Britain has been based for centuries on the supreme power of an elected Parliament to pass laws and levy taxes. But this has all been brought to question in the Common Market. Regulations made in Brussels are law in Britain, and have to be enforced by our courts and put into effect by our administration. But they are not made by the British people, and they are not made by the British Parliament.¹⁹¹

The establishment of political integration proved to be a difficult task because, according to Burgess, the states of Western Europe "rediscovered their identities, their interests and their aspirations."¹⁹² It seems that this point highlighted the intergovernmental character of the Paris Summit of 1974 in which the EC member states created the European Council to convene up to three times a year. The Paris Summit asserted that with the various Heads of Government of the member states the European Council would

... ensure consistency in Community activities and continuity of work [...] the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, meeting in the Council of the Community, will act as initiators and coordinators.¹⁹³

The Tindemans Report, which offered an analysis "on the concept and on the shape of the European Union,"¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ "Pamphlet Opposing Continued EEC Membership, Issued by the Trade Union Congress of the United Kingdom, May 1975," in Vaughan, *Post-War Integration Europe*, 203. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁹² "Press Conference by Mr. Georges Pompidou President of the French Republic (21 January 1971)," in, *Selection of Texts*, 202. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁹³ Ibid., 275. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁹⁴ Vandamme, "The Tindemans Report (1975-76)," 150.

cited the need to maintain Community patrimony and the need to complete the economic and monetary union of the EC; however, the "main thrust" of the Tindemans Report emphasized this point:

Public opinion is extremely skeptical on the will to establish a genuine European union and solve the real problems of the day at European level. It wants results and questions the lack of political will on the part of its leaders. For me, the conclusion is obvious: *if we wish to safeguard the achievements of the Treaties and conquer new ground the member states must agree on new aims. At this stage, the stakes are political, that is quite irrefutable.*¹⁹⁵

If anything, history is not, according to the late George W. Ball, "the constant replaying of old themes, but a flow of events that, if man is to survive, must be so channelled as to meet the needs of an evolving age."¹⁹⁶ Georges Pompidou, who succeeded de Gaulle as President of France, asserted that while one cannot deny the political identity of states like Germany or Britain, it is possible to build a Europe which not only deals with technical issues but a Europe in which its member states

are prepared to harmonize their policies and to integrate their economies. If one takes this view the dispute over supranationality becomes irrelevant.¹⁹⁷

While the first direct elections of the European Parliament in 1979 "altered the barren institutional landscape and gave the parliamentary institution ample

¹⁹⁵ Text of Mr. Leo Tindemans' letter to the European Council in Tindemans, "European Union: Report to the European Council," 5. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁹⁶ Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 98.

¹⁹⁷ "Pompidou Press Conference (21 January 1971)," 202.

grounds for demanding greater powers,"¹⁹⁸ the member states (through an intergovernmental framework) developed new initiatives like the Snake¹⁹⁹ and the introduction of a European Council to help bring the Community closer to a common foreign policy. While there were economic and political constraints, then, the member states did what they could to forge Europe ahead.

EUROPEAN UNION; SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND THE MAASTRICHT TREATY

The essential groundwork for the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1991 lay in the founding of the European Monetary System (EMS) of 1978 and the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986.²⁰⁰ The importance of the SEA for the supranational development of the European Community was that it introduced qualified majority voting for the establishment of the single market and increased the powers of the European Parliament.²⁰¹ The supranational developments of EMS and SEA were important because they set the EC member states on the course of establishing the single market and in planning the implementation of an independent central bank and a single currency.²⁰² (The details of Europe's single currency and Central Bank and their dividing impact on the British Conservative Party's

¹⁹⁸ Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 55.

¹⁹⁹ See fn. 187.

²⁰⁰ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 129.

²⁰¹ Palmer, *Europe without America?*, 21.

²⁰² Chapter 2, Title II of the TEU.

understanding of the TEU are discussed in Chapter VI of this dissertation.) Jacques Delors noted that the single market would open markets to trade, secure "control over capital flows" and "strengthen" international monetary stability."²⁰³ Delors also asserted that

[t]he essential parallelism between the economic, social and monetary sectors, the irrevocable link in the final phase between currencies, the common management of some policies and the resultant relinquishment of sovereignty all make economic and monetary union a most profoundly political economic goal and, at the same time, the first initial sign of a genuine shared destiny.²⁰⁴

Delors' supranational vision of the SEA and the TEU, however, clashed with the intergovernmental approach of certain states like Denmark and the United Kingdom. The debate, as will also be shown in the next two chapters, is fundamental because it is here in these two international treaties that, according to Thatcher, the quest towards supranational Europe began to take its definitive shape.²⁰⁵ It is therefore not surprising to note that the Thatcher government "entered the negotiations determined to limit [the]

²⁰³ Jacques Delors, "The Commission's Program for 1991: President of the Commission, to the European Parliament and His Reply to the Debate, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1/91 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities), 10.

²⁰⁴ Jacques Delors, Address by the President of the Commission of the European Communities, to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 26 September 1989, *Information Department of Council of Europe*, 4. (Emphasis added.)

²⁰⁵ Thatcher, *The Path to Power*, 473.

scope [of institutional reform]."²⁰⁶ In explaining the SEA agreement to the House of Commons Thatcher asserted:

*I do not believe in the concept of a united states of Europe, nor do I believe that it would ever be attainable [for] [t]he whole history is completely different.... I am constantly saying that I wish that they would talk less about European and political union. The terms are not understood in this country. In so far as they are understood over there, they mean a good deal less than some people here think they mean.*²⁰⁷

Britain's determination to limit institutional reform was also seen in the negotiations of the TEU. In negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, Major protected Britain's national interest by placing CFSP and Home and Judicial Affairs at the intergovernmental level.²⁰⁸ The importance of the supranational debate concerned many in Denmark to vote "No" (50.7% No; 49.3% Yes) on the TEU in early 1992.²⁰⁹ "When [the Danes] voted against Maastricht in their referendum," as Scottish nationalist Jim Fairlie²¹⁰ comments, "it was precisely the loss of sovereignty to which their government had agreed that they objected."²¹¹ The "threat to national

²⁰⁶ Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 57.

²⁰⁷ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 88, Sixth Series, Session 1985-1986, col. 432. (Emphasis added.)

²⁰⁸ Titles V and VI of the TEU respectively.

²⁰⁹ "Why the Danes Wouldn't," *The Economist*, 6 June 1992, 42.

²¹⁰ For more on Mr. Fairlie's contribution to the Scottish nationalist movement, see his biographical sketch in Chapter V of this dissertation.

²¹¹ Jim Fairlie, in correspondence with Tom Kerr, undated. (Emphasis added.) Letter was most likely written in late October 1992.

independence,"²¹² as will be explored later in this chapter, highlighted the crucial debate over the issue of common citizenship.²¹³

A. EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM

The EMS was established at the Brussels Summit of December 1978.²¹⁴ Like Monnet, the then President of the Commission Roy Jenkins asserted that integration had to come about on a piecemeal basis.²¹⁵ "The lesson [Monnet] taught me," Jenkins writes in his memoirs, "was always to advance along the lines of least resistance provided that it led in approximately the right direction."²¹⁶ For Jenkins, the creation of the EMS was not a "an original step;"²¹⁷ rather, it was seen as a *logical* step in relaunching the supranational goals of the Hague Conference back in 1969.

Jenkins also attempted to sell the EMS from a "macroeconomic" perspective in which the EMS would lower inflation, increase investment, and reduce

²¹² "Why the Danes Wouldn't," 42.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ To summarize, the EMS had four main components: a European Currency Unit (ECU), an exchange and intervention mechanism, credit facilities, and transfer arrangements (Palmer, *Europe without America?*, 148). Under the exchange and intervention mechanism, the EMS established a grid of bilateral exchange rates in which there was a fluctuation of +/- 2.25%. The ECU would serve as a denominator for the exchange rate mechanism and "as a means of settlement between monetary authorities of the EC" ("Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978," in, *Selection of Texts*, 414).

²¹⁵ Roy Jenkins, *European Diary: 1977-1981* (London: Collins, 1989), 22-23..

²¹⁶ Ibid., 23.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

unemployment.²¹⁸ Moreover, Jenkins wanted Europe to have a certain amount of economic independence.²¹⁹ Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany was for the scheme because of the "adverse effects on the German economy of the decline of the US dollar."²²⁰ This was a result of Germany's dependence on the US market for the sale of German capital goods. Jenkins writes in his memoirs

But in the late seventies, when the era of dollar omnipotence was only a decade behind, it seemed like a collapse of the verities. *It produced considerable inconveniences as well a competitive disadvantage of for Europe.* It also confirmed Helmut Schmidt's view that President Carter was abdicating from the leadership of the West. And the German Chancellor was less inhibited about filling the monetary than the political gap, and even better qualified to do so.²²¹

Economic independence, along the lines of developing a supranational framework, did not inspire Great Britain to join the EMS. The UK did not join the EC's new monetary arrangement because the James Callaghan government was afraid that EMS, "with the probability of a consequent devaluation of the pound, would make inflation worse."²²² London feared losing control over credit and monetary policy to the West German central bank because

²¹⁸ Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 105.

²¹⁹ Ian Murray, "Jenkins Warning on EEC Future," *The Times*, 7 October 1978, 4.

²²⁰ Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 126.

²²¹ Jenkins, *European Diary*, 197. (Emphasis added.)

²²² "Problems, Problems, Problems," *The Economist*, 28 October 1978, 23. See also, "One Cheer for Mr. Callaghan," *New Statesman*, 27 October 1978, 229.

*of the dominating role of the Deutschmark in the EMS, while the Labour leaders feared they would be forced by Bundesbank conservative orthodoxy to deflate rather than devalue sterling if the UK economy hit trouble.*²²³

There were domestic considerations. Prime Minister James Callaghan's Labour Party "remained suspicious of what they thought was too close an entanglement with Europe..."²²⁴ At the Labour Party Conference (October 1978), "speaker after speaker [came] to the podium to condemn the idea [of EMS]."²²⁵ While the Labour Party Conference of that year defeated a motion "calling on the Government to start negotiations for Britain's withdrawal from the Community,"²²⁶ the Labour Party Manifesto of 1979 asserted that

*We aim to develop a Europe which is democratic and socialist, and where the interests of the people are placed above the interests of national and multinational capitalist groups, but within each country must be able to realize its own economic and social objectives, under the sovereignty of its own Parliament and people.*²²⁷

Moreover, it became clear to Callaghan that EMS "entry would provoke a grand bust-up in the Labor Party, with the possibility of cabinet resignations that the government could ill afford."²²⁸ Considerations "of

²²³ Palmer, *Europe without America?*, 148. (Emphasis added.)

²²⁴ James Callaghan, *Time and Chance* (London: Williams Collins Sons and Co., Ltd., 1987), 493.

²²⁵ George, *An Awkward Partner*, 129.

²²⁶ "Move to Leave European Community Soundly Rejected," *The Times*, 5 October 1978, 4.

²²⁷ *The Labour Party Manifesto, 1979* (London: The Labour Party, 1979), 32. (Emphasis added.)

²²⁸ "Problems, Problems, Problems," 23. (Emphasis added.) Similar themes and issues facing the Labour Party in the 1970s over European monetary policy affected the British Conservative Party in the 1990s. See Chapter VI of this dissertation.

party unity," Stephen George argues, "seem to have been instrumental in swaying a Labour Prime Minister in a direction that would put Britain out of step with the rest of the Community."²²⁹

B. SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT

In examining the SEA, however, Burgess notes that the Act was a compromise between the intergovernmentalists and the supranationalists.²³⁰ In respect to the SEA's federalist dimension, Disnan notes that the SEA "sought to infuse" the Community "with a renewed sense of purpose"²³¹ and, as Article 1 of the Commission Provisions of the SEA observes, make "concrete progress towards European unity."²³² Under the SEA, the EC member states agreed to the establishment of a single market in which all trade barriers would be lifted and all internal frontiers abolished, so to ensure the free movement of capital, goods, and services.²³³

The SEA's supranational agenda also expands Community competences into other areas of state activity which include research and technological development, the environment, and regional and social policy.²³⁴ In establishing the single market the

²²⁹ George, *An Awkward Partner*, 130.

²³⁰ Burgess, *Federalism and the European Union*, 205.

²³¹ Disnan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 129.

²³² "The Single European Act," *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 2/86 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities), 7.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 11.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 13-16.

Council of Ministers, as outlined in Article 100A of the SEA, will use qualified majority voting in laying down provisions for health, safety, and environmental and consumer protection.²³⁵ Moreover, in pursuing improvements in the work place, Article 118 B asserts that the Commission "shall endeavor to develop the dialogue between management and labor at European level which could, if the two sides consider it desirable, lead to relations based on agreement."²³⁶

Brigid Laffan writes, however, that the political success behind the SEA also "lies in the capacity of the negotiators to strike a new intergovernmental bargain, especially among the larger member states."²³⁷ Thatcher's support for the SEA's single market program, "with the strong support of British industry and business,"²³⁸ was made possible because deregulation "and economic liberalism began to replace Keynesian demand management as the dominant mode of economic policy in the 1980s."²³⁹ There were other incentives for the intergovernmentalists to support the SEA. While Thatcher agreed to the use of majority voting on some treaty articles dealing with certain aspects of the internal market,²⁴⁰ other aspects such as the free

²³⁵ Ibid., 12.

²³⁶ Ibid., 13.

²³⁷ Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 57.

²³⁸ Parliamentary Debates, 5 December 1985, col. 429.

²³⁹ Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 57.

²⁴⁰ Parliamentary Debates, 5 December 1985, col. 429.

movement of persons and fiscal harmonization, covered in Article 100A(2) of the SEA, are based on unanimity.²⁴¹ What makes this point interesting, however, is that Thatcher and her fellow Euro-skeptic colleagues (like Bill Cash and Michael Spicer) would come to regret the significance of the above provisions in their fight against ratification of the TEU in 1992-1993.²⁴²

SEA's Title III, which pertains to foreign policy of the EC, is purely intergovernmental in nature. Under Article 30.1, for example, the EC states "shall endeavor jointly to implement a European foreign policy."²⁴³ Laffan asserts that word "endeavor" "conveys the limits of the process as it exists"²⁴⁴ for a European foreign policy would, as stated in Article 302(a) of the SEA, require "*the convergence of [the member states'] positions and the implementation of joint action.*"²⁴⁵ Laffan also asserts that much of the language in Title III is "non-binding."²⁴⁶ In Article 30.2(d), for example, the SEA asserts that

the [member states] shall endeavor to avoid any action or position which impairs their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or within international organizations.²⁴⁷

²⁴¹ "The Single European Act," 12.

²⁴² See Chapter VI of this dissertation.

²⁴³ "Single European Act," 18.

²⁴⁴ Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 152.

²⁴⁵ "Single European Act," 18. (Emphasis added.)

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ "Single European Act," 18.

Laffan seems to identify the SEA's Article 30. 2 as a "key" factor to the SEA's intergovernmental dimension²⁴⁸ for as is asserted in Article 30.2(c) the member states "shall take full account of the positions of the other partners and shall give due consideration to the desirability of adopting and implementing common European positions."²⁴⁹

In her report to the House of Commons, however, Thatcher noted that SEA's Title III "looks to a steadily closer relationship."²⁵⁰ in foreign policy among the EC's member states. In her Bruges speech, Thatcher asserted that she perceived it in Britain's interest to work on problems of common interest.²⁵¹ Having said that, Thatcher also asserted in her Bruges Speech that "working together" on common problems does not "require power to be centralized in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy."²⁵² For Thatcher, the intergovernmental approach to European unity preserves

*the different traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one's own country; for these have been the source of Europe's vitality through the centuries.*²⁵³

Like Thatcher, Major (through the TEU agreement) aspired for Britain to retain its ability to act

²⁴⁸ Laffan, *Integration and Cooperation in Europe*, 152.

²⁴⁹ "Single European Act," 18.

²⁵⁰ Parliamentary Debates, 5 December 1985, col. 429. (Emphasis added.)

²⁵¹ Thatcher, "Britain's Policies Towards Europe, Trade, and Defence."

²⁵² Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

²⁵³ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

unilaterally on other issues. This includes the special relationship with the United States and the difficulties over the issue of Hong Kong.²⁵⁴

C. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

Like the outcome of the SEA, there emerged at the Intergovernmental Conference of 1991 a compromise between those who wanted to see integration move ahead along federal lines and those who were considered reticent.²⁵⁵ H.T Wilson observed that so long as there is an intergovernmental factor to be dealt with in European Community affairs

its viability [that is, European unity] will be heavily dependent on its ability to meet the minimal needs of each member -- particularly the large members -- in the context of what is perceived to be the joint surrender of their respective governmental and political powers.²⁵⁶

There emerged, for example, an intergovernmental outcome regarding the CFSP of the TEU. As Trevor C. Salmon explains, there emerged out of the Maastricht process two school of thoughts. The first school was the "quantum leap forward," which called for a more federalist approach to the making and implementation of foreign policy.²⁵⁷ Federalists wanted to develop the

²⁵⁴ This point is raised in Chapter VI of this dissertation.

²⁵⁵ Richard Corbett, "The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (September 1992): 272.

²⁵⁶ H. T. Wilson, "The European Mind on the Eve of Full Economic Integration," *History of European Ideas*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1993): 3. (Emphasis in the original.)

²⁵⁷ Trevor C. Salmon, "The Growing Pains of European Adolescence: Groping for a European Pillar," *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 16, No. 2-3 (1993): 220.

"tree" approach in which EC, CFSP, and Home and judicial Affairs would be under a single treaty framework and, more or less, reflect the Community method and structure.²⁵⁸ In the Belgian Memorandum of 19 March 1990, for example, the Belgian delegation asserted the need for the General Affairs Council to "become once again the Community's political decision-making center."²⁵⁹ The Belgian delegation called for a European union to cover all aspects (economic, political, bilateral and multilateral) of foreign policy.²⁶⁰

There was (and is) the more gradualist approach to CFSP.²⁶¹ The EU member states which supported this school of thought were Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Portugal. In ascertaining their position, Delors recognizes that the political realm of integration is much more difficult "than economic integration, because the traditions, diplomatic practices and history of the Twelve are different."²⁶² As Thatcher has noted in her

²⁵⁸ Sophie Vanhoonacker, "A Critical Issue: From European Political Cooperation to a Common Foreign and Security Policy," in Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker, eds., *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community*, (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 32.

²⁵⁹ "Belgian Memorandum: 19 March 1990," in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union*, 273.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Salmon, "The Growing Pains of European Adolescence," 220.

²⁶² Delors' Address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 26 September 1989, 4.

Bruges speech, the EC's member states' future does not simply lie with only Europe.²⁶³ "Spain cares about Latin America," European Commissioner Leon Brittan writes, "in the way that France looks to North and West Africa and Indo-China, and Britain to the Commonwealth."²⁶⁴ Ultimately, the member states agreed under Title V of the TEU

Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.²⁶⁵

The intergovernmental position was (and is) that the European Union should be built as a "Temple" in which CFSP and Home and Judicial Affairs would "have their own rules and procedures."²⁶⁶ For the intergovernmentalists like John Major, the CFSP should not only aim to maintain peace and international stability and adhere to the compliance of the rule of international law, but it "*should also bear in mind the special relations of individual Member States.*"²⁶⁷

Title VI, which pertains to Home and Judicial Affairs, also reflects the member states' belief in the need for cooperation at the European level. Title VI,

²⁶³ Thatcher, "Britain's Policies Towards Europe, Trade and Defence."

²⁶⁴ Leon Brittan, *Europe: The Europe We Need* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994), 182.

²⁶⁵ Article J4(1), (4), and (7) of the TEU

²⁶⁶ Vanhoonacker, "A Critical Issue," 32.

²⁶⁷ "European Council: Presidency Conclusions: Rome, 14 and 15 December 1990, in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union*, 319. (Emphasis added.)

for example, established a European Police Office (Europol) which would coordinate efforts between states in combat²⁶⁸ing drug trafficking and terrorism. Matters such as the latter are international in scope. This reflects in Title VI's Article K3 the need to adopt

...joint action in so far as the objectives of the Union can be attained better by joint action than by the Member States acting individually on account of the scale or effects of the action envisaged; it may decide that measures implementing joint action are to be adopted by a qualified majority.²⁶⁹

While Article K2 stipulates that member states will coordinate efforts (through a coordinating Committee) in implementing the provisions under Article K1 (eg. asylum policy, combating drug addiction, judicial cooperation in civil matters, etc), Article K4 asserts that the Council "shall act *unanimously*, except on matters of procedure and in cases where Article K3 expressly provides for other voting rules."²⁷⁰ Moreover, Title VI does not affect the "exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security."²⁷¹

Neither Home and Judicial Affairs nor CFSP are part of the TEU legal framework *per se* nor, more importantly, subject to judicial review of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).²⁷² *When stipulated with* Home and Judicial

²⁶⁸ Article K1(9) of the TEU

²⁶⁹ Article K3 (2)(b) of the TEU

²⁷⁰ Article K4(3) of the TEU. (Emphasis added.)

²⁷¹ Article K2 (2) of the TEU

²⁷² Trevor C. Salmon, "The Union, CFSP, and the European Security Debate," in Lodge, *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future*, 264.

Affairs, the Council shall act "*unanimously*, except for procedural questions and in the case referred to in Article J3(2)." ²⁷³ While the CFSP, as the intergovernmentalists define it, calls for the EU member states to honor common objectives in the realm of international organizations, ²⁷⁴ there is "no suggestion that the Union should take over from the member states in the UN as that would entail a loss of voting power." ²⁷⁵ While the EU member states who are Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council retain the right to act in their own national interest, the Maastricht Treaty obliges member states like France and the United Kingdom to "ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter." ²⁷⁶

An interesting clash between progress towards a federal Europe and the national identity of a EU member state revolved around the issue of common citizenship. For supranationalists, the concept of common citizenship was perceived as a way of advancing the argument that the project of European unity "*referred not just to governments but also to peoples*." ²⁷⁷ The

²⁷³ Article. J8(2) of the TEU. In Article J3 (2) asserts that the "Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its development, define those matters which decisions decided are to be taken by a qualified majority."

²⁷⁴ Lodge, "The Transition to a CFSP," 244.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 245.

²⁷⁶ Article J4 of the TEU.

²⁷⁷ Jacob Soderman, "Citizen, Who Stand Up for Your Rights," *The European*, 7-13 December 1995, 8. (Emphasis

supranationalists, thus, assert that the "Community constituted a new legal order, the subject rights of which were member states and their nationals."²⁷⁸ Under common citizenship, for example, the peoples of the European Union are allowed to work and reside in any part of the Union.²⁷⁹ This right is construed as fundamental because according to Title I of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Right of Workers (1989)

[t]he right to freedom of movement shall enable any worker to engage in any occupation or profession in the Community in accordance with the principles of equal treatment as regards access to employment, working conditions and social protection in the host country.²⁸⁰

added.) For example, see "Preambles to the Treaties of Rome," in Nelsen and C-G Stubb, *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, 14.

²⁷⁸ Soderman, "Citizen Who Stand Up for Your Rights," 8. (Emphasis added.)

²⁷⁹ Article 8a of the TEU. See also "Resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference in the Context of the European Parliament's Strategy for European Union," *Official Report*, C324, 24 December 1990.

²⁸⁰ "Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers," in Bernard Rudden and Derrick Wyatt, eds., *Basic Community Laws*, new edition: includes the Maastrich Amendments (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 613. This Charter, cite: Rudden and Wyatt, was only adopted by 11 of the 12 Member States at the Strasbourg Summit 9 December 1989 (p. 611). An individual and his family have the right to live anywhere in the Union but as Article I (1) of an EEC Directive (28 June 1990) states: "the individual must be able to prove to possess insurance and "have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence" ("Council Directive of 28 June 1990 on the Right of Residence [90/364/EEC]," in *ibid.*, 411).

The question here, however, is whether or not Community citizenship can replace national citizenship.²⁸¹ It is an interesting question because under common citizenship of the TEU a European citizen can vote in the local and European Parliament elections of the area he works and resides in.²⁸² Furthermore, a European citizen has the right to petition (through an Ombudsman²⁸³) the European Parliament regarding "complaints against the Union."²⁸⁴

The issue of common citizenship was a concern for the Danish people in the first referendum on the Maastricht Treaty.²⁸⁵ This is because the Danes were concerned that rights and privileges enjoyed by Danes would be extended to other European citizens.²⁸⁶ It was made clear at the Birmingham Summit (October 1992) that European citizenship would offer "additional rights and protection without in any way taking the place of their

²⁸¹ Ernest Wistrich, *The United States of Europe* (London: Routledge, 1994), 94.

²⁸² Article 8b of the TEU. See also "Resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference," 24 December 1990.

²⁸³ Article 8d of the TEU.

²⁸⁴ David O'Keefe, "Union Citizenship," in David O'Keefe and Patrick M. Twomey, eds., *Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty* (London: Chancery Law Publishing, 1994), 101. According to Article 138 e of the TEU, the Ombudsman can make inquiries "for which he finds grounds, either on his own initiative or on the basis of complaints submitted to him directly or through a member of European Parliament, except where the alleged facts are or have been the subject of legal proceedings."

²⁸⁵ "The Danes Say No," *The Economist*, 6 June 1992, 11.

²⁸⁶ Carlos Closa, "Citizenship of the Union and the Nationality of the Member States," in O'Keefe and Twomey, *Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty*, 114.

national citizenship."²⁸⁷ Denmark's Declaration at the Edinburgh Summit (December 1992) also attempted to resolve this conflict over the problem of national identity within the European Union context.²⁸⁸ In that Declaration, Denmark stated that it would establish legislation granting European citizens the right to vote or to stand for elections in the next European Parliament election of 1994. However,

Nothing in the Treaty on European Union implies or foresees an undertaking to create a citizenship of the Union in the sense of citizenship of a nation state.... Citizenship of the Union in no way in itself gives a national of another Member State the right to obtain Danish citizenship or any of the rights, duties, privileges or advantages that are inherent in Danish citizenship by virtue of Denmark's constitutional, legal and administrative rules.²⁸⁹

Were the Danes' concerns justified? If anything, the Birmingham and the Danish Declarations reinforced traditional international law which states that citizenship of the individual is determined by a member state.²⁹⁰ As well, an individual can only attain European citizenship if he (or she) is a national of

²⁸⁷ "Birmingham Declaration -- A Community Close to its Citizens," *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Vol. 25, No. 10 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992), 9. (Emphasis added.)

²⁸⁸ "Maastricht Sails On." *The Economist*, 22 May 1993, 15-16.

²⁸⁹ "Unilateral Declaration of Denmark, to be Associated to the Danish Act of Ratification of the Treaty on European Union of which the Eleven Other Member States will take Cognizance," in Rudden and Wyatt, *Basic Community Laws*, 233. (Emphasis added.)

²⁹⁰ Hans Kelsen, *Principles of International Law*, Second Edition, Revised and Edited by Robert W. Tucker (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), 372.

one of the Member States of the Union.²⁹¹ "An individual who cannot claim to be a national of a Member State," therefore, "cannot claim to be a citizen of the Union either."²⁹² European citizenship does not replace the citizenship of the member state for, as was outlined above, it is limited in scope.²⁹³

Finally, there was (and is) the issue of subsidiarity. Like the issue of CFSP and Home and Judicial Affairs, there existed an ideological rift between the supranationalists and the intergovernmentalists. There was (and is) a rift because there continues to be no agreement as to how subsidiarity should be defined.²⁹⁴ Articles A and 3b were placed in the TEU to alleviate the anxieties of "ideological" factions within the European Union.²⁹⁵ For the supranationalists, for example, the European Community is there to manage ^{European} legislation which affects directly the national life of European citizens.²⁹⁶ After all, Article A of the TEU asserts a

²⁹¹ Article 8 of the TEU.

²⁹² Closa, "Citizenship of the Union," 109.

²⁹³ Dawn Oliver and Derek Heater, *The Foundations of Citizenship* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), 142-143.

²⁹⁴ "Trial by Subsidiarity," *The Economist*, 4 July 1992, 15.

²⁹⁵ John Petterson, "Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit Any Vision," *Parliamentary Affairs: A Journal of Comparative Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (January 1994): 118.

²⁹⁶ "Resolution on the European Parliament's Guidelines for a Draft Constitution for the European Union," *Official Report*, C231, 17 September 1990.

*new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen.*²⁹⁷

For the supranationalist this definition of subsidiarity is designed "to recognize that legitimacy of Government grows from the individual citizen and not from institutions."²⁹⁸ It is a "commitment"

to have its proposals adopted by all democratic means, in particular by mobilizing European public opinion and its democratically elected representatives.²⁹⁹

The supranationalists assert that there are certain economic and political functions which do not have to be implemented at the general (or federal) level of government.³⁰⁰ Article A hopes to lead

to a better relationship between the States and the European Union as well as between the part of the states and their own government centers.³⁰¹

The supranationalist approach to subsidiarity seeks, therefore, "to constitutionalize a division of powers between different levels of government in a federal constitution for Europe."³⁰²

The intergovernmental understanding of subsidiarity, however, is perceived as limiting the powers of the European Union.³⁰³ The British Conservative Party of John Major, for example, adopts

²⁹⁷ Article A of the TEU. (Emphasis added.)

²⁹⁸ Dafydd Wigley, in correspondence with the author, 8 September 1994. Mr. Wigley of the Plaid Cymru is an MP for Caernafon.

²⁹⁹ "Resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference in the Context of Parliament's Strategy for European Union," *Official Journal*, C96, 17 April 1990.

³⁰⁰ See Chapter V of this dissertation.

³⁰¹ George Robertson, in correspondence with the author, 6 September 1994. (Emphasis added.)

³⁰² Petterson, "Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit Any Vision," 119. (Emphasis added.)

³⁰³ "Trial by Subsidiarity," 15. (Emphasis added.)

this line of reasoning because it is based on the Tory's belief in parliamentary sovereignty.³⁰⁴ "A parliament which cannot provide redress for the grievances of its electors," Lord Tebbit observes, "is an impotent parliament."³⁰⁵ In other words, Petterson writes that Major's Tory government believes in "territorial government" which "resists any constraints -- internal or external-- on the autonomy of central government."³⁰⁶

Unlike the supranationalists, the inter-governmentalists assert that the principle of subsidiarity can only affect the relationship between Brussels and the member states. A.G. Toth notes that only member states can determine at what level (be it central, regional or local government) to implement Community legislation. For Toth, this question "is a matter for national law to regulate in which Community law cannot interfere. Subsidiarity can only determine whether decisions should be taken at the Community or national level, no more."³⁰⁷

Article 3b of the TEU reflects the intergovernmental approach to subsidiarity because it

³⁰⁴ Wigley, in correspondence with the author, 8 September 1994. For more on the British Conservative Party's understanding of the impact the TEU (in particular the EMU) would have on parliamentary sovereignty, see Chapter VI of this dissertation.

³⁰⁵ Norman Tebbit, "Concern for Identity," *The European Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (February 1994): 4.

³⁰⁶ Petterson, "Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit any Vision," 119.

³⁰⁷ A.G. Toth, "Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity," in O'Keefe and Twomey, *Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty*, 38.

can be used as a device "for dividing competences between the EC and its member states according to which can perform specific actions more effectively."³⁰⁸

Article 3b is written as such:

The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.³⁰⁹

For subsidiarity to work, however, there must be a clear outline as to what are the exclusive, concurrent and potential powers of the Union.³¹⁰ Exclusive powers are responsibilities and powers enshrined in the Treaties; because these powers are enshrined in the Treaties, the member states of the Community "lose the right to act unilaterally,"³¹¹ and therefore, do not apply to the subsidiarity principle. Concurrent powers are responsibilities

³⁰⁸ Petterson, "Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit Any Vision," 120.

³⁰⁹ Article 3b of the TEU.

³¹⁰ Toth, "A Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity," 39. The European Community also acknowledged that this is one of the problems with Article 3b of the TEU. See "Subsidiarity Principle," 119. The "functional" element in which there is "an obligation to act because it is regarded as having the sole responsibility for the performance of certain tasks" ("The Subsidiarity Principle," *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Vol. 25, No. 10 [Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992], 120).

³¹¹ "Subsidiarity Principle," 119. The exclusive powers of the TEU include the freedom of movement of goods and services (Article 8a), common commercial policy (Article 113), and the conservation of fisheries resources (Article 102 of the 1972 Act of Accession).

in which both the Union and the member states would have the power to act. In this area, the Union would assert its authority only when it felt the need -- for example, delaying only with certain aspects of a matter or by enacting outline legislation. The member states would remain free to act on all aspects on which the Union had not taken action.³¹²

Potential powers include responsibilities "which might come within Union competence but which would initially be left with the member states."³¹³

The subsidiarity principle does apply, however, to the EU's concurrent powers in which, as mentioned above, they are responsibilities shared with its member states. While the authors of the TEU

did enumerate and at times carefully circumscribe the Community's powers, they also drew a distinction in Article 3b between exclusive Community competence and competence shared with the Member States without defining or specifying the content of each of these 'blocks of competence.'³¹⁴

The essential problem for anti-European elements in the British Conservative Party, for example, is that the European Union has discussed bringing shared competences into the European framework.³¹⁵ With the establishment of the single market, the European Community has warned that

³¹² A.G. Toth, "The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty," *Common Market Law Review*, Vol. 29 (1992): 1088. As mentioned in "Subsidiarity Principle," (p. 118): "Subsidiarity is a dynamic concept in the Community system. Far from putting Community action in a straitjacket, it allows it to be expanded where circumstances so require and, conversely, to be restricted or abandoned where it is no longer justified."

³¹³ Toth, "The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty," 1088.

³¹⁴ "Subsidiarity Principle," 119.

³¹⁵ Michael Spicer, *A Treaty Too Far: A New Policy for Europe* (London: Fourth Estate, Ltd, 1992), 116.

[t]he dynamics of the four freedoms generate-- and will continue to generate-- an impetus towards flanking measures which in turn call for the introduction of genuine policies, [...] albeit ones that do not at present involve exclusive Community competence-- that is, the possibility of depriving the Member States of the power to act.³¹⁶

There emerged out of this constitutional (or legal) debate an attempt to reach a compromise between the intergovernmentalists and the supranationalists. For Sir *R. W. Brittan*, Article 3b (like Article A) attempts to eschew the belief that all functions need to be performed at the federal level.³¹⁷ This article implies that

we have to examine if there are other methods available for Member States, for example, legislation, administrative instructions or codes of conduct, in order to achieve the objectives in a sufficient manner.³¹⁸

Article 3b, for example, links subsidiarity to the need for proportionality in which Community action is limited to what is "appropriate and necessary to achieve its desired goal."³¹⁹ The Birmingham Declaration of 1992 affirmed to set

guidelines for applying the principle in practice, for instance by using the lightest possible form of legislation, with maximum freedom for Member States on how best to achieve the objective in question.³²⁰

At the Edinburgh Summit (December 1992), the European Council agreed to a set of guidelines . which would

³¹⁶ "Subsidiarity Principle," 121.

³¹⁷ Brittan, *Europe*, 23.

³¹⁸ "Subsidiarity Principle," 116.

³¹⁹ Jo Steiner, "Subsidiarity under the Maastricht Treaty," in O'Keefe and Twomey, *Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty*, 59.

³²⁰ "Birmingham Declaration-- A Community Close to its Citizens," 9.

add strength to the proportional aspect of subsidiarity.³²¹ The following was adopted by the member states:

- the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States; and/or;

- actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would conflict with the requirements of the Treaty (such as the need to correct distortion of competition to avoid disguised restrictions on trade or strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would otherwise significantly damage Member States' interests; and/or;

- the Council must be satisfied that action at Community level would produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or effects compared with action at the level of the member state.³²²

As Article 3b asserts, then, the TEU attempts "to make clear from the outset that the subsidiarity principle regulates the exercise of powers rather than the conferment of powers."³²³ While European institutions will only implement duties and responsibilities articulated in the Treaty,³²⁴ the Community "should only intervene [in concurrent competences] if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be realized sufficiently by the Member States."³²⁵ If the Community must intervene, the Commission must attempt to set "the result to be achieved, but leave it to the

³²¹ "European Union: Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Vol. 25, No. 10 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992), 17.

³²² European Council, "Conclusions of the Presidency," European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992, 7.

³²³ "Subsidiarity Principle, 119.

³²⁴ Toth, "Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity," 38.

³²⁵ "Subsidiarity Principle," 116.

member states to choose the most appropriate means of doing so."³²⁶

CONCLUSION

This chapter tested Haas' assertion that the member states of the European Communities do have the ability to impede or promote the integration process.³²⁷ In examining the history of the European Community, supranationalists were able to bring forth new elements (like the Treaty of Rome and the CAP) which would signify development towards the establishment of a supranational Europe. It was during the de Gaulle years, however, that integration practitioners and scholars began to realize that concepts like national identity and state sovereignty continued to have political zeal in Western Europe. For de Gaulle, the EDC was simply an impediment to his vision of France taking a leading role in European affairs. De Gaulle also fought with the supranationalists over the issue of majority voting. The Luxembourg Compromise, for de Gaulle, signified a state's fundamental right to protect its national interest when dealing with issues of European integration.

In the 1970s, the oil crisis made it difficult for the EC's member states to arrive at a foreign policy consensus. While there was progress towards developing a single market through (for example) the Werner

³²⁶ Ibid., 123.

³²⁷ See Chapter III of this dissertation.

Report, foreign policy has remained an intergovernmental matter. The intergovernmental dimension to foreign policy can also be seen in the SEA and the TEU. While this may be the case, it was with the SEA and (in particular with) the TEU, however, that a supranational Europe took more of a definitive shape. Denmark, for example, responded to the development of a supranational Europe by voting "No" to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in its Referendum in 1992. The key element in voting "No" revolved around the issue of common citizenship.

The fundamental clash of ideas between supranationalists and intergovernmentalists can be seen within the British case study which make up the final two chapters of this study. The next two chapters will examine the various schools of thought of both the British Conservative Party and the Scottish National Party (SNP) over the issue of the supranational shape of the European Union and of the devolution process. This work analyzes to what degree issues like sovereignty and economic maximization take precedence in dealing with European membership and, moreover, highlight 'the main participants' (both in the Tory Party and the SNP) views of where to lead Britain (or an independent Scotland) into the next century.

CHAPTER V

DIFFERENT STRANDS OF THOUGHT WITHIN THE SNP REGARDING
DEVOLUTION AND SCOTLAND'S ROLE IN EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

The ~~next~~ ^{two} chapter comprise the British case study of this dissertation and test the hypothesis of whether or not there is emerging within the United Kingdom a fundamental debate between economic maximization and the role of national identity and state sovereignty. In particular, Chapter V outlines a clear manifestation of this crucial debate by examining two major strands of thought within the Scottish National Party (SNP). This debate over the importance of the role of ideas in the contemporary politics of Western Europe has emerged within the SNP over the issues of devolution and Scotland's "independent" role in the European Union.

The internal SNP debate over the future of Scotland's role in the European Union can be seen as that of an ideological one between economic and traditional nationalists. The economic nationalists, which include Allan Macartney,¹ Alex Salmond,² and Jim Sillars,³ assert that the United Kingdom is an

¹ Allan Macartney was elected Member of the European Parliament for North East Scotland in 1994. He is also the SNP's foreign affairs spokesperson.

² Alex Salmond, who has served as the SNP's MP for Banff and Buchan since 1987, is the National Convener of the Party.

³ Jim Sillars is the chief architect of the SNP's "Independence in Europe" campaign. Before joining the SNP he was a Labour MP for South Ayrshire, 1970-1979. He helped create the Scottish Labour Party in 1976.

anachronistic phenomenon because it no longer possesses any political utility in advancing the economic and social interests of Scotland. Jim Sillars advocates, for example, that the European Union can be construed as a practical replacement of Westminster for the betterment of Scotland's needs because of Europe's institutional progress towards the development of a federal entity.⁴ An important example of this supranational development was the coming into operation of the Single European Act (SEA) in July of 1987 and, more importantly, the signing of the Treaty on European Union in 1992.⁵ These two supranational developments, Sillars notes, demonstrate that decision making power over economic and social matters was moving away from the seat of government in London to the ever developing institutions in Brussels.

The traditional nationalists of the SNP include Jim Fairlie,⁶ James Halliday,⁷ and Jim Lynch.⁸ They are

After the 1979 referendum, he left Labour and joined the SNP. He was an MP for Glasgow Govan, 1988-1992. He has now retired from politics and works in the private sector.

⁴ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 836, Fifth Series, Session 1971-1972, 3 May 1972 cols. 537-538.

⁵ See Chapters IV and VI of this dissertation.

⁶ Jim Fairlie, who served as the Party's Senior Vice Chairman (1981-1984) and on the National Executive Council, was a staunch critic of the Party's "Independence in Europe" campaign. An intense debate between Fairlie and the leadership took place during the Paisley by-election in 1990. Fairlie had written an article for the *Scots Independent* critiquing Sillars's position "on the understanding that it would not be published until after polling day in Paisley" (Jim Fairlie, in correspondence to the author, 2 December 1994. [Emphasis in the original.]). The *Glasgow Herald*,

dubious about the "Independence in Europe" campaign because they believe that those who adhere to Sillars' economic recipe of nationalism have betrayed the SNP's traditional line of thought regarding Scotland's political future. The traditionalists claim that the "Independence in Europe" campaign is just an example of Orwellian doublethink because Sillars and Salmond want for Scotland to be "independent" and a member of a supranational institution all at the same time. "Independence in Europe" is, for Fairlie, simply another form of devolution. The more important disagreement for the traditional nationalists, however, centers around the economic nationalists' assertion

however, obtained a copy of the article and published excerpts on the eve of the by-election. Party activists were upset with the article "and it became clear to me that however valid my arguments were in opposition, to the line being promoted by Sillars et. al, the Party were unlikely to support me" (ibid.). Fairlie resigned on 2 December 1990. What makes these series of events even more interesting is that the "Independence in Europe" campaign was not at the time formal SNP policy. Fairlie prepared a discussion paper called "Independence in Europe" for the December meeting of the National Assembly in the same year, but because of his resignation, it was never circulated. (Fairlie's paper is discussed in this chapter.) At the National Assembly meeting, the Sillars' position was endorsed by 44 votes to two, with 2 absentations (ibid.). The National Executive Council supported Sillars position in March 1991.

⁷ Jim Halliday was Chairman of the SNP, 1956-1960. He was a parliamentary candidate for Stirling and Falkirk Burghs, 1955 and 1959 and West Fife, 1970.

⁸ Like Jim Fairlie, Jim Lynch is a Euroskeptic and, as will be discussed below, a critic of the SNP's position on devolution in the 1990s. Lynch, who served as a member of the SNP's National Executive Council (1978-1988), was a parliamentary candidate for Edinburgh North (1974), Central Fife (1979) and Dundee East (1983). Unlike Fairlie, Lynch maintains formal links with the SNP.

that the SNP needs to base Scotland's claim to independence in economic terms. For the traditional nationalists, as this chapter outlines, Scotland should, for better or for worse, be free and independent because it is a nation in its own right and is, therefore, worthy of statehood.

The SNP leadership's policy regarding the issue of devolution has also sparked another fundamental debate between the economic and traditional nationalists of the Party. Salmond and fellow Scottish MPs like Roseanna Cunningham⁹ and Margaret Ewing¹⁰ have taken what Neil MacCormick¹¹ defines as a "gradualist" line of thinking towards Scottish independence.¹² As understood by the SNP leadership, the concept of gradualism perceives devolution as a means for attaining Scottish statehood. While the gradualists of the SNP leadership remain dubious about the Labour Party's ability to even establish a Scottish Assembly,¹³ they assert that a devolved Parliament in Edinburgh is (at this historic juncture) the only

⁹ Roseanna Cunningham was elected MP for Perth and Kinross in April 1995.

¹⁰ Margaret Ewing, who is MP for Moray since 1987, serves as the SNP's Parliamentary Leader.

¹¹ Neil MacCormick served on the National Executive Council and helped draft the SNP's new constitution in the 1970s. He also identifies himself with the pro-European wing of the Party.

¹² Neil MacCormick, "Unrepentant Gradualism," in Owen Dudley Edwards, ed., *A Claim of Right for Scotland, Includes the 1988 Document* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1989), 99-110.

¹³ Interview with Alex Salmond in *Scots Independent*, September 1995, 6-7.

credible (or realistic) choice which can revolutionize the annals of Scottish politics.¹⁴

For the traditionalists of the SNP, however, there is a distinct feeling of political frustration with the SNP leadership's position on the devolution question.¹⁵ They find it very difficult, for example, to understand why the SNP gradualists have failed to learn from the Labour Party's indecisive (and Unionist) behavior towards the 1979 referendum on devolution. Labour's conduct in 1979 convinced the fundamentalist wing of the SNP like Christine Creech¹⁶ and Jim Fairlie that politicians like Tony Blair and George Robertson only perceive devolution as an *end rather than a means* as to how Scotland is to be governed. For traditionalists of the Party, as this chapter demonstrates, the devolution process fails to shape any revolutionary alteration as to how Scotland is to be governed because the Scottish Assembly is designed to work around and, more importantly, to preserve the Westminster Parliament.¹⁷ In other words, the SNP leadership's gradualist position towards independence draws the Party away from its fundamental aim of trying to separate Scotland altogether from a "'system' itself

¹⁴ Anthony Kerr, "Share a Platform," *Scots Independent*, February 1978, 8.

¹⁵ Interview with Jim Fairlie in Perth, Scotland (UK), 22 September 1995.

¹⁶ Christine Creech is a member of the SNP's National Executive Council.

¹⁷ Christine Creech, "Devolution -- A Unionist Parliament," *The New Politics for Independence*, SNP Conference Issue (1995): 7.

[which] is at the root of the economic and social woes [that] plague the country as a whole."¹⁸

SCOTLAND'S ROLE IN EUROPE

A. ECONOMIC NATIONALISTS

The economic nationalists of the SNP assert a practical line of argument to the revolutionary quest for a sovereign Scotland. Economic nationalists like Salmond and Sillars advocate that political independence coupled without economic independence would merely be a "vain achievement."¹⁹ This is because they believe, as Robert Crawford observes, that the Scottish electorate "wants to know where the Party stands" on economic, political, and social issues for

*there is little point in our propagandizing on independence and hope to persuade the majority of Scots of the merits of that if we are failing to attract support on the substantive issues which confront all societies.*²⁰

In arguing their case, for example, the SNP's leadership issues the complaint of the isolation of Scotland from the governmental bureaucracy in London.²¹ "Government," as H. Drucker observes, "has moved to the center of the social and economic life of the

¹⁸ Robert Crawford, "Ideology and the SNP," *Scots Independent*, February 1979, 3.

¹⁹ Leopold Kohr, "The New Radicalism," David Rollo, ed., *The Scotland We Seek* (Oban: Scots Independent (Newspapers) Limited, 1987), 25.

²⁰ Crawford, "Ideology and the SNP," 3. (Emphasis added.)

²¹ Allan Macartney, "A Springboard for Independence," *The New Politics for Independence*, SNP Conference Issue (1995): 6-7.

country."²² While this might be the case, Jim Sillars, the author of the "Independence in Europe" campaign, has a clear answer to the query as to "whether the political union with England still has *sufficient merit to warrant its retention*, or whether it has become a stranglehold on Scottish aspirations."²³ The Party's economic nationalists often deliberate why Scotland should be obliged to return North Sea oil revenue which, according to SNP economic figures, Scotland makes a net contribution to the UK Treasury of about £ 2 billion.²⁴ The SNP also deliberates as to why Scotland should be allowed to become a nuclear waste dump²⁵ by a Tory government which is "predominantly an English political party enjoying the support of fewer than 40 per cent ~~h..~~ of Scottish electors."²⁶

SNP's economic nationalists concur with Labour MP John McAllion's assessment that Scottish politics has become "Westminsterized;" that is, political action

²² H. Drucker, *The Politics of Nationalism and Devolution* (London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1980), 15.

²³ "Destruction of Scotland 'Too High a Price' for Union," *SNP News Release*, 8 December 1988, 1. (Emphasis added.)

²⁴ "Nine Reasons to Choose Independence in Europe," *Scottish National Party Position Paper*, n.d., Sec. 1, 13).

²⁵ The SNP leadership claims that Scotland is becoming a nuclear waste dump in which if the nuclear industry gets its way European states and England can send nuclear waste (about ten train loads and 100 lorry loads) to Dounreay every day for the next fifty years ("Nine Reason to Choose Independence in Europe," Sec 1, 13).

²⁶ Anthony King, "What is Scotland's Future?," in Dudley Fishburn, ed., *The World in 1996* (London: The Economist Publications, 1995), 29.

and the formation of policy are organized around arguing not for what is good for Northern Ireland, Scotland or for Wales but as to what is in the best interest for the United Kingdom as a whole.²⁷ Margaret Ewing laments that

Legislative Bills -- often ill thought out -- are presented to MPs by an all powerful, ideological executive.... The Committees are stacked with an in-built majority of Government sycophants -- look no further than the recent Committee on Scottish Local Government. Unitary authorities make sense against the background of an independent Scottish Parliament; but *Tory backbenchers with neither interest in nor knowledge of Scottish public opinion* have their faces sternly set against such ideas.²⁸

Paul H. Scott²⁹ notes that the Scottish people are governed by a Scottish Office in which its civil servants are "subject to ministers appointed by the government in London which makes the major decisions of policy."³⁰

Economic nationalism, Isobel Lindsay argues, is not simply a "campaign for economic betterment;" rather, it is "concerned with how modern society can fulfill the social, emotional, and material needs of its citizens."³¹ In bringing about a more democratic

²⁷ John McAllion, "Westminsterized," *Scottish Trade Union Review*, No. 63, March-April 1994, 18.

²⁸ Margaret Ewing, "Scotland: Pacesetter or Follower?" *Scottish Trade Union Review*, No. 66 September-October 1994, 16. (Emphasis added.)

²⁹ Paul H. Scott, who was Rector of University of Dundee, has served as Vice President of the SNP since 1992.

³⁰ Paul H. Scott, *Scotland in Europe: Dialogue with a Skeptical Friend* (Edinburgh: Canongate Press, 1992), 16.

³¹ Isobel Lindsay, "Nationalism, Community, Democracy," in Gavin Kennedy, ed., *The Radical*

government, Sillars asserts that an independent Scotland would give back to its citizens charge over their own economic and political destiny.³² Sillars laments that the main weakness with the traditionalists' line of argument, however, is that they "have done little work on more closely defining what independence means in practical terms."³³ The basic incentive for the Scottish electorate to vote for an independent Scotland lies in the economic realm³⁴ because, as Sillars noted as way back as 1972, the Scottish "are living in a time when there is an explosion of expectations among ordinary people, a desire for job opportunity, a better standard of life."³⁵ Sillars continues with his assessment of the Scottish electorate:

The doubts held by our group of potential independence voters, who go along part of the way but hesitate about the final irrevocable steps, are not without validity. Their collective caution will not vanish by increasing the volume of exhortation. They will only become convinced when the SNP faces up to certain economic and

Approach: Papers on an Independent Scotland (Edinburgh: Lindsay and Co., Ltd., 1976), 21.

³² Interview with Jim Sillars at the Sheraton Hotel in Edinburgh, Scotland (UK) on 10 February 1995.

³³ Jim Sillars, *Scotland: The Case for Optimism* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1986), 182.

³⁴ Margaret Ewing, "Learn from History," *The New Politics for Independence*, SNP Conference Issue (1995): 10.

³⁵ Parliamentary Debates, col. 537. (Emphasis added.) For example, read David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective," *International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (July 1971): 543 and Jean Monnet, "Men and Nations Must Learn to Control Themselves," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. XXVII, No. 19 (July 15, 1961): 579.

political imperatives which lie at the root of public doubt and anxiety.³⁶

In facing up to these "economic and political imperatives," however, Sillars came to realize that the economic and institutional decision-making of Scotland's political and economic interests were shifting from London to Brussels.³⁷ This development made Sillars further question whether or not the United Kingdom is suited for "Scotland's internationalized community emerging as [the Scottish people] approach the Europe of 1992 and the world of the 21st century."³⁸

The SNP leadership, which inaugurated its "Independence in Europe" campaign at the Inverness Party Conference back in September 1988,³⁹ believed the European Union would be a pragmatic replacement for Scotland to join as an independent state.⁴⁰ Unlike its surrogate relationship with the United Kingdom, Scottish membership with the European Union would be based upon an equal partnership with the other member states of the Union.⁴¹ This equal partnership obliges all member states in the European Union to follow the institution's rules and procedures. The SEA not only

³⁶ Sillars, *The Case for Optimism*, 182.

³⁷ Parliamentary Debates, 3 May 1972, cols. 537-538.

³⁸ "Destruction Scotland 'Too High a Price' for Union," 1.

³⁹ "European Strategy Triumphs," *The Scotsman*, 17 September 1988, 4.

⁴⁰ Andrew Marr, *The Battle for Scotland* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1992), 192.

⁴¹ Interview with Kevin Pringle, at Scottish National Party Headquarters, in Edinburgh, Scotland (UK), 25 October 1994. Mr. Pringle serves as the SNP's Research Officer.

requires member states to take on more decisions on the single market through majority voting,⁴² but, as Sillars asserts, there is also the expansion of Europe into other areas of state competencies such as the Common Fisheries Policy and the European Social Fund.⁴³ In examining the Treaty on European Union (TEU),⁴⁴ Europe is developing a federal Europe in which there are aspirations, not only for the establishment of a single currency and the establishment of a Central Bank,⁴⁵ but for the expansion into other state competencies such as Common Foreign and Security Policy.⁴⁶

The economic nationalists of the SNP also assert that Scotland should join the European Union as an independent state because of its strong economic ties to the European continent.⁴⁷ As the home to a hundred European companies, Scotland "builds more computers per head of population than any other country in the world."⁴⁸ Scotland not only produces 20 per cent of Europe's oil supplies,⁴⁹ but Scotland's productivity in

⁴² See Chapter IV of this dissertation.

⁴³ Sillars, *The Case for Optimism*, 185.

⁴⁴ For details on the TEU, see Chapters IV and VI of this dissertation.

⁴⁵ For more on this point, read Peter Gumbel and Thomas Kamn, "Decision Point: EU Nations Near Vote on Fate of Single Currency," *The Wall Street Journal*, 13 December 1995, A14.

⁴⁶ See, for example, the Declaration on Practical Arrangements in the Field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Final Act of the TEU.

⁴⁷ "Independence in Europe -- 'Good for Business,'" *SNP News Release*, 11 May 1995, 1-2.

⁴⁸ Magnus Linklater, "Scotland the Brave European," in Dudley Fishburn, ed., *The World of 1992* (London: The Economist Publication, 1991), 38.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

manufactured exports is (according to the SNP) 30 per cent higher than the rest of the UK.⁵⁰ While the British Conservative Party have perceived Scotland to be a "subsidized nation,"⁵¹ Anthony King points out that Scotland (as an independent state) can "go it alone inside the EU."⁵² According to the SNP Budget figures for 1995/1996, for example, Scotland's revenues made up 9.8 per cent (about £27.2 bn) of the UK's total revenue (about £278.9 bn).⁵³ The SNP figures suggest, as Alex Salmond argues, that Scotland contributes 9.8 per cent of total UK revenue -- "over £23 per week per taxpayer."⁵⁴

As an independent state in the European Union, Scotland would have a seat at the Council of Ministers and European Council. This is important because, as mentioned above, it is in the Council of Ministers where key decisions on European policy are made.⁵⁵ In the Council of Ministers, on certain matters Scotland would have an equal voice with the other member states of the Union because of the unanimity requirement. Unanimity, for example, is required (under the legal obligations of the TEU) on issues such as asylum, immigration, and indirect tax harmonization as well as

⁵⁰ "Independence in Europe -- 'Good for Business,'" 1.

⁵¹ See Chapter VI of this dissertation.

⁵² King, "What is Scotland's Future?," 29.

⁵³ "Scots Pay More Tax than Rest of UK -- Tartan Jibe 'Returned with Interest,'" *SNP News Release*, 8 November 1995, 2.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 1. (Emphasis in the original.)

⁵⁵ Interview with Pringle.

treaty changes.⁵⁶ Through the Council of Ministers, Sillars also asserts that Scotland can "address policy issues totally free from the need to check with Whitehall to see if our views must be adjusted to conform with their majority outlook"⁵⁷ and, when necessary, enact the Luxembourg Compromise.⁵⁸ The SNP's leader Alex Salmond notes that through the concept of subsidiarity⁵⁹ Scotland can play its

part in the political reform of the Community, arguing for greater democracy and accountability within EC structures to close the "democratic deficit." Our objective is not a European superstate but a confederate Community of independent nations which chose to share their sovereignty and cooperate more closely for the benefit of all, while still retaining their rich diversity.⁶⁰

Sillars also notes that "Independence in Europe" gives Scotland an opportunity to develop its international dimension. Sillars discusses, for example, Scotland developing its relationship with the Nordic Region.⁶¹ In this respect, Scotland potentially might form a coalition with its Nordic partners in the Council of Ministers to block legislation deemed outside the realm

⁵⁶ "The Power of Small Nations in the New Europe," *Scottish Center for Economic and Social Research*, Paper No. 5 (September 1994): 6.

⁵⁷ Jim Sillars, *No Turning Back: The Case for Scottish Independence within the European Community and How We Face the Challenge of 1992*, 10.

⁵⁸ "The Power of Small Nations in the New Europe," 6. For more on the Luxembourg Compromise, read Chapter IV of this dissertation.

⁵⁹ This concept is discussed in Chapter IV of this dissertation.

⁶⁰ Alex Salmond, "A Response from the Leader of the Scottish National Party Concerning Scottish Independence," 9 August 1994, 8.

⁶¹ Interview with Sillars.

of the bloc's national (or regional) interest.⁶² As an anti-isolationist/separatist party,⁶³ Allan Macartney would like to see the development of an Association of States of the British Isles in which there would be regular meetings over issues of common interest such as railways and communications.⁶⁴ In this new relationship, Jim Mitchell notes, London would not be able to hinder Scotland's economic and political well-being.⁶⁵ As the status quo stands, however, Sillars observes that

We may have opinions on the need to reach UN targets for Third World aid, and our people individually give more per head to aid charities than others in the British isles, *but collectively we can do nothing systematic on an institutional basis.*⁶⁶

"By pooling sovereignty in defined areas," then, "the European Union enables all Member States -- both large and small-- to exert influence at a European level."⁶⁷

In examining the implementation of the "Independence in Europe," program, the SNP asserts that an independent Europe would not only have to be based upon an "negotiated settlement between Scotland and Westminster",⁶⁸ but through a referendum "allowing the

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Sillars, *No Turning Back*, 9. This point is discussed in Chapter VI of this dissertation.

⁶⁴ Allan Macartney, "Independence in Europe," *Scottish Government Yearbook*, 1990, 38.

⁶⁵ Jim Mitchell, "Only Way is a Powerful Scottish Parliament with Equal Voice in EC," *The Scotsman*, 3 February 1992, 8.

⁶⁶ Sillars, *No Turning Back*, 4. (Emphasis added.)

⁶⁷ "The Power of Small Nations in the New Europe," 2.

⁶⁸ Interview with Pringle. See also Lister Gardiner, "Scotland in Europe: Some Legal Implications," *Scottish Center for Economic and Social Research Paper No. 2* (September 1990): 6.

people of Scotland to decide if it should be part of the EU."⁶⁹ In a January 1995 poll, for example, 53 per cent of the Scottish electorate favored Scotland remaining in the EU.⁷⁰ Without such a formal arrangement, however, it becomes unclear as to whether or not the European Union can recognize Scotland as an independent entity because such a political act would be "considered unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a member state."⁷¹

Nevertheless, the SNP leadership finds it difficult to cite any reasonable objection as to why the European Union would deny Scotland membership for such a move would run "completely counter to the preferred view of an inexorably expanding Community."⁷² The philosophy of Europe, furthermore, is to establish closer ties with its peoples "and to ensure development of its prosperity in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,"⁷³ which supports "the truly democratic will of a nation like Scotland to attain self-government."⁷⁴ As Lister Gardiner further

⁶⁹ Ian A. Bromner, "Scotland and Europe," *The Scotsman*, 3 March 1995, 12. (Emphasis added.)

⁷⁰ Robbie Dinwoodie, "SNP At Odds with Poll for Europe," *The Glasgow Herald*, 19 January 1995, 1.

⁷¹ Christian von Arnim, "European Route to Home Rule 'Fatally Flawed,'" *The Scotsman*, 21 September 1994, 4.

⁷² Macartney, "Independence in Europe," 40.

⁷³ Gardiner, "Scotland in Europe," 13.

⁷⁴ Ibid. (Emphasis added.) See also Elizabeth Buie, "UN Tackles Britain over Home Rule," *The Glasgow Herald*, 21 July 1995, 1 and 3 and Elizabeth Buie, "UN 'Not Satisfied' on Home Rule Issue," *The Glasgow Herald*, 22 July 1995, 4.

argues, the Treaty of Union of 1707 created "a unitary state out of two European states which at that time clearly possessed sovereign statehood within the meaning of international law."⁷⁵ If the United Kingdom were to be dissolved, the constituent parts "would return to their sovereign statehoods which would mean so far as may be relevant that each state would take on independently the treaties, rights and obligations in existence prior to that revocation."⁷⁶ What is clear, however, as analyzed in the text below, is that there is empirical evidence to demonstrate that the Scottish people want some form of political change. In a February 1995 *Glasgow Herald* poll, for example, 76 per cent of the Scottish people favored the development of a new political relationship with the London establishment.⁷⁷

For the SNP, the "Independence in Europe" campaign is an attempt to free Scotland from an "increasingly intolerant state," which, according to Paul H. Scott, is

riddled with secrecy, patronage and pompous absurdity, with a parliamentary system that allows a Prime Minister, usually elected on a minority vote, to assume virtually absolute power.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Gardiner, "Scotland in Europe," 7.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Robbie Dinwoodie, "Shifting Scenery as the Play Goes on," *The Glasgow Herald*, 9 February 1995, 6.

⁷⁸ Paul H. Scott, *Towards Independence: Essays on Scotland* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1991), 214.

While the member states of the European Union contest the institution's economic and political future,⁷⁹ however, Roseanna Cunningham asserts that the SNP must develop a "detailed and constructive response" to Europe's post-Maastricht debate.⁸⁰ By being a member state to the EU, nevertheless, Scotland could negotiate on its own behalf over fishing and not be excluded from the Social Chapter.⁸¹ Sillars observed that the

great sea of change in economic power distribution to which I refer cannot be reversed. Indeed, it should be welcomed by internationalists, because a world more evenly balanced in terms of economics is likely to be a more stable one politically. We should also be happy to see peoples who have been traditionally poor and exploited creating an indigenous strength, reaching new levels of independence, and growing in prosperity.⁸²

Scotland under the UK, the SNP leadership argues, has "zero independence."⁸³ Under the "Independence in Europe" campaign, however, Scotland regains its ability to shape its own destiny in a supranational organization (be it confederal, federal, or, simply intergovernmental) where sovereignty is shared in certain economic and political sectors of the state.⁸⁴ As Margaret Ewing asserts, the "Independence in Europe" campaign signifies that SNP cannot be looked upon as a

⁷⁹ For example, read Leon Brittan, "Europe Must Grow to Change," and Norman Macrae, "The European Farce," in Fishburn, *The World in 1996*, 48 and 19 respectively.

⁸⁰ Roseanna Cunningham for Vice Convener Policy, Pamphlet distributed at the 1995 SNP Conference in Perth, Scotland (UK).

⁸¹ Paul H. Scott, "Europe Adds Urgency to the Case for Independence," *The Scotsman*, 15 February 1995, 14.

⁸² Sillars, *No Turning Back*, 8.

⁸³ Interview with Pringle.

⁸⁴ Interview with Sillars.

mere protest party; "Scottish politics is dynamic and exciting; and the SNP is in the van."⁸⁵

B. TRADITIONAL NATIONALISTS.

The traditional nationalists of the SNP would concur with the economic nationalist's assessment that the United Kingdom's centralized form of government does not take into consideration the interests of the Scottish people.⁸⁶ Paul H. Scott compares Scotland's relationship with the United Kingdom to that of being in bed with an elephant; that is, the

elephant can use its sheer bulk and weight to flatten resistance altogether. This can happen even by accident without any malicious intention. If there is a conflict of interests of tastes, weight is liable to predominate. This sort of experience is common whenever a country has a neighbor much larger and wealthier than itself.⁸⁷

The question for the traditional nationalists, however, is whether or not Scottish nationalism *should* be based upon an *economic rationale*. Their answer to those who espouse the Salmond and Sillars argument is that the aspiration for a free Scotland should not be based upon material gain. The Scottish poet Hugh MacDiarmid summarizes eloquently their sacrosanct position: "*I am not interested in economics. I believe, and my whole nationalist position is grounded in the belief, that where there's a will there's a way, and if we are*

⁸⁵ Margaret Ewing, "Scots' Two-Front Fight," *The Times*, 14 September 1988.

⁸⁶ Interview with Dr. Robert D. McIntyre, at his residence in Stirling, Scotland (UK), 24 March 1995. Dr. McIntyre, an MP for Motherwell and Wishaw (1945), served as Chairman of the SNP from 1948-1956. He also served as President, 1958-1960.

⁸⁷ Scott, *Towards Independence*, 49.

sufficiently intent on having independence, nothing will stand in our way. *We are quite prepared to meet all the sacrifices, if any, that are required.*"⁸⁸

The traditional nationalists have certain fundamental disagreements with an economic perspective of Scottish independence. For one, the traditionalists have difficulties asserting their aspirations for independence on what they would describe as simply being short-term economic and social issues. An example of a "short-term political issue" would be Margaret Thatcher's introduction of the poll tax to Scotland in 1988.⁸⁹ While this issue does not fall entirely within the scope of this chapter, a few words should be recorded. The poll tax, Joanne Robertson notes, became the "embodiment of the government's arrogance and

⁸⁸ Hugh MacDiarmid, *A Political Speech*, A Transcript from a Recording taken at the 1320 Club Symposium Glasgow University, 6 April 1968 (Edinburgh: MacDonald Presston Limited, 1972), 5. (Emphasis added.)

⁸⁹ The purpose of the poll tax (or community charge) was to restructure the payment for a community's local services. In abolishing domestic rates, Thatcher recalls in the first volume of her memoirs that her government would "replace them with a community charge at a flat rate on all adults. There would be rebates for those on low incomes -- though rebates should be less than 100 per cent so that everyone should contribute something, and therefore have something to lose from electing a spendthrift council. This principle of accountability underlay the whole reform" (Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* [London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993], 648). "Together," Nicholas Ridley announced before the House of Commons, "[these] proposals will provide the essential linkage between those who use, pay and vote for local services" (Parliamentary Debates [Hansard], House of Commons, Sixth Series, Session 1987-1988, 16 December 1987, col. 1115).

disregard for Scottish opinion."⁹⁰ The economic nationalists of the SNP responded to Thatcher's community charge with demonstrations and petition drives⁹¹ and, moreover, by starting a campaign of non-payment⁹² and of asserting that Scotland was fed up being treated like "a colony by Mrs. Thatcher and her English government..."⁹³ The economic nationalists asserted that London was not only using Scotland as a guinea pig⁹⁴ but that, moreover, the Scots were becoming aware that the SNP was the only Party which "can stop the poll tax and deliver a Scottish Parliament."⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Joanne Robertson, "Born of Anger and a New Desperation," *The Sunday Times-Scotland*, 27 August 1995, 2.

⁹¹ "Poll-Tax Non-Payment Call Backed to the Hilt," *The Scotsman*, 16 September 1988, 4.

⁹² "Poll Tax: Don't Pay -- The Only Way," Says SNP," *SNP News Release*, 31 March 1989, 1. For more on this point read Rob Edwards, "A Thistle in the Flesh," *New Statesman and Society*, 23 September 1988, 21 and Marr, *The Battle for Scotland*, 179-180.

⁹³ "District Election Results," *SNP News Release*, 6 May 1988, 1.

⁹⁴ Margaret Ewing, Speech to SNP National Conference in Inverness, Scotland (UK), 15 September 1988.

⁹⁵ "District Election Results," 1. (Emphasis added.) In the District Elections of May 1988, for example, the SNP took 25.2 per cent of the vote as compared to the Conservative Party's 17.1 per cent of the vote (*ibid.*). For the SNP, the 1988 District Elections were of major significance because it represented a net increase of over 50 seats for the SNP "and most importantly, it displaced the Tories as Scotland's second party" ("New Political Situation -- 'SNP Will Force the Issue,'" *Scottish National Party Parliamentary Group News Release*, 12 May 1988, 2). As well, there was division within the Labour Party over the issue of non-payment of the poll tax ("Still Taxing Labor Unity," *The Scotsman*, 6 September 1988, 11). In her speech before the SNP Conference in Inverness, Ewing asserted that the split in the Labor Party over the poll tax damaged Labour's claim of representing

While the SNP's primary goal in fighting the poll tax was to demonstrate its opposition to Westminster rule over Scotland,⁹⁶ the traditional nationalists assert that the SNP should not be construed as an anti-poll tax party but, rather, as an anti-Unionist Party "seeking the reestablishment of a National Scottish Parliament."⁹⁷ For Jim Fairlie, the problem with the economic nationalists' argument over the poll tax was that the SNP leadership attempted to use the issue of the poll tax as an incentive to influence voters to vote for the establishment of a Scottish Parliament.⁹⁸ The fact of the matter, however, is that while the poll tax is now part of the history of British politics, Scotland continues to contest for its independence. If the poll tax is unable to rally the cry of the Scottish electorate, Fairlie argues, what issue, then, would rally the people of Scotland to vote for independence? Alleviating unemployment? Regaining the assets to North Sea oil? While the discovery of oil "contributed" to the political success of the SNP in the 1970s,⁹⁹ "the

Scotland's interests (Ewing, Speech to SNP National Conference, 15 September 1988).

⁹⁶ Jim Fairlie, "Fairlie Frankly," *Scots Independent*, June 1988, 2.

⁹⁷ Raddy Ramsay, "Scots Independent Forum," *Scots Independent*, June 1988, 8.

⁹⁸ Jim Fairlie, "Fairlie Frankly," *Scots Independent*, February 1988, 2.

⁹⁹ The 1970s proved to be a fruitful decade for the SNP in which the Party took a series of electoral wins. These wins included the following: Margo MacDonald won the Govan by-election in November 1973 (41.0%); Gordon Wilson took a close second in the Dundee East by-election of 1973 (30.2%); and in February of 1974 the SNP sent seven MPs to Westminster including Gordon

knowledge that an independent Scotland would be vastly richer, did nothing to stop the loss of nine [SNP] seats in 1979."¹⁰⁰ "The problem is of course that if those [economic] ends could be achieved within the context of the UK," Fairlie further writes, "the need for independence would no longer be there."¹⁰¹ The late Donald Stewart¹⁰² once asserted that the SNP's nationalist movement must be based upon something more fundamental than mere economic or material gain.¹⁰³

A key political debate to dominate the SNP in the 1990s, however, is the "Independence in Europe" movement. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the issue of European unity is an important one because of the significance it would have on how one governs the different peoples of Western Europe.¹⁰⁴ While Donald Stewart agrees that British membership to the EC in the 1970s signified that "the best days of the UK were over...",¹⁰⁵ Sillars made the further point that an

Wilson (Dundee East), Donald Stewart (Western Isles) and Margaret Ewing (Moray and Naim) (*A Short History of the Scottish National Party* [Edinburgh: Research Department of the Scottish National Party. 1994], 4).

¹⁰⁰ Jim Fairlie, "Fairlie Frankly," *Scots Independent*, March 1988, 2.

¹⁰¹ Jim Fairlie, "I Am Not a Nationalist, But...", in Rollo, *The Scotland We Seek*, 9. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁰² Donald Stewart was MP for the Western Isles, 1970-1987. He also served as president of the Party between 1982-1987.

¹⁰³ Donald Stewart, "The Way Forward," in Rollo, *The Scotland We Seek*, 5.

¹⁰⁴ See Chapter IV of this dissertation.

¹⁰⁵ Donald Stewart, *A Scot at Westminster* (Sydney, Nova Scotia [Canada]: The Catalone Press, 1994), 55.

important argument behind the "Independence in Europe" campaign is to give Scotland the opportunity to

strengthen [the Community's] democratic institutions, widen its capacity for ideological and political change, and subscribe to the debate about what kind of Community it may ultimately become.¹⁰⁶

Fairlie would agree with Sillars that the state cannot live in economic isolation.¹⁰⁷ While fellow traditional nationalist Jim Lynch, for example, would like to see Scotland rebuild its industrial base in its post-Independent phase before establishing an economic relationship with the EU,¹⁰⁸ Fairlie writes that in an interdependent world sovereign states have "accepted specific treaty limitations in their law-making rights."¹⁰⁹ Fairlie also asserts that it is the responsibility of the international community to work together "for the betterment of all."¹¹⁰

The "basic reality" of today's European Union, however, is that member states are asked to relinquish their power and sovereignty "on a permanent basis".¹¹¹ The traditional nationalists assert skepticism about a

¹⁰⁶ Sillars, *No Turning Back*, 5.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Jim Fairlie, in Perth Scotland (UK) 2 December 1994.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Jim Lynch, at the Sheraton Hotel in Edinburgh, Scotland (UK), 25 March 1995.

¹⁰⁹ Jim Fairlie, "Independence in Europe: A Discussion Paper," November 1990, 4.

¹¹⁰ Jim Fairlie, Letter to the *Glasgow Herald*, 30 September 1994, 1.

¹¹¹ Jim Fairlie, unpublished letter to *The Scotsman*, 18 September 1991. (Emphasis added.) See also Kenny Farquharson, "Precarious Stance on European Slippery Slope," *Scotland on Sunday*, 24 September 1995, 14.

European Union that is becoming far too centralized¹¹² and on the detrimental effect it would have on Scottish sovereignty.¹¹³ The TEU, Fairlie laments, is an attempt to establish "a federal government within an increasingly centralized European Community."¹¹⁴ While there were merits in merging coal and steel in certain states of Western Europe, as the late Donald Stewart once argued, "the appetite grew and the current monster shows no sign of being satiated."¹¹⁵ In a paper on "Independence in Europe" (November 1990), for example, Fairlie articulates the same concerns of those who oppose the TEU in the Conservative Party.¹¹⁶ Like the Euroskeptics of the Tory Party, Fairlie argues that a "claim of sovereignty" means "representative authority in the 'name of the people' to exercise law-making and law-enforcement with a designated territory."¹¹⁷ The essential problem that Fairlie has with the European Union is that it is not simply an agreement on economic cooperation; rather, it is a supranational agreement in which Community law is superior to state law.¹¹⁸ Moreover, Fairlie's most fundamental objection (like those within the Euro-sceptic wing of the

¹¹² Dinwoodie, "SNP at Odds with Poll for Europe," 1.

¹¹³ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 60, Sixth Series, Session 1983-1984, col. 703.

¹¹⁴ Jim Fairlie, Letter to the Editor of the *Perthshire Advertiser*, May 1991.

¹¹⁵ Stewart, *A Scot at Westminster*, 49.

¹¹⁶ See Chapter VI of this dissertation.

¹¹⁷ Fairlie, "Independence in Europe," 4.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

Conservative Party) is the establish of European Monetary Union in which its implications "cannot be divorced from the concept of sovereignty, a concept around which the entire constitutional debate in Scotland revolves."¹¹⁹ For Fairlie the implications of EMU on Scottish sovereignty is an important issue to contest because

*... the manipulation of the levers of power will rest with the central bank, the financial institutions and the bureaucratic structures which will grow up around them. There are already demands to give the European Parliament increased political control and EMU will heighten them further. This could only be at the expense of national parliaments and is incompatible with any notion of a Confederation of Nation States.*¹²⁰

Unlike Sillars, then, Fairlie perceives the European Community to be not only an "exclusive club" which would restrict "trade and economic cooperation with the rest of the world," but, moreover, a supranational institutions in which its essential aim is to create "closer political as well as economic union," acting as antithesis to the "SNP's policy of the restoration of sovereignty to the Scottish people."¹²¹ As a nationalist, Stewart once wrote, it seems illogical striving "to regain power for the people of Scotland,

¹¹⁹ Jim Fairlie, "Implications for Scotland of Economic and Monetary Union," Conference paper presented in February 1992. (Emphasis added.)

¹²⁰ Fairlie, "Independence in Europe," 5.

¹²¹ Ibid. 2-3. (Emphasis added.) On the same point, read Dick Douglas, *At the Helm: The Life and Times of Dr. Robert D. McIntyre* (Portessie: NPFI Publications, 1995), 95-96.

[and then] hand over power to a faceless European bureaucracy."¹²²

Finally, as with the issue of the poll tax, the economic nationalists seem to be caught up on the economic and political gains of Scotland in Europe. "We all know," Fairlie writes, "that what is right and correct is not always politically popular or fashionable, but if political parties in Scotland are to be seen to stand for something other than merely their own elevation to positions of power, some principles at least must be non-negotiable."¹²³

Economic nationalists, as Christine Creech laments, spend so much time arguing over economic and social problems that they fail to acknowledge the true essence or spirit of independence and self-determination.¹²⁴ The traditional nationalists observe that those in the SNP leadership have

no concern with things of fundamental importance, with the great spiritual issues of underlying the mere statistics of trade and industry, with the ends to which all other things should merely be means, that I don't feel the destiny of Scotland lies with it.¹²⁵

What, then, should be the basis for Scottish nationalism, if it is not to be asserted from an economic perspective? The SNP, which can trace its

¹²² Stewart, *A Scot at Westminster*, 49-50. (Emphasis added.)

¹²³ Jim Fairlie, unpublished letter to *The Glasgow Herald*, 17 August 1994. (Emphasis added.)

¹²⁴ "A Real Political Agenda for Scotland," *Scots Independent*, September 1995, 4.

¹²⁵ MacDiarmid, *A Political Speech*, 9. (Emphasis added.)

political roots back to 1934,¹²⁶ advocated the belief that

[the] future of Scotland is not in the hands of peace conferences and foreign ambassadors and agitated prime ministers. The future of Scotland is in the hands of her own people.¹²⁷

For the traditionalists of the Party, the SNP was established to assert the "belief that self-government meant independence from Westminster in the total sense."¹²⁸ Sillars might be able to debate the argument of how the Commonwealth brought about assimilation in the United Kingdom¹²⁹ or the late John P. Mackintosh might have been able to deliberate whether or not the Scots possess dual nationality,¹³⁰ but, for traditional nationalists, Scotland is a distinct nation with its own history institutions and language¹³¹ in which, for example, "unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a *distinctively English principle* [having] no counterpart

¹²⁶ For more on the origins of the SNP read, for example, Richard J. Finlay, "Pressure Group or Political Party: The Nationalist Impact on Scottish Politics, 1928-1945," *Twentieth Century British History*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1992): 274-297 and by one of its political founders J.M. MacCormick, *The Flag in the Wind: The Story of the Nationalist Movement in Scotland* (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1955).

¹²⁷ Robert D. McIntyre, "Scotland and the Peace," *Scots Independent*, June 1945, 1. (Emphasis added.)

¹²⁸ Richard J. Finlay, *Independent and Free: Scottish Politics and the Origins of the Scottish National Party, 1918-1945* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1994), 239. (Emphasis added.)

¹²⁹ Parliamentary Debates, 3 May 1972, cols., 535-536.

¹³⁰ John P. Mackintosh, "The New Appeal of Nationalism," *New Statesman*, 27 September 1974, 408.

¹³¹ For example, read Alasdair Gray, *Why Should Scots Should Rule Scotland* (Edinburgh: Canongate Press, 1992).

in Scottish constitutional law."¹³² While it is not the intention of SNP to change the ways of English parliamentary life, argued Dr. Robert D. McIntyre in his maiden speech in the House of Commons back in 1945, we "come with the intention of returning as soon as possible to our own country, where we may, under democratic government, achieve the long-needed reconstruction of Scotland."¹³³

For the traditional nationalists of the SNP, sovereignty is not an "abstract" nineteenth century concept bearing no relevance in the twentieth.¹³⁴ Rather, the Scottish understanding of sovereignty is a clear manifestation of popular consent.¹³⁵ This un-English form of sovereignty was most clearly and eloquently stated in the Declaration of Arbroath (1320).¹³⁶ The Declaration of Arbroath, which "has been often cited as an early and remarkable expression of patriotism,"¹³⁷ cites that

if [Lord Robert] should give up what he has begun, and agree to make us or our kingdom subject to the King of England or the English, we should exert ourselves at once to drive him out as our enemy and a subverter of

¹³² "MacCormick and Another v. The Lord Advocate," *Scots Law Times* (1953): 262. (Emphasis added.)

¹³³ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 5, Fifth Series, Session 1944-1945, 1 May 1945, col. 1299. (Emphasis added.)

¹³⁴ Fairlie, unpublished letter to *The Scotsman*, 18 September 1991.

¹³⁵ J.M. Reid, *Scotland's Progress: The Survival of a Nation* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode (Publishers), Ltd., 1971), 14.

¹³⁶ Interview with McIntyre and Scott, *Towards Independence*, 50.

¹³⁷ A.I. Dunlop, "Arbroath Declaration of Scottish Independence," *Kilmarnock Standard*, 17 September 1949.

his own rights and ours, and make some other man who was well able to defend us as our King; for, as long as but a hundred of us remain alive, never will we on any conditions be brought under English rule. *It is in truth not for glory, nor honors that we are fighting, but for freedom -- for that alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself.*¹³⁸

As a 1941 SNP Newsletter makes clear the Party's creed advocates Scottish statehood not because it is a "convenient administrative unit," but is a "form taken by communities of free men. When men become enslaved nations disappear to reappear again with individual freedom."¹³⁹

While the concept of nationalism has been perceived to be an antithesis to the progressive development of international relations,¹⁴⁰ it has also been "the laboratory of liberty."¹⁴¹ The concept of self-determination, for the traditionalists of the Party, is fundamental because it comes from the "gut."¹⁴² History is full of examples where national groups have asserted their "gut" instinct for

¹³⁸ *The Declaration of Arbroath*, edited by Sir James Fergusson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), 9. (Emphasis added.)

¹³⁹ "Scottish Nationalism and Totalitarian Ant Heap," *Scottish National Party Newsletter*, No. 3 (April 1941): 1. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁴⁰ For example, read Brain Swimme and Thomas Berry, *The Universe Story* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), 206-222 and George Robertson, "The Limits of nationalism," A Speech to the Klingenthal Conference of the 21st Century Trust "What is the Nation? The Limits of Self-determination," at the Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt Germany on 2 September 1994.

¹⁴¹ George F. Will, *Suddenly: The American Idea at Home and Abroad* (New York: The Free Press, Ltd., 1990), 53.

¹⁴² Interview with Fairlie.

statehood.¹⁴³ The Greeks in the nineteenth century, Halliday notes, "rebelled against their Turkish imperial masters and claimed their political freedom."¹⁴⁴ And that aspiration for freedom, Halliday further emphasizes, does not merit apologies or economic justification.¹⁴⁵ "Freedom," McIntyre eloquently observes, "cannot be bought or sold."¹⁴⁶ For better or for worse,¹⁴⁷ Scottish independence is sacred because every

nation is unique; it is one of the glories of nationality as it developed in western Europe during the Christian centuries that every citizen can realize and take a pride in the peculiar character of his own country and people without wishing to impose them on the rest of the world. "Who's like us? -- nobody!" expresses a rational, civilized, and modest attitude towards the rest of the world.¹⁴⁸

"The burning desire for freedom because it is right, and just, and its denial intolerable," as Halliday writes, "is an attribute only for those who define themselves as nationalists."¹⁴⁹

An important challenge for the traditionalists, however, is that the Scottish electorate has been "brainwashed" by London suggesting that Scotland would

¹⁴³ James G. Kellas, *Nationalism and Ethnicity* (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1989), 53.

¹⁴⁴ James Halliday, *Scots Independent*, September 1995. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁴⁵ James Halliday, *Scots Independent*, February 1992, 2.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with McIntyre.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with James Halliday, in St. Andrews, Scotland (UK), 3 April 1995.

¹⁴⁸ Reid, *Scotland's Progress*, 9. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁴⁹ James Halliday, *Scots Independent*, January 1993, 2. (Emphasis added.)

be worse off in a post-independent environment.¹⁵⁰ Whether or not Scotland would be worse off after independence is not an issue for the traditionalists because as AJC Kerr eloquently observes:

I do not carry a Utopian blueprint of the perfect Scotland in my mind. *Freedom also means freedom to be imperfect, to make our own mistakes, to learn from them and to correct them the best we can. But that is far better and more dignified than girning about the injustices a built-in majority inflicts on us, going down to Westminster with the begging bowl and girning more and more when we come back empty handed.*¹⁵¹

Nevertheless, a main segment of Scottish voters "require more physical satisfaction in the form of security and prosperity."¹⁵² While Halliday would "gladly sleep on straw" in knowing Scotland to be independent from London,¹⁵³ the SNP's political status and overall aspiration remain a minority viewpoint in Scottish politics.¹⁵⁴ In the 1992 General Election, for example, the SNP was able to capture only 22 per cent of the vote resulting in a mere three seats in the House of Commons.¹⁵⁵ In a 1994 ICM Poll, whereas 44 per cent supported devolution, only 38 per cent of the electorate supported independence.¹⁵⁶ The next section, then, ponders whether or not the SNP should resort to

¹⁵⁰ "A Real Political Agenda for Scotland," 4.

¹⁵¹ AJC Kerr, "Why I Am a Nationalist," in Rollo, *The Scotland We Seek*, 14. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁵² Halliday, *Scots Independent*, February 1992, 2.

¹⁵³ Interview with Halliday.

¹⁵⁴ Roger Levy, *Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1990), 58.

¹⁵⁵ Peter Jones, "Time to Think Again," *The Scotsman*, 21 September 1994.

¹⁵⁶ "John Major's Hogmanay Madness," *The Economist*, 7 January 1995, 46.

promoting devolution as a means to independence or, as Fairlie observes, "that [the Party] [should] take [on the responsibilities of] independence only when the Scots are unmoved by the 'possibility' of a fall in the standard of living in the aftermath of gaining independence."¹⁵⁷

SNP AND THE DEVOLUTION PROCESS

A. ECONOMIC NATIONALISTS

In the 1990s, under the leadership of Alex Salmond, the SNP looked again at the merits of the devolution process as an attempt to attract Scottish voters.¹⁵⁸ The SNP's examination of devolution took on more immediate attention when, in December 1995, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democratic Party released their plan for a Scottish Assembly.¹⁵⁹ Under their political scheme, the Scottish Assembly would be made up of 129 SMPs (Scottish Member of Parliament) elected by proportional representation.¹⁶⁰ The Scottish Assembly would take powers (now under the auspices of the Scottish Office) over education, law and order, health, local government, training, transport, industry, and the environment.¹⁶¹ The Scottish Assembly would also

¹⁵⁷ Fairlie, "Fairlie Frankly," March 1988, 2.

¹⁵⁸ Peter MacMahon, "Salmond Shuns the 'Pure Way,'" *The Scotsman*, 20 September 1995, 5.

¹⁵⁹ Peter MacMahon and David Scott, "Scotland Offered Three Visions of the Future," *The Scotsman*, 1 December 1995, 1.

¹⁶⁰ *Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Right* (Edinburgh: Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995), 21.

¹⁶¹ See Appendix I in *ibid.*, 32-33.

have the power to raise (or to lower) income tax by about 3p to the pound.¹⁶²

The question here, however, is whether or not the SNP should support a constitutional settlement that does not grant Scotland full independence. For the SNP leadership the Scottish Assembly, along Liberal Democratic and Labour lines, does not give the Scottish Assembly the power to get rid of the Trident missile or, moreover, offer a direct link to the European Union as member state.¹⁶³ Another political concern is that the constitutional scheme leaves the West Lothian question unsolved¹⁶⁴ and, moreover, the question of who would "referee" constitutional disputes between Edinburgh and London remained in dispute.¹⁶⁵ The answer to the above question depends upon who within the SNP is addressed. The devolution process towards independence represents another issue which has divided the economic and traditional nationalists of the

¹⁶² Ibid., 27.

¹⁶³ MacMahon, "Salmond Shuns 'The Pure Way,'" 5.

¹⁶⁴ The West Lothian Question is addressed in Chapter VI of this dissertation.

¹⁶⁵ According to the Constitutional Convention: "The appropriate roles of both Parliaments in disputes will be respected and to facilitate its operation, an existing body will be used in the first instance with options including the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council" (*Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Right*, 19). See also Kenny Farquharson, "Parley Here, Parley There," *Scotland on Sunday*, 3 December 1995, 10 and Lord Mackay, "A House Divided Against Itself," *The Times*, 7 February 1996, 18.

Party.¹⁶⁶ The economic nationalists take, for example, a gradualist perspective towards independence. In examining their position there seems to be three important reasons as to why the gradualists assert the devolution "process"¹⁶⁷ is an important issue.

The first reason in supporting devolution, Neil MacCormick explains, is to restore democracy to Scotland.¹⁶⁸ In this century, as Isobel Lindsay observes, an important element in nationalism has been the need to bring about decentralization. Centralized states (such as the United Kingdom), Lindsay further argues, "are beginning to face an internal challenge and it is groups with a long-established political/cultural identity which are spear-heading this challenge."¹⁶⁹ In bringing about a Scottish Assembly, economic nationalists perceive an opportunity to reflect on

[t]he lack of national democratic institutions [which] has grievously sapped Scottish self-belief. Standardizing forces have eroded the external signs of our nationhood, speech, custom and dress, and left us confused and adrift. The deferential philosophy of dependence on English largesse attacks the quality of enterprise, invention and self-reliance in which we once took pride. Dependence is in any case something of a myth, though a powerful one. There is hardly an area of Scottish life that cannot be uplifted and quickened by an Assembly.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ Peter Jones, "Fault Line that Cuts Across the Road to Independence," *The Scotsman*, 1 February 1995, 14.

¹⁶⁷ September 1995 interview with Salmond in *Scots Independent*, 6.

¹⁶⁸ MacCormick, "Unrepentant Gradualism," 100.

¹⁶⁹ Lindsay, "Nationalism, Community, Democracy," 22.

¹⁷⁰ "Why We Must Vote Yes," *The Scotsman*, 23 February 1979, 12.

While the Constitutional Convention does not grant the Scottish Assembly the power to take decisions on foreign and defence policy,¹⁷¹ it would put Scotland, as George Rosie asserts, on a good start on the road towards constitutional reform.¹⁷² The Scottish Assembly would, Rosie further argues, "do something to restore the pride, energy, and self-reliance of the Scottish people. It would allow us to make our own rules. With a bit of luck our elected representatives might be able to hammer out policies that suit Scotland."¹⁷³ Stephen Maxwell, in other words, assert that the Constitutional Convention would bring about an institution mindful of "the right of the majority to determine issues of public interest..."¹⁷⁴ The concept of gradualism, MacCormick writes, is a "commitment to democracy, for we should seek to go at the speed of the greatest majority in promoting constitutional change."¹⁷⁵

A second reason as to why the Salmond leadership espouses a gradualist line towards a constitutional reform is that they, as Sillars notes, are taking political stock as to what the polls suggest about the issue.¹⁷⁶ The polls of 1995 suggest that devolution,

¹⁷¹ Peter MacMahon, "Only Proposal That Reflects the Will of People," *The Scotsman*, 1 December 1995, 7.

¹⁷² George Rosie, "Movement of the Scottish People," *The Scotsman*, 29 November 1995, 13.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Stephen Maxwell, "Scotland's Claim of Right," in Edwards, *A Claim of Right for Scotland*, 121. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁷⁵ MacCormick, "Unrepentant Gradualism," 106. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Sillars.

rather than independence, is the more realistic (or politically viable) choice at the moment. The Scottish electorate, Peter Kellner notes, want a "*different kind of marriage, but not a divorce.*"¹⁷⁷ In looking at the polls, for example, 30 per cent favor an independent Scotland "separate from England and Wales" whereas 46 per cent would like to a Scottish Parliament within the UK "with some tax and spending powers..."¹⁷⁸ In maintaining their "marriage" with London, the same poll also reported that up to 74 per cent of Scots would like to keep the British pound as their currency.¹⁷⁹ Kellner notes the currency issue to be a significant one because "power over currency means power over money supply, interest rates and, in the short term, competitiveness in the world market."¹⁸⁰

While there is support for institutional reform,¹⁸¹ the Scottish electorate, the *Glasgow Herald/System Three* reported in February 1995, is "concerned [more] with jobs and hospital beds than [with] a debating chamber on Calton Hill."¹⁸² The same article, however, reported that the electorate seem to categorize the former issues as "short-term" ones. In

¹⁷⁷ Peter Kellner, "An Open Marriage, Not a Divorce," *The Sunday Times-Scotland*, 27 August 1995, 4. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 5. In the same poll, only 8 per cent of believed that an independent Scotland should have a separate currency from both Britain and Europe.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Dinwoodie, "Shifting Scenery as the Play Goes On," 6.

the long-term the poll indicates that the electorate is "more open to change."¹⁸³ When the same poll asked the electorate to comment on John Major's dismal view of the Scottish Assembly as a move towards separatism,¹⁸⁴ the Scottish electorate were said to "see not a nightmare but a possibility, maybe even an opportunity."¹⁸⁵ With 47 per cent accepting the idea of the UK breaking up into an island of "disparate nations," "it is one [slippery slope] many seem to be prepared to put a tentative foot on."¹⁸⁶

As a gradualist towards independence, then, Salmond believes that by addressing these types of economic and social issues, the SNP can begin the process in reaching out to those "who are not yet convinced of the argument for Scottish independence."¹⁸⁷ As Billy Wolfe¹⁸⁸ observed, it is important for the SNP to address an economic argument for independence because such a process helps "stimulate our fellow Scots into thinking in terms of Scottish solutions for Scottish problems in order 'to save Scotland from national extinction...'"¹⁸⁹ Wolfe summarized by also noting that

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ See Chapter VI of this dissertation and "John Major's Hogmanay Madness," 46.

¹⁸⁵ Dinwoodie, "Shifting Scenery as the Play Goes On," 6.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ MacMahon, "Salmond Shuns 'The Pure Way,'" 5.

¹⁸⁸ Billy Wolfe was Chairman of the SNP, 1969-1979.

¹⁸⁹ Billy Wolfe, "General Election Crusade," *Scots Independent*, August 1978, 5.

I am in favor of the Party examining the fabric of life in Scotland and drafting policies with a view to making proposals for improving that fabric, *not only when we have self-government but also in the current political context.*¹⁹⁰

"Profound movements of opinion," Gordon Wilson¹⁹¹ once observed, "do not come from a vacuum. They derive from a people's perception of events over the long term."¹⁹²

Finally, an Assembly offers the SNP the opportunity to test Roseanna Cunningham's assertion that a devolved Assembly cannot "satisfy our needs."¹⁹³ This can only be done, Wolfe argues, by the SNP demonstrating responsibility in the affairs of government through offering sound policy proposals.¹⁹⁴ It also means, Dick Douglas argues, that the SNP must seize the moment of every political opportunity that arises.¹⁹⁵ Winnie Ewing¹⁹⁶ is pragmatic in the sense that the SNP must use every political gain as a way "to work for the next gain."¹⁹⁷ After all, as Margaret Ewing

¹⁹⁰ Billy Wolfe, *Scotland Lives: The Quest for Independence* (Edinburgh: Reprographic, 1973), 131. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁹¹ Gordon Wilson served as an SNP MP for Dundee East, 1974-1987. He was also SNP National Secretary, 1964-1971; Vice Chairman, 1973-1973; Senior Vice Chairman, 1973-1974; and National Convener, 1979-1990.

¹⁹² Gordon Wilson, *The Scottish Paradox*, The Lang Lecture at the University of St. Andrews (Edinburgh: SNP Publications, 1988), 17. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁹³ Roseanna Cunningham, "Use It, Use It, Use It!," *The New Politics for Independence*, SNP Conference Issue (1995): 4.

¹⁹⁴ Wolfe, "General Election Crusade," 5.

¹⁹⁵ James Rouguie, "Ewing Opens Up Split Over Home Rule," *The Scotsman*, 22 September 1995, 1.

¹⁹⁶ Winnie Ewing is SNP member of European Parliament since 1975. She also serves as President of the SNP.

¹⁹⁷ Peter Jones, "Doing What Comes Gradually," *The Scotsman*, 31 January 1995, 13.

noted in her 1995 address before the SNP Conference in Perth, the Scottish people do not want to belong to a nation (or to a Party for that matter) that "whinges" and "whines" all the time.¹⁹⁸ The role of our nation," Ewing argues instead, "seeks, and our Parliament will seek, to play a positive role."¹⁹⁹ For the first time, the Scottish people, Margaret Ewing asserts,

want to work together for the reconstruction of our country and that work cannot begin too soon. Our people realize that freedom means taking on responsibilities for our own problems, not passing on the buck to others.²⁰⁰

In creating a devolved Assembly, the SNP, Levy argues, would not only have "another platform from which to argue its case," but be involved "in the exercise of some limited executive power."²⁰¹

As Margaret Ewing, however, asserts:

... I will not hinder the real potential to establish a real parliament. But until my dying day I will always champion the cause of Scottish freedom. On the constitutional basis of the people's sovereignty only the people can set the boundaries of their freedom; and it might help if the constitutional debate were returned to a Scottish voice.²⁰²

For the gradualists, then, the argument as to whether or not Scotland will be independent in ten, twenty, or even fifty years is not an issue²⁰³ for as Salmond

¹⁹⁸ Margaret Ewing, Speech to 1995 SNP Conference, in Perth, Scotland (UK), 21 September 1995, *SNP News Release*.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

²⁰¹ Levy, *Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads*, 59.

²⁰² Ewing, 1995 Speech to SNP Conference. (Emphasis added.)

²⁰³ Rouguie, "Ewing Opens Up Split Over Home Rule," 1.

asserts, "the people, not the politicians, will choose when independence comes."²⁰⁴ "Our job," Salmond continues, "is to accelerate the process -- by the force of our argument certainly but also by the face that we present to Scotland every day."²⁰⁵

B. TRADITIONAL NATIONALISTS

Traditional nationalists like Christine Creech, Jim Fairlie, and Chris McLean,²⁰⁶ oppose the gradualist understanding towards independence for several reasons. First of all, devolution is designed to maintain the authority of Westminster parliament.²⁰⁷ As McLean asserts, any amendment to the powers of the Assembly would require Westminster consent.²⁰⁸ Devolution, McLean writes, "entails maintenance of a bilateral political relationship with England, and as with any such relationship any alteration in the terms must be agreed by both parties."²⁰⁹ Because this piece of legislation is mutable, it does not seem surprising when Alex Neil accuses the Labour Shadow Scottish Secretary George Robertson of being "intellectually dishonest" about devolution.²¹⁰ Robertson, the Scottish traditionalists

²⁰⁴ Alex Salmond, Speech to SNP National Conference, in Perth, Scotland (UK), 22 September 1995, *SNP News Release*.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Chris McLean served as Press Officer of the SNP.

²⁰⁷ Chris McLean, "Claim of Right or Cap in Hand," in Edwards, *A Claim of Right for Scotland*, 110.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Alex Neil "A Charade of No Substance," *The New Politics for Independence*, Party Conference Issue (1995): 8.

argue, is trying "to dress up devolution as a transfer of power from London to Scotland, when the real power will be in London."²¹¹ Devolution, for the purists of the Party, is merely a "blind alley."²¹² It is a "blind alley" because a Labour government can place "belt and braces on any Assembly, and ... make it as difficult as possible for it to expand its powers."²¹³ Christine Creech warns her SNP colleagues:

*This is a Unionist Parliament. It will be custom built in London as an independent straight jacket. We should not put our arms voluntarily in the restraints before these are tied behind our backs.*²¹⁴

For Fairlie, then, "devolution and independence are not different degrees of the same thing"²¹⁵ for there is simply "no backdoor way to Independence."²¹⁶ No self-respecting nationalist, the traditionalists of the Party argue, should be expected to accept such a proposal.²¹⁷

The traditionalists of the Party are also opposed to devolution because the House of Commons has always failed to deliver on the issue of Home Rule. Since 1889, Scott notes, the House of Commons has introduced

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Kenny Farquharson, "Step-by-step Stumbling Block," *Scotland on Sunday*, 24 September 1995, 6.

²¹³ Neil, "A Charade of No Substance," 8 and Interview with Sillars.

²¹⁴ Creech, "Devolution -- A Unionist Parliament," 7. (Emphasis added.)

²¹⁵ In conversation with Fairlie, 22 September 1995. See also Jim Fairlie, "Nationalists Right to Oppose Devolution," *The Scotsman*, 10 January 1995, 14. (Emphasis added.)

²¹⁶ Neil, "A Charade of No Substance," 8.

²¹⁷ Levy, *Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads*, 59 and Stewart, "The Way Forward," 3.

no less than 34 Home Rule bills of which each failed to acquire the political consent of the English political parties.²¹⁸ As Scott explains:

We have had both Labour and Liberal Democrat governments in the past who were, in theory, committed to Scottish Home Rule, but failed to enact it. *If these parties were to introduce a Bill, every UK Department of State would be careful at the drafting state to see that it lost as little of its power and influence as possible.* During the debates in Parliament, the Bill would be at the mercy of the whims and bright ideas which happened to catch the fancy of the overwhelming English majority in both Houses.²¹⁹

In particular, the traditional wing of the Party notes that there is a deep mistrust between SNP and Labour.²²⁰ Labour sees the SNP as a political threat because without Scotland, Scott observes, Tony Blair cannot hope to form a government in Westminster.²²¹ "The [real] threat [the SNP] pose[s]," Lindsay notes, however, "is not just a threat to seats, it is a threat to fixed ideas, to long established certainties."²²² The Labour Party is in rivalry with the SNP, Fairlie writes, because its leadership perceives the latter to be a threat to "the one thing that nationalists seek to dismantle -- the British state."²²³ It is therefore not surprising when in answering Lorraine Mann's question at *The Scotsman's* Great Debate (1995) Robertson noted

²¹⁸ Scott, *Scotland in Europe*, 50.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 51. (Emphasis added.)

²²⁰ Interview with Lynch.

²²¹ Scott, "Europe Adds Urgency to the Case for Independence," 14.

²²² Lindsay, "Nationalism, Community, and Democracy," 21.

²²³ Jim Fairlie, "Value of an Assembly as a Platform," *The Scotsman*, 2 February 1995, 10. (Emphasis added.)

that if he knew that devolution would lead to independence he would not be for the Scottish Assembly.²²⁴ "George's second preference," as Salmond notes, "is for the status quo. He just doesn't like to admit it in public."²²⁵ If this is the case, how can the SNP leadership hope to work with Labour?²²⁶

In answering this question, there are those among the fundamentalist wing of the SNP who, not out of choice, have taken a pragmatic assessment of devolution and the Labour Party.²²⁷ Halliday, for example, writes the Labour Party "has been entrusted with the support of the Scottish electoral majority"²²⁸ for the simple reason that Tony Blair is "promising to do things."²²⁹ As the poll results cited above appear to indicate

The Union is under no imminent threat. The SNP has been done down, tied down and spent down once again...²³⁰

While this might be the case, the polls also seem to argue that the Scottish electorate desire constitutional reform and that the Labour Party has made devolution (among other issues) a part of its electoral agenda.²³¹ Margaret Ewing, who describes

²²⁴ Ewen MacAskill, "Passions Run High Over Way Ahead," *The Scotsman*, 13 February 1995, 1.

²²⁵ Salmond, 1995 Speech to SNP Conference.

²²⁶ Creech, "Devolution -- A Unionist Parliament," 6-7.

²²⁷ Interview with Lynch. See also Jones, "Fault Line that Cuts Across the Road to Independence," 6.

²²⁸ James Halliday, *Scots Independent*, January 1993, 2.

²²⁹ Interview with Lynch.

²³⁰ James Halliday, *Scots Independent*, May 1992, 2.

²³¹ "Something for Everyone to be Read among the Runes, *Glasgow Herald*, 9 February 1995, 6.

herself as a fundamentalist at heart,²³² believes that if Labour wants to make a difference in Scottish politics that if they "want to deliver, then let them deliver."²³³ The burden of proof is, therefore, on Blair to disprove Salmond's assertion and many others in the SNP that "Labour cannot be trusted on the constitution."²³⁴ Those with such views warn, however, that because the Blair leadership have set high expectations for themselves, they essentially will "have no hiding place" from the electorate's and, moreover, the SNP's wrath if they fail to deliver their promises.²³⁵

In putting the politics of devolution aside, the more important point about this debate between the gradualists and fundamentalists is that it is ideological one,²³⁶ which strikes at the very core of this dissertation. As with the European Union, the internal struggle within the SNP over devolution is not just an argument about economic/political gains, but is about national integrity. Traditionalists like Fairlie seem unable to concur with Halliday's or, more importantly, with Salmond's assessment of devolution for the simple reason that the gradualists are playing

²³² Joanne Robertson, "Best of Enemies," *The Sunday Times*-- *Scotland*, 5 February 1995, 2.

²³³ Ewing, "Learn from History," 10. (Emphasis added.)

²³⁴ Salmond, 1995 Speech to SNP Conference. (Emphasis in the original.)

²³⁵ Interview with Lynch.

²³⁶ "Skinning the Cat of Independence," *The Scotsman*, 1 February 1995.

"politics as usual" by working with a party that is set at maintaining Westminster rule. The traditionalists are skeptical of a leadership which believes that the SNP can win its argument for independence by "bribing" the electorate with economic carrots. As with Europe, the traditionalists assert that there can be no "halfway houses" to independence.²³⁷ Nationalism "on condition," Stewart once observed, is a "betrayal" to the quest for Scottish independence²³⁸ for it leaves out in the cold all those who have worked passionately for its reality.²³⁹ "The SNP," Stewart further wrote, "must be proud to state our objectives without reservations or caveats."²⁴⁰

After the dismal results of the 1979 referendum,²⁴¹ the SNP vowed that it would "campaign for independence and nothing else."²⁴² In 1983, the SNP shifted to being "neutral" over the issue²⁴³ and then, in 1990, it shifted its position back to recognizing that the "mandate to negotiate independence might be gained not only at a Westminster elections, but also at any

²³⁷ Stewart, "The Way Forward," 3.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Farquharson, "Step-by-Step Stumbling Block," 6.

²⁴⁰ Stewart, "The Way Forward," 3. (Emphasis added.)

²⁴¹ For more on the 1979 referendum, read John Bocel, David Denver, and Allan Macartney, eds., *The Referendum Experience: Scotland 1979* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1981), Levy, *Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads*, 58-90 and Marr, *The Battle for Scotland*, 121-164.

²⁴² Jones, "Fault Line That Cuts Across the Road to Independence," 6.

²⁴³ Ibid.

election for any future assembly."²⁴⁴ The point for the traditionalists, however, is that, for reasons described above,

*either you are a nationalist and accept the sovereignty of the Scottish people, or you are a Unionist and accept the sovereignty of the British parliament. You cannot have it both ways -- both cannot be sovereign.*²⁴⁵

For McLean, independence is an "explicit rejection of authority of Westminster; the basis of the claim is the Scottish people are sovereign, not the English parliament."²⁴⁶ While "purity of political line does not always play well with the public,"²⁴⁷ the traditionalists assert that "we cannot grumble, because we must emphasize our commitment to independence in all circumstances; and, to the uncommitted, this must seem [fortunately or unfortunately] like single-issue politics."²⁴⁸

CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the battle of ideas within the SNP over the issues of Scotland's role in the European Union and the establishment of a Scottish Assembly. The economic nationalists see the European Union as a working panacea to Edinburgh's no longer relevant relationship to London. In being part of the European Union, Scotland would enjoy equal status with

²⁴⁴ Alex Salmond, "Truth and Devolution," *Scotland on Sunday*, 5 February 1995, 6.

²⁴⁵ McLean, "Claim of Right or Cap in Hand," 112. (Emphasis added.)

²⁴⁶ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

²⁴⁷ "Skinning the Cat of Independence," 10.

²⁴⁸ James Halliday, *Scots Independent*, November 1992, 2. (Emphasis added.)

that of the other member states and, moreover, welcome the economic gains from being part of a major trading bloc. In respect to devolution, the economic nationalists take on a gradualist perspective in which the Scottish Assembly is perceived to be a means to bringing about full independence. While the SNP leadership remains dubious about Labour's ability to bring about devolution,²⁴⁹ Salmond is convinced that the Assembly is valuable platform from which to contest the "independence ticket."²⁵⁰

The traditionalists, on the other hand, are dubious of the "Independence in Europe" campaign because they perceive the SNP leadership not only replacing one centralized form of government with that of another, but trying to justify the need to base the argument for Scottish independence on economic reasoning. While Scotland needs to maintain its links with an interdependent world, Scotland wins its argument for independence not because of North Sea oil or for the poll tax, but because it is (for better or for worse) honorable and right. While there are those among the traditionalists who believe that devolution "could carry us up to the point of independence,"²⁵¹ others remain firm in their belief that there can be no "political waffling" over independence. For the

²⁴⁹ September 1995 interview with Salmond in *Scots Independent*, 6-7.

²⁵⁰ Salmond, 1995 Speech to SNP Conference.

²⁵¹ Halliday, *Scots Independent*, May 1992, 2.
(Emphasis added.)

traditionalists, the Labour Party wishes to preserve the Union and protect itself from political force which they deem as an impediment to its political agenda.²⁵²

In respect to the *End of History* paradigm,²⁵³ Fukuyama is correct in observing that Scottish nationalism does not represent in any empirical fashion an antithesis to the principles of liberal democracy.²⁵⁴ And, indeed, Andrew Marr is correct in pointing out to Fukuyama that a main theme in Scottish politics is about the creation of new democratic institutions.²⁵⁵ But this is not the real issue. The real challenge to Fukuyama is that the "traditionalist" position challenges the "politics as usual" position and rather emphasizes that ideas are still in "motion."²⁵⁶ As this chapter attempted to demonstrate, the SNP represents an ideological challenge to how the Scots should be governed for the Salmond leadership challenges Westminster's definition of sovereignty and, moreover, debates among themselves over what role Scotland should play in what can be conceived as a significant examination of how Europe is to be governed at the end of the twentieth century.

²⁵² For example, see Peter MacMahon, "Memo Seeks Exposure of SNP 'Extremists,'" *The Scotsman*, 20 September 1995, 5.

²⁵³ See Chapter II of this dissertation.

²⁵⁴ Andrew Marr's interview with Francis Fukuyama, *The Big Ideas* (BBC 2), 31 January 1996.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Michael Foley, "Introduction," in Michael Foley, ed., *Ideas that Shape Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 2.

Economic and traditional nationalists of the SNP might very much believe that Scotland's relationship to the "British state" is no longer relevant to its cultural and economic needs. Within the framework of a democratic state, however, the SNP has made its life's work to contest elections until it does win a majority of the hopes and aspirations of the Scottish people. The SNP is in no hurry for independence will come when the Scottish electorate vote for it. After all, as Salmond asserts correctly:

*This is not a game. I believe that this party has the ability to change this country, to change Scotland -- and that we alone can. That is our task. It is more important than you or me or any person in this hall or any one person in the whole of Scotland. To achieve it will require passion and commitment combined with pragmatism and iron self discipline.*²⁵⁷

²⁵⁷ Salmond, 1995 Speech to SNP Conference.

CHAPTER VI
STRANDS OF THOUGHT WITHIN THE
BRITISH CONSERVATIVE AND UNIONIST PARTY REGARDING
DEVOLUTION AND BRITAIN'S ROLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

INTRODUCTION

The tension between the compatibility of economic maximization and the continuing role of national identity and state sovereignty in the United Kingdom also manifests itself within the various strands of political thought of the British Conservative and Unionist Party.¹ The ideological divide between the Tory² factions can be vividly seen, for example, in the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty. In the ratification process, Euro-skeptic³ Tories like Sir Teddy Taylor and Lord Rees-Mogg used various legal and political tactics to impede the Government's Maastricht legislation.⁴ The Tory leadership responded

¹ Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam, "Tories Do the Splits," *Red Pepper*, No. 11 (April 1995): 16-17.

² In British political history, the word Tory was first used during the Exclusion Crisis (1679-1681) to describe those who opposed the exclusion of the Duke of York (James II). After 1760, the term refers to those who pledged allegiance to George III, accepted the established order in Church and State, and, later on, opposed the Reform Bill of 1832. The modern Conservative Party is based on the principles of Toryism which a few of its basic beliefs are analyzed in the text below.

³ According to the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, a skeptic is someone who is "given to questioning truth of fact(s) and soundness of inference(s), critical, incredulous."

⁴ David Baker, Andrew Gamble, and Steve Ludlam, "The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: Conservative Divisions and British Ratification," *Parliamentary Affairs: Contemporary Journal of Comparative Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1994): 38.

to Party dissent by challenging the latter to either support Major's European policy or to face the consequences of "playing in the hands of those who would destroy the livelihoods of the people of this country,"⁵ and, moreover, by making the question of ratification an issue of confidence in the Government.⁶

The pro-European Tories are made up of John Major and those in the Cabinet who supports his position on Europe. Other related pro-Europe factions such as the Tory Reform Group (led by David Hunt) and the Conservative Group for Europe (led by Lord Howe) also support Major's European policies.⁷ For the Prime

⁵ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 229, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 22 July 1993, col. 601.

⁶ In an attempt to defeat the Labour Party's amendment on the social chapter, Major solicited the support of the Ulster Unionists in which the Government offered them a series of concessions "including the creation of a Commons committee with the right to look at security in the [Northern Irish] province" (Philip Stephens, "Major Ready to Defy Commons on Social Chapter," *The Financial Times*, 23 July 1993, 1). Nevertheless, the Government was defeated 324 to 316 on the 22 July 1993. Major then tabled a vote of confidence which stated: "That the House has confidence in the policy of Her Majesty's Government on the adoption of the Protocol on Social Policy" (Parliamentary Debates, 22 July 1993, cols. 606-611). The Government won the confidence vote 339-299 on the 23 July 1993 (Baker, Gamble, and Ludlam, "The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht," 59).

⁷ "Scent of Blood Starts Civil War," *The Sunday Times*, 18 June 1995, 13. The various factions of the Tory Party understand the term "pro-Europe" differently. For the Tory Reform Group, "pro-Europe" means the development of a federal Europe and (as a must) the establishment of the EMU (ibid). European Reform Group Tories include Edwina Currie, Ted Heath, and David Hunt. Lord Howe's group, Conservative Group for Europe, has similar policy goals with that of the Tory leadership (ibid). Conservative Group for Europe Tories include Lord Howe and Michael Heseltine. In this

Minister, the UK benefits from EU membership because of the establishment of a single market and the promotion of free trade. The Party leadership perceived itself as protecting British sovereignty, along economic lines, by securing for the United Kingdom opt-out clauses on the single currency and the social chapter. John Major was also able to secure an intergovernmental approach to Common Foreign and Security (CFSP) and Home and Judicial Affairs (HJA). Baker has argued that the above "national" accomplishments were an attempt to appease the wrath of the Tory's Euro-skeptics.⁸

The Euro-skeptics' fundamental objection to the Maastricht Treaty is its federalist agenda. For the Euro-skeptics, the European Union has moved beyond the original intent of the Treaty of Rome which was the development of a Common Market. While Euro-skeptics like Norman Lamont and John Redwood are in favor of Britain maintaining its economic links to Europe,⁹ they also believe that the European debate has a profound

chapter, the term "pro-Europe" describes the policy goals of John Major and those in (and outside) the Cabinet who support the Prime Minister. Read, for example, Michael Heseltine, *The Challenge of Europe: Can Britain Win?* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), Geoffrey Howe, *Nationalism and the Nation-State*, The Rede Lecture, 1994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Gareth Smyth, "Heath's Land," *New Statesman and Society*, 26 May 1995, vi-vii and Hugo Young, "No, Prime Minister," *Marxism Today*, November 1988, 16-23.

⁸ Baker, Gamble, and Ludlam, "The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht," 38.

⁹ "Scent of a Bloody Civil War," 13. See Norman Lamont, "Why Redwood is the Right Man for Europe," *The Times*, 27 June 1995, 18 and John Redwood, "Saving Europe from Itself," *The Times*, 29 March 1996, 18.

impact on principles they, as a Party, hold dear. While Major was able to secure opt-out clauses for the UK and maintain an intergovernmental framework for CFSP and HJA, the Euro-skeptics assert that the Government underestimates the constitutional consequences of the TEU. For the Euro-skeptics, the concept of sovereignty is not simply an abstract principle,¹⁰ but, more importantly, a critical issue of "who decides."¹¹ As this chapter demonstrates, the debate over TEU is not just about economic maximization, but, rather, a fundamental examination of how the continent of Europe (in general) is to govern itself at the end of the twentieth century. In particular, the TEU, for Lady Thatcher, is a debate about

*being British and it is about what we feel for our country, our parliament, and our traditions and our liberties. Because of our history, that feeling is perhaps stronger here than anywhere else in Europe, and it must determine the way in which our government approach such matters.*¹²

The issues of sovereignty and self-determination are in such "flux"¹³ that the Euro-skeptics very much believe that the people of Britain should be entitled to

¹⁰ Chapter III discusses the theoretical aspect of the concept of sovereignty.

¹¹ Nicholas Ridley, *My Style of Government: The Thatcher Years* (London: Hutchinson, 1991), 138. (Emphasis added.)

¹² Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 199, Sixth Series, Session 1991-1992, 20 November 1991, col. 292. (Emphasis added.)

¹³ Michael Foley, "Introduction," in Michael Foley, ed., *Ideas that Shape Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 2.

determine the future of Britain's role in Europe through a referendum.¹⁴

This chapter also deals with the issue of devolution. The Conservative Party has played a considerable amount of "politics" on this particular debate. The British newspapers are filled, for example, with stories of the Tory leadership's opposition to the Labour Party's proposed Scottish Assembly for it fears that it could lead to full Scottish independence and that it would add another layer of administration and taxation on the people of Scotland.¹⁵ While the Conservative Party enjoys an overall consensus regarding the sanctity of the United Kingdom,¹⁶ there are those in the Conservative Party (for example, Malcolm Rifkind and Lord Cockfield) who conclude that the Tory leadership should not dismiss the concept of devolution altogether.¹⁷ The Scottish Local Elections and the Perth and Kinross by-election (April and May of 1995 respectively), for example, suggest the possibility of growing anti-Tory unrest within Scottish

¹⁴ Interview with Bill Walker, at Constituency Office in Blairgowrie, Scotland (UK), 18 August 1995. Walker is Tory MP for North Tayside. See also Joanna Bale, "Goldsmith Promises to Fight for a Referendum," *The Times*, 4 December 1995, 2.

¹⁵ "The Prime Minister," *The Scottish Leader*, Autumn 1995, 2. See also "Nationalism -- A Dangerous Fiasco," *The Scottish Leader*, Autumn 1995, 1.

¹⁶ Phil Gallie, in correspondence with the author, 16 November 1994. Gallie is Tory MP for Ayr. See also the Former Scottish Secretary Ian Lang's interview in Robbie Dinwoodie, "Devolution? It's a Trap," *The Glasgow Herald*, 14 January 1995, 10.

¹⁷ Andrew Evans, "Only Devolution Can Save Union, Says Tory Peer," *The Scotsman*, 20 April 1995, 8.

politics. The poor election results prompted certain Scottish Tories like John Young of the Cathcart Conservative Association to invite the Tory leadership to reexamine Scottish government and offer pragmatic suggestions in making it more accountable to the Scottish electorate.

For the Conservative Party, as this chapter demonstrates, the issue of devolution goes beyond the mere argument of mechanics and responsibilities of government. Unlike the other parties of the UK, the Tories perceive themselves to be the guardians of Britain's historic institutions.¹⁸ For the Tories, the Union is like a "marriage" in which Major pledges to uphold "for better or for worse, for richer or for poorer."¹⁹ The Tories agree that only the Scottish people can decide (through parliamentary elections) as to whether or not they wish to remain within the United Kingdom.²⁰ However, the proposed Scottish Assembly (along Labour Party lines) would only intensify the

¹⁸ Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot*, Seventh Revised Edition (Washington, DC: Regenery Gateway, Inc., 1987), 270. For more on the history of the British Conservative Party, read Robert Blake, *The Conservative Party: From Peel to Thatcher*, New and Revised Edition (London: Methuen Press, Ltd., 1985) and Frank O'Gorman, *British Conservatism: From Burke to Thatcher* (London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1986).

¹⁹ Interview with Ian Stewart at Scottish Conservative and Unionist Headquarters in Edinburgh, Scotland (UK), 29 August 1995. Stewart is Research Officer for the Scottish Conservative Association.

²⁰ Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 624.

"political" problems of the Union and, thus, could result in its breakup.²¹ As Allan Stewart laments

... the business community and wealth creators in Scotland would have the most to fear not from a one-off constitutional change, *but from the fact that a constitutional change such as this would in no sense be the end of the road.* There is a simple reason why it would not be the end of the road. If the arrangements were perceived to be working well, the Scottish National Party would say, "Make them work better. Let's have full independence." If the arrangements were perceived to be working badly, as it is my belief that they would, the SNP would be even better positioned and could say, "We have tried this half-way house, O people of Scotland, and it does not work. Westminster is not giving us enough money. It is all the fault of Westminster... Give us more power."²²

In carrying the marriage analogy further, as Ian Stewart comments, whereas independence is seen as a "divorce," devolution is merely a "trial separation."²³

This case study addresses several questions. In discussing Tory ideological divisions over the European Union, for example, what have the various factions offered as a realistic policy regarding Britain's best interest in Europe and why? In regards to the devolution process why does the Tory Party appreciate the Union to be a sacrosanct entity? The assessment of the various answers to these questions documents the argument that there are certain factions within the Tory Party which adamantly accept that there are

²¹ Ian Stewart, *Scotland's Future: The Scottish Constitutional Issue* (Edinburgh: Scottish Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1995). See also Peter Lynch, "Labour Answers the West Lothian Question," *The Glasgow Herald*, 20 January 1996, 19.

²² Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 203, Sixth Series, Session 1991-1992, 7 February 1992, cols. 613-614. (Emphasis added.)

²³ Interview with Stewart.

fundamental issues relating to the identity, integrity, and sovereignty of the state overriding the advantages of economic and political maximization.

EUROPE AND THE TORY PARTY: ECONOMICS V. SOVEREIGNTY

Between December 1991 and July 1993 the various factions of the Tory Party fought over the possible significance of Britain's ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The principle issues that the factions debated included the establishment of a single currency²⁴ and the intergovernmental dimension of CFSP and HJA. Exacerbating the divisions between the different Tory factions was the need to consider the effects the TEU (and in particular the single currency) would have on parliamentary sovereignty for as Heseltine observed

[i]n our interdependent world, and particularly within an increasingly convergent European Community, [sovereignty] is a barrier to understanding. Sovereignty can be impotent. A man in the desert is free and sovereign. He is beyond the reach of any alien authority, but he is powerless. To have value, sovereignty must be capable of being used.²⁵

The analysis below examines each of the factions' position in turn.

According to Francis Fukuyama, states in a post-*End of History* environment preoccupy themselves with economic activity.²⁶ If such an assertion is correct, it

²⁴ See, for example, Andrew Marr, "Make Way for the Globe-trotting Trader," *The Independent*, 16 March 1995 and William Rees-Mogg, "Virtual Unreality," *The Times*, 1 June 1995, 20.

²⁵ Heseltine, *The Challenge of Europe*, 211.

²⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: The Free Press,

seems reasonable then for John Major's Government to emphasize the economic perspective of Britain's relationship with the European Union. What is important now in European politics is not whether or not the continent will be democratic,²⁷ but that the European Union makes a firm commitment to free trade and to the establishment of a single market.²⁸ It is therefore of little surprise that in this context the 1992 British presidency of the EU made the completion of the single market its central goal.²⁹ Under the British presidency, for example, the EU member states agreed to a series of directives which would facilitate progress towards a single market. The directives dealt with issues such as excise duties, the value added tax, and the pharmaceutical industry.³⁰ The 1992 British presidency concluded at the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992 in which it emphasized that the member states had agreed "in identifying the priorities and practical steps necessary to ensure that the internal market works fairly and effectively and without undue burdens on business, notably small and medium-sized enterprises."³¹

Ltd., 1995), xiii. For more on this point, see Chapter II of this dissertation.

²⁷ Interview with Francis Fukuyama, at the RAND Corporation in Washington, DC (USA), 16 December 1993.

²⁸ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 214, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 24 November 1992, col. 760.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ "Conclusions of the Presidency," European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992. See also Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol.

The Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, which established the legal basis of Europe's single market program,³² outlined the steps towards the establishment of the single market and the "elimination of trade barriers."³³ As in every good *End of History* society, Heseltine observes that Britain can "achieve more" for its people "within a more competitive European market than [it] can hope for within a collection of purely national markets."³⁴ One of Major's more important concerns for Britain in the European Union is not "to reduce the number of currencies, *but to increase the number of jobs.*"³⁵ Like Major, Edward Heath believes that Britain's relationship to the EU is not only

216, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 14 December 1992, col. 23.

³² Robert Wester writes that in the negotiations of the SEA the Thatcher Government "played a decisive role" ("United Kingdom and European Political Union," in Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker, eds, *The Inter-governmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community* [Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992], 193). See Chapter IV of this dissertation and Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 555-557.

³³ Geoffrey Smith, "Britain in the New Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Fall 1992): 166. For more on the SEA, read Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act," in Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change* (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1991), 41-85 and William Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, *Understanding the European Communities* (New York: Philip Allan, 1990), 199-201.

³⁴ Heseltine, *The Challenge of Europe*, 77. On the same point, read William Pfaff, "Nations Can Resolve to Act, But Europe Isn't a Nation," *International Herald Tribune*, 10 February 1994, 6.

³⁵ John Major, "Raise Your Eyes, There is a Land Beyond," *The Economist*, 25 September 1993, 23. (Emphasis added.)

about "shaping our role in the world," but about solving the "practical, everyday concerns of ordinary people."³⁶ In preserving Britain's economic interest, Major further argues that this goal can only be achieved if British companies maintain their "vital" links in the European market.³⁷ "It is clear," the *Financial Times* writes, "that the Community will not last long if it becomes a vast machine for creating unemployment."³⁸

Major's economic perspective to the European Union also asserts that the single market should not isolate itself from the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe.³⁹ Major believes that the European Union should support extending membership to the Visegrad states of Eastern Europe.⁴⁰ Major observes that European support for enlargement in the East would not only provide for security, but for *trade and prosperity*.⁴¹ In other words, Major's objective for European unity is "to enable the *peoples of Europe* to live more harmoniously together and to enjoy greater *prosperity and influence*."⁴² This means, former Tory Chancellor of the

³⁶ Edward Heath, "I Put the National Interest First," *The Independent*, 13 December 1995, 17. (Emphasis added.)

³⁷ Parliamentary Debates, 22 July 1993, col. 526.

³⁸ "Get Europe to Work," *Financial Times*, 20 May 1993, 19.

³⁹ John Major, "Why We Need Europe," *Newsweek*, 14 December 1992, 24.

⁴⁰ Parliamentary Debates, 14 December 1992, col. 24.

⁴¹ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

⁴² Smith, "Britain in the New Europe," 166. (Emphasis added.)

Exchequer Nigel Lawson argues, that the EU must "open up its markets to agricultural produce, steel, and textiles from Central and Eastern Europe."⁴³ "We must not," Major warns, "replace those physical barriers with invisible tariff walls and a tangle of trade restrictions."⁴⁴

The Major Government understood that the development of the single market would protect the UK's national interests because its active participation places Britain in "the heart of Europe,"⁴⁵ and that, therefore, it would serve as an opportunity to maximize the performance of the UK economy. This task could only be accomplished by Britain being directly involved in Europe for, like Jim Sillars' argument for Scottish independence in Europe,⁴⁶ Major did not believe it "credible" for the UK "to sit on the sidelines of Europe and let other people determine policies. That is frankly no way for the United Kingdom to behave."⁴⁷ Major further explains in the House of Commons:

There are, in truth, only three ways of dealing with the Community: We can leave it, and no doubt we would survive, but we would be diminished in influence and

⁴³ Nigel Lawson, *The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical* (London: Corgi Editions, 1993), 1033.

⁴⁴ Major, "Why We Need Europe," 25.

⁴⁵ Ian Lang, *The Fulfilled Society* (Edinburgh: Scottish Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1993), 13.

⁴⁶ See Chapter V of this dissertation and Jim Sillars, *No Turning Back: The Case for Scottish Independence within the European Community and How We Face the Challenge of 1992*, August 1988, 5.

⁴⁷ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 213, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 4 November 1992, col. 284. (Emphasis added.)

prosperity; we can stay in it grudgingly, in which others will lead it; or we can play a leading role in it, and that is the right policy. It does not mean accepting every idea marked with a European label. It does mean trying to build the sort of Europe that we believe in...⁴⁸

Like Sillars, Major perceives the EU to be "an inescapable framework for real life and proposed... to put Britain at the heart of it."⁴⁹ While Major supported the need for the single market, however, he sought out to protect the UK's economic and political interests⁵⁰ by securing for Great Britain opt-out clauses to the single currency and the social chapter.

Unlike the Euro-skeptics, Major seems to look at the UK's opt-out clause to the single currency from a practical perspective. For Major, an important point behind the opt-out clause to the single currency is to reserve this (and a future) Parliament's right to determine whether or not such a monetary framework would maximize the UK's economy in the European market.⁵¹ Major wishes to reserve Britain's right to

⁴⁸ Parliamentary Debates, 20 November 1991, col. 270. (Emphasis added.) Like Major, Sillars observes that "[l]ike it or not, we are in the European Community. We either sit in a corner snarling and growling, always looking for errors through a jaundiced eye, or we approach our new situation in a constructive fashion.... [W]e should strive to make the Community work more effectively, strengthen its democratic institutions, widen its capacity for ideological and political change, and subscribe to the debate about what kind of Community it may ultimately become" (Sillars, *No Turning Back*, 5 [Emphasis added.]).

⁴⁹ Hugo Young, "Prime Minister," in Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, eds., *The Major Effect* (London: MacMillan Press, 1994), 23. (Emphasis added.)

⁵⁰ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 200, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 11 December 1991, col. 862.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, col. 875.

vote on the single currency because he wants to ascertain whether such a scheme could yield economic benefits for the UK.⁵² In theory, the establishment of a single currency would mean stable prices and poorer EU states "would have a better chance of catching up if they are able to link their own development efforts to those of the Community."⁵³ The benefits of a single currency would, if successful, mean "low inflation across the whole of Europe."⁵⁴ Single currency membership would provide for the UK favorable conditions in mending its prospects for improved "employment, interest rates, inward investment, ... and price levels."⁵⁵

However, Major also recognizes that there are economic difficulties in establishing a single currency. Not only are there economic complexities in the three stages establishing EMU,⁵⁶ but "unanticipated"

⁵² John Major, "You Can Judge Me on My Record," *The Daily Telegraph*, 3 July 1995, 18.

⁵³ *European Union* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities), 35.

⁵⁴ *Parliamentary Debates*, 11 December 1991, col. 875.

⁵⁵ "Fireworks over Europe," *Yorkshire Post*, 9 June 1995, 10. On the same point, see Joy Copley, "Fresh Row Over Single Currency," *The Scotsman*, 9 June 1995, 9.

⁵⁶ This pressure was exacerbated by the economic complexities of creating the EMU which included three stages. First, there would be a need for member states to eliminate all residual capital controls, to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and to harden its ERM commitment; second, there would be a need for the European Monetary System (EMS) to develop a common set of macroeconomic policies adopted by national authorities; and three, there would then be the development of the single currency and a European Central Bank (ECB). (Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey A. Frieden, "The Political Economy of European Monetary

events and "political" opposition have "intervened to interrupt the momentum of monetary unification."⁵⁷ The Bundesbank, in implementing strict monetary policies resulting from the costs of German unification,⁵⁸ is taking an economic risk regarding the EMU because there is simply "no guarantee that these institutional arrangements would perform as smoothly and as beneficially for Germany as its domestic arrangements have."⁵⁹ The British pound and the Italian lira failed to converge with the rest of the other currencies in the EMS.⁶⁰ In June 1991, Thatcher admitted to her Government's mistake in trying to "shadow" the deutschmark "pursuing the objective of a stable exchange rate at the expense of monetary discipline."⁶¹ This objective, argues Thatcher, "produced inflation which was the underlying cause of the recession."⁶² Eastern Europe would have a difficult time joining the EU's single market with a single currency because, as

Unification: An Analytical Evaluation," in Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A. Lake, eds, *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*, Third Edition [London: Routledge, 1995], 269.)

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Jeffrey J. Anderson and John B. Goodman, "Mars and Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe," in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann, eds, *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies Europe, 1989-1991* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 53.

⁶⁰ Eichengreen and Frieden, "The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification," 267.

⁶¹ Margaret Thatcher, "Where I Stand on Britain and Europe," *The Sunday Times*, 28 May 1995, Sec. 3, 3.

⁶² Ibid.

mentioned above, it would require "strict budget discipline" and the "convergence of the economies."⁶³

Finally, Major also looks at the political difficulties of the single currency from a practical perspective. This perspective is considerably different from that of the Euro-skeptics which, as will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, looks at the constitutional implications of the single currency. For current purposes, it may be noted that the constitutional consequences of the single currency are important to examine because, for the Euro-skeptics, the EU's proposed monetary arrangement would limit a state's monetary autonomy.⁶⁴ While this might be the case, the Major Government does not agree with the Tory Euro-skeptics that it is in Britain's national interest to decide once and for all to opt-out of the single currency altogether.⁶⁵ The TEU Protocol on Certain Provisions relating to Great Britain and Northern Ireland states, for example, that the UK, upon implementing its opt-out clause to the single currency, forfeits any vote in selecting the President, Vice-president, and Executive Board of the

⁶³ Leo Murray, "Europe at the Crossroads," *Contemporary Review*, March 1995, 115. See also: Karsten Prager and Adam Zagorin, "Jacques Delors: A Call for Public Support," *Time*, 28 December 1992, 25.

⁶⁴ Eichengreen and Frieden, "The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification," 267.

⁶⁵ *Panorama* Program on the Conservative Party Leadership Contest on 3 July 1995.

ECB.⁶⁶ The Protocol also states that the United Kingdom "shall be excluded from any calculation of a qualified majority under Article 109k(5)."⁶⁷ In opting out of a single currency the UK government could contribute to the further creation of a "two-tier" Europe.⁶⁸ The problem with just being outside a single currency framework, as Lord Howe once observed back in 1991, is that it would place Britain in "isolation" from the other members of the Community:

The real threat is that of leaving ourselves with no say in the monetary arrangements that the rest of Europe chooses for itself, with Britain once again scrambling to join the club later, after the rules have been set out and after the power has been distributed by others to our disadvantage. That would be the worst possible outcome.⁶⁹

Major agrees with the anti-Europeans of the Tory Party that to proceed with a single currency without further thinking through its economic and political complications would be "folly."⁷⁰ At the December 1995 Madrid Conference, for example, Major noted that he would like to see the EU launch a study that would not only analyze "the impact a single currency would have on the EU's single market," but the "'cohesiveness' of the EU in the event of a handful of countries breaking

⁶⁶ Point 7 of the Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the TEU.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ John Cole, "Are We In or Out of Europe," *New Statesman and Society*, 19 February 1993, 9.

⁶⁹ Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 180, Sixth Series, Session 1990-1991, 13 November 1990, col. 464.

⁷⁰ Major, "You Can Judge Me on My Record," 18.

away to launch a single currency."⁷¹ In negotiating with the EU over the single currency, however, Major said to the House of Commons that the opt-out clause is for Britain

a choice that is fully there for us to make at the same time and in the same fashion as other countries, except that we have the additional option of deciding that it would not be right for this country.⁷²

For Major, Britain's choice for an opt-out to the single currency encourages the development of a type of Europe "which does not impose undue conformity, but encourages flexibility."⁷³ As mentioned above, what is even more important for Major is that by being part of the European Union the UK can protect its national interest

*by exercising its influence and authority, by persuading, by pushing, by fighting for its interest, and sometimes, by digging our toes in and saying no as we did over the social chapter and the single currency.*⁷⁴

The Major Government's other opt-out clause pertains to that of the social chapter. While the Government's Opposition finds it difficult to understand Major's reservations with the social chapter,⁷⁵ the Conservative Party notes that this part

⁷¹ Nicholas Wood and Philip Webster, "Major Puts Brakes on Europe's Drive for Single Currency," *The Times*, 13 December 1995, 2.

⁷² Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1991, col. 866.

⁷³ John Major, "Europe: A Future that Works," *European Access*, No. 5 (October 1994), 6.

⁷⁴ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 214, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 4 November 1992, col. 285. (Emphasis added.)

⁷⁵ If the goal of the Tory leadership is to develop a single market, proponents of the social chapter

of the Treaty is a plethora of social provisions which contradict Britain's industrial mindset.⁷⁶ Unlike the Euro-skeptics, the Major Government is opposed to the implementation of the social chapter not because of its constitutional implications but, from a practical perspective, it would force the UK to adopt European guidelines across the board over issues related to workers rights and the minimum wage.⁷⁷ Major also objects to other components of the social chapter which include the establishment of new trade union powers, restrictions on employers' rights in job recruitment, and new directives on flexible job opportunities.⁷⁸

The point here is this. Prime Minister John Major is a proponent of the economic maximization of the single market because it gives the UK access to the European and international business world. For Major, however, the social chapter is detrimental to the UK's

believe that such provisions would guarantee equality between workers across Europe (Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1991, col. 863). If part of the social chapter, the UK "has a chance to influence [its] political and economic destiny rather than being pushed to the periphery" ("The Only Show in Town," *New Statesman and Society*, 21 May 1993, 5). By being outside the social chapter, the then leader of the Labour party Neil Kinnock argued, the Tory leadership deliberately hurts the interests of British workers (Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1991, col. 863).

⁷⁶ Michael Angus, "Avoid a Chapter of Disasters," *The Times*, 22 July 1993, 16.

⁷⁷ Glenn Frankel, "Major Claims EC Victory for Britain," *The Washington Post*, 12 December 1991, A 52.

⁷⁸ Ibid. See Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Agreement on Social Policy Concluded Between the Member States of the European Community with the Exception of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the TEU.

economic interests.⁷⁹ In protecting British interests from a practical point of view, the Tory leadership which is sympathetic to Major's beliefs argues that the UK has been able to attract 40 per cent of foreign investment inside the EU because Britain is outside the confines of the social chapter.⁸⁰ The UK "has the leading edge in the marketplace in Europe" because of low inflation, low interest rates, and competitive labor costs.⁸¹ The Tory Party estimates that the production and wage costs for General Motors in the UK is \$18.9 per hour as compared to \$24.9 in Germany.⁸² With the advantage of the single market, fellow Conservative MP Edwina Currie argues, Peugeot cars are made in Coventry, Honda in Swindon, and Ford in Halewood.⁸³ By being outside the social chapter, British businesses would be able "to keep their own costs down

⁷⁹ Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1991, col. 864. See also Philip Stephens, "Major Ready to Defy Commons on Social Chapter," *Financial Times*, 23 July 1993, 1.

⁸⁰ Malcolm Rifkind, Speech to the University of St. Andrews Conservative and Unionist Association, in St. Andrews, Scotland (UK), 23 February 1996.

⁸¹ Parliamentary Debates, 22 July 1993, col. 628. See also Anatole Kalestsky, "Britain's Coming Boom," in Dudley Fishburn, ed., *The World in 1993* (London: The Economist Publications, 1992), 24-25.

⁸² Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 216, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 14 January 1993, col. 563.

⁸³ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 217, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 18 January 1993, col. 70. See also Barry Hildenbrand, "Ready, But No Longer So Willing," *Time*, 5 October 1992, 28-29.

and [attract] foreign investment from Japan and elsewhere that might otherwise go to the Continent."⁸⁴

Major believed he was protecting the UK's national interest by securing an intergovernmental dimension to the TEU's CFSP and HJA. Securing an intergovernmental dimension for these two areas of state competency illustrates the point that while the UK was interested in economic integration, it was weary of political integration. While weary of political integration, however, Major accepted minimalist political concessions by allocating CFSP and HJA as the second and third pillars of the TEU and, in doing so, the other member states agreed to cooperation in these two areas "outside the Treaty of Rome."⁸⁵ For Major, this is important for the issue of state sovereignty because cooperation (along intergovernmental lines) "means that the Commission will not have sole right of initiative and the European Court of Justice will have no jurisdiction."⁸⁶ In respect to HJA, the member states agreed to cooperate and coordinate efforts in combatting terrorism and drug trafficking.⁸⁷ As Major noted in the House of Commons, the issues of terrorism

⁸⁴ Frankel, "Major Claims EC Victory for Britain," A 52.

⁸⁵ Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1991, col. 859.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ See Title VI, Article K1 of the Provisions on Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs in the TEU.

and drug trafficking merit "a wide range of common policies and areas of close cooperation"⁸⁸ because

International crime knows no frontiers. Terrorists and other criminals must not be allowed to escape justice or to retire abroad with the proceeds of their crime. This text gives us the new basis for cooperation with our partners in bringing these criminals to justice.⁸⁹

However, HJA provisions protect Britain's right to maintain its own frontier controls to fight terrorism and illegal immigration for it would be "irresponsible to weaken our controls, and we are not prepared to do so..."⁹⁰ Article K2 (2) of HJA, moreover, cites that this Title

shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon member states with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguard of internal security.⁹¹

This is an important article because it recognizes the importance of state security and the difficulties member states have had in controlling their internal frontiers from acts of terrorism and violence.⁹²

The origins of CFSP can be traced back to European Political Cooperation (EPC). Many of its instruments of decision making (for example, unanimity) were integrated into the CFSP framework. While EPC decisions

⁸⁸ Major, "Europe: A Future that Works," 8.

⁸⁹ Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1991, col. 860.

⁹⁰ Parliamentary Debates, 20 November 1991, col. 280. (Emphasis added.)

⁹¹ Article K2 (2) of the TEU.

⁹² Andrew Duff, "The Main Reforms," in Andrew Duff, John Pinder and Roy Price, eds., *Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European Union* (London: Routledge, 1994), 25.

were limited to the economic and political realm,⁹³ Hurd notes that its intergovernmental approach obtained the political consensus of member states with various foreign policy objectives.⁹⁴ The more important point behind the CFSP process is that it maintains the sovereignty of the member states for, as Major argues, it attempts "to strike the right balance between closer cooperation and a proper respect for national institutions and traditions."⁹⁵ Hurd concurs by noting that the principle behind CFSP

*is, and will remain, a simple one. Where we can work together as Europeans, we do so; where we cannot work together, for lack of agreement or where there is no need to do so, we are free to go our own way.*⁹⁶

Like HJA, CFSP is outside the legal realm of the EU framework.⁹⁷ While the European Commission "does not have the sole right of initiative, as it does in most

⁹³ Gabriella Graselli, "Western Europe's Security after Maastricht," *European Access*, No. 5 (October 1992): 7. For more on the EPC, read Kathleen M. Spieker, "A Community Perspective on the Integration of EC External Relations and European Political Cooperation in Pre-Maastricht Community: Case Studies Manifested Through Economic Sanctions and Trade Used as Political Instruments," Ph.D Dissertation, University of St. Andrews, 1994 and Sophie Vanhoonacker, "A Critical Issue: From European Political Cooperation to a Common Foreign and Security Policy," in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union*, 25-37.

⁹⁴ Douglas Hurd, "Developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy," *International Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 3 (1994): 422.

⁹⁵ John Major, *The Evolution of Europe* (London: Conservative Political Center, 1991), 12.

⁹⁶ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 222, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 30 March 1993, col. 170. (Emphasis added.)

⁹⁷ Hurd, "Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy," 422.

areas under the treaty,"⁹⁸ the crucial point for the Tory Party leadership is that in protecting state sovereignty Article J8(2) clearly states that European Council "shall act unanimously..."⁹⁹ A minimalist concession for the Government seems to lie in Article J3(2) which states the European Council will "define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority."¹⁰⁰ "Once agreed," Hurd writes, "common positions and joint actions will now be international legal obligations."¹⁰¹

For John Major, CFSP's intergovernmental approach is "consistent" with the UK's foreign policy objectives.¹⁰² Under the terms of the Treaty, for example, Britain retains the right to pursue foreign policy objectives (such as the Falklands and Hong Kong) outside the political domain of CFSP.¹⁰³ The TEU's Declaration on dependent territories states

The Conference, noting that in exceptional circumstances divergences may arise between the interests of the Union and those of the overseas countries and territories..., agrees that the Council will seek to reach solution which accords with the position of the Union. However, in the event that this proves impossible, the Conference agrees that the member states may act separately in the interests of the said overseas countries and territories, without this affecting the Community's interests. The member state concerned will give notice to the Council and the

⁹⁸ Ibid., 425.

⁹⁹ Article J8(2) of the TEU.

¹⁰⁰ Title V, Article J(3)2 of the TEU.

¹⁰¹ Hurd, "Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy," 425.

¹⁰² Wester, "The UK and European Political Union," 197.

¹⁰³ Hurd, "Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy," 423. See also Parliamentary Debates, 30 March 1993, col. 176.

*Commission where such a divergence of interests is likely to occur and, when separate action proves unavoidable, make it clear that it is acting in the interests of an overseas territory mentioned above.*¹⁰⁴

The other British dimension to CFSP is the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance. In the Maastricht negotiations, for example, Major was able to convince the other member states of the EU to make the West European Union "the defence component of the European Union, while at the same time being the instrument of the European pillar of NATO."¹⁰⁵ Article B(4) of the TEU's Declaration on Western European Union states the following:

Accordingly WEU is prepared to develop further the close working links between WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU Member States in the Alliance. This will be undertaken on the basis of the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defence identity and the Alliance. WEU will act in conformity with the positions adopted in the Atlantic Alliance.¹⁰⁶

The Major Government is adamant about the maintenance of the Atlantic relationship because "it is about the

¹⁰⁴ Declaration on the Representation of the Interests of the Overseas Countries and Territories Referred to in Article 227(3) and (5)(a) and (b) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community of the TEU. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁰⁵ Graselli, "Western Europe's Security after Maastricht," 7. See also Title V, Article J4 of the TEU and Article B(4) of the Declaration of Western European Union.

¹⁰⁶ Article B(4) of the TEU's Declaration on Western European Union. See also Wester, "The UK and European Political Union," 199 and Parliamentary Debates, 4 November 1992, col. 293.

defence of common interests,"¹⁰⁷ which has been (and is) "a key element of European identity."¹⁰⁸

In negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, then, John Major took a pragmatic approach to Britain's understanding of the TEU by pushing for the completion of the single market and in opting out of the social chapter in which the latter was deemed to be incompatible to Britain's business culture. In dealing with the single currency, Major also takes a practical approach. As will be analyzed later in this chapter, there are those in the Conservative Party who like the Government to introduce a referendum to decide the issue one way or the other. For the Tory leadership, the idea of a referendum is "hypothetical"¹⁰⁹ because there is still no certainty as to whether a single currency is feasible.¹¹⁰ In February 1996 Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind asserted that the Government is opposed to an early opt-out to the single currency for, as mentioned earlier, it wants to determine what detrimental effects Britain and others would face if outside the monetary framework.¹¹¹ As well, John Major believes that such a move would only serve to impede

¹⁰⁷ Iain Duncan Smith, "Going with the Grain of History," *The Times*, 31 March 1995, 16.

¹⁰⁸ Anglo-Italian Declaration on European Security and Defence, 5 October 1991, in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, *The Intergovernmental Conference*, 412. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁰⁹ Rifkind, Speech given at the University of St. Andrews Conservative and Unionist Association.

¹¹⁰ Nicholas Wood, "We May Never Join EMU -- Major," *The Times*, 9 June 1995, 1.

¹¹¹ See also Peter Riddell, "At Young Malcolm's Feet," *The Times*, 12 February 1996, 18.

Britain's negotiating power at the next Intergovernmental Conference in 1996.¹¹²

Unlike the Tory leadership, the Euro-skeptics of the Party do not seem to overtly concerned with Major's practical perspective to Britain's understanding of the TEU. Euro-skeptic Tories like Michael Spicer, Sir Teddy Taylor, and Lord Rees-Mogg are more concerned with the TEU's constitutional implications. As a staunch defender of parliamentary sovereignty, for example, Thatcher observes that Britain's debate over its future role in Europe is

*a very serious debate. There are enormously serious issues affecting the future rights of the House and its future responsibilities. When we are talking about the rights and responsibilities of the House, what we are really talking about are the rights of our constituents, and they need to be treated very seriously indeed.*¹¹³

While Major is concerned over the economic ramifications of the establishment of a "frankreich,"¹¹⁴ for Euro-skeptic Tories the debate is a fundamental one because it does not merely about economic maximization or number crunching; rather, it is about the protection of Britain's historic institutions and traditions.

For the Euro-skeptics, the crucial argument they have over the Maastricht Treaty centers around Major's ambivalence as to whether or not to implement the opt-

¹¹² Andrew Grice and Michael Prescott, "Major Drops Bid to Curb Brussels," *The Sunday Times*, 21 May 1995, 24.

¹¹³ Parliamentary Debates, 20 November 1991, col. 291. (Emphasis added.)

¹¹⁴ James Landale and Nicholas Wood, "Single Currency 'Threatens to Break Up EU,'" *The Times*, 21 February 1996, 9.

out clause to the single currency. To reiterate, the monetary dimension of the EMU is a controversial aspect of the 1992 program because it "involves agreeing to irrevocably fixed exchange rates or the establishment of a single currency."¹¹⁵ For Spicer, the word "irrevocable" is objectionable because it

means unalterable, gone beyond recall, in other words, for ever. It is impossible, in my view, to exaggerate the significance of the inclusion of this notion of eternity into the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. *It is what sets Maastricht apart from everything that has gone before. If it were to be ratified it would, indeed, quite literally be the point of no return.*¹¹⁶

Fellow Conservative MP Edwina Currie, however, finds the word "irrevocable" to be a meaningless one because every piece of legislation "that passes through this House is irrevocable until it is changed."¹¹⁷ Currie also argues that not only has the UK signed treaties (such as the North Atlantic Treaty) using similar language,¹¹⁸ but, as Heath asserts, the Euro-skeptics' bickering over the use of words like "federal" and "irrevocable" does not help Europe's perception that the UK is not a "constructive" player in the European Union.¹¹⁹ Currie summarizes her belief in the House of Commons that the UK must not be afraid to "join in and

¹¹⁵ Barry Harrison and Nigel Healey, "European Monetary Union: Off-Course, But Still Afloat," *Contemporary Review*, March 1995, 120.

¹¹⁶ Michael Spicer, *A Treaty Too Far: A New Policy for Europe*, Foreword by The Rt. Hon. Lady Thatcher (London: Fourth Estate, Ltd., 1992), 13. (Emphasis added.)

¹¹⁷ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 216, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 13 January 1993, col. 980.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., col. 981.

¹¹⁹ Heath, "I Put the National Interest First," 17.

*be part of alliances, and do our utmost to make them work in our interests.*¹²⁰

In response to Currie, Spicer asserts that his overall argument is not whether or not Great Britain should form or participate in the creation of alliances with other states in the international community.¹²¹ Fellow Euro-skeptic John Redwood, for example, believes that the UK's essential foreign policy objectives for the 1990s is to create stronger links with the United States and the Far East.¹²² The more important point that Spicer makes, however, is Currie's complete misunderstanding of "the whole thrust of this treaty and the Treaty of Rome."¹²³ Once the transfer of a state power to coin currency is relinquished, Spicer argues, "it has taken the essential step towards giving away sovereignty and the control of its economy."¹²⁴ "That," Spicer warns *"has profound implications for the sovereignty, rights and history of this Parliament."*¹²⁵

If the UK were to decide to join a single currency, the Euro-skeptics argue, it would have to adhere to the decisions of the ECB, which has no accountability to the member states' political

¹²⁰ Parliamentary Debates, 13 January 1993, col. 981. (Emphasis added.)

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Nicholas Wood, "Redwood Says EU is Repressing Britain's Potential," *The Times*, 27 September 1995, 2.

¹²³ Parliamentary Debates, 13 January 1993, col. 981.

¹²⁴ Ibid., col. 980

¹²⁵ Ibid., cols. 980-981. (Emphasis added.)

authorities.¹²⁶ Article 7 of the Protocol on ECB stipulates, for example, that neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, "shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, or from any government of a member state or from any other body."¹²⁷

Article 7 of the TEU also stipulates that the

...Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the member states undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision making bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks.¹²⁸

The establishment of a single currency is seen by Lady Thatcher as a "conveyor belt to federalism"¹²⁹ because, for all practical purposes, the implementation of a single currency requires the establishment of a single tax structure. As Spicer notes in the House of Commons:

There will be misery and political disruption throughout the new state unless a single central compensatory authority with taxation and expenditure powers is established in association with a single currency. It is logical as night follows day that the establishment of a single currency should involve the establishment of a single taxation authority and single economic authority. If that is not the foundation, the makings and the essence of a new sovereign state, I do not know what is.¹³⁰

Christopher Gill, who is a Conservative MP for Ludlow, said before the Bruges Group in February 1995:

Under a single currency, there would be but one Chancellor of the Exchequer; and I hazard a guess that

¹²⁶ Harrison and Healey, "European Monetary Union," 123.

¹²⁷ Chapter III, Article 7 of the Protocol on the European Central Bank of the TEU. (Emphasis added.)

¹²⁸ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

¹²⁹ Parliamentary Debates, 20 November 1991, col. 294.

¹³⁰ Parliamentary Debates, 13 January 1993, cols. 983-984. (Emphasis added.)

the same Chancellor would not be residing at 11 Downing Street! Economic policy would be decided by the Council of Ministers, relegating national Parliaments to the status of rate-capped National Assemblies.¹³¹

The "prospect of central bankers in Frankfurt governing our economies," Euro-skeptic colleague Bill Cash concludes, "will undermine the basis of democracy in Europe."¹³²

Like Major, the Euro-skeptics object to the social chapter. Spicer, however, perceives that the establishment of the social chapter is not only detrimental to the British business community but that it threatens the sanctity of parliamentary sovereignty. Like the single currency, the issue of the social chapter is of fundamental importance for, as Thatcher noted in her Bruges speech

We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them reimposed at a European level with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels.¹³³

Spicer explains that the essential problem with the social chapter can be traced back to the Single European Act of 1986. Spicer notes the SEA placed two important articles "which the Commission can [use to] sidestep the power of the veto of the member states."¹³⁴

¹³¹ Christopher Gill, *Speaking Out on Europe*, with an Introduction by Martin Holmes, Bruges Group Occasional Paper No. 18, 6.

¹³² Bill Cash, "The Tide Turning Against Federal Europe," *Parliamentary Brief*, Vol. 2, No. 8 (May/June 1994): 72. (Emphasis added.)

¹³³ Margaret Thatcher, "Britain's Policies Towards Europe, Trade and Defence," Speech Given at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, 20 September 1988, *British Information Services*, No. 50/88. (Emphasis added.)

¹³⁴ Spicer, *A Treaty Too Far*, 46.

These articles, 100A and 118A, deal with single market measures and health and safety work respectively.¹³⁵ For Spicer, the Commission can impose upon Britain the constraints of the social chapter through defining these measures as "health and safety."¹³⁶ According to Spicer, because the Commission can require Britain (under Article 118A of the SEA) to comply to these directives, such compliance impedes "consent of the British Government"¹³⁷ As Article 100A makes clear these provisions will be decided by qualified majority voting.¹³⁸ Like the SEA, the Euro-skeptics also object to the social chapter because it too "endorses collective bargaining."¹³⁹ Article 3 of the social chapter not only requires the EU to consult unions and employees about the content of Community directives, but, according to Article 4 (1), "Should management and labor so desire, the dialogue between them at Community level may lead to contractual relations, including agreements."¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ "The Single European Act," *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 2/86 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities), 12-13.

¹³⁶ Spicer, *A Treaty Too Far*, 46.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ "Single European Act," 12.

¹³⁹ David Goodhart, "Technical Document Raises Ire and Passion," *Financial Times*, 23 July 1993, 7.

¹⁴⁰ See Articles 3 and 4 of the Agreement on Social Policy Concluded between the Member States of the European Community with the Exception of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the TEU. Compare with Article 118 B in "Single European Act," 13.

With the next Intergovernmental Conference coming up in 1996, Euro-skeptic Tories are concerned that certain EU member states wish to extend EU's authority into areas like CFSP and other social issues.¹⁴¹ In respect to CFSP, the Euro-skeptics have no objections to cooperating with other states in the international community.¹⁴² However, Spicer examines Article J1(4) in which

The member states shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these are principles are complied with.¹⁴³

This last sentence, Spicer comments, "may appear to safeguard the member states' authority, at least in the field of applying the foreign policy of the Union,"¹⁴⁴ but, as Spicer continues his line of argument, it "does not equate with a national right of veto."¹⁴⁵ In the Declaration on Voting in the Field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the member states of the TEU agree

that, with regard to Council decisions requiring unanimity, member states will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a unanimous decision where a qualified majority exists in favor of that decision.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹ Noel Malcolm, "The Case Against 'Europe'," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 2 (March/April 1995): 66-68. See also Parliamentary Debates, 30 March 1993, col. 172.

¹⁴² Parliamentary Debates, 30 March 1993, col. 170.

¹⁴³ Article J1(4) of the TEU Spicer quotes .

¹⁴⁴ Spicer, *A Treaty Too Far*, 125.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Declaration on Voting in the Field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the TEU.

The Declaration, Spicer writes, is detrimental to parliamentary sovereignty because it "amounts to an agreement by member states not to employ their veto and effectively represents a reversal of the Luxembourg Compromise."¹⁴⁷ Under Title V, Lord Rees-Mogg argues "foreign policy becomes the responsibility of the European Union."¹⁴⁸ While principles will be adapted by unanimity and its implementation be adapted by qualified majority vote, these "policies are binding and can only be changed through the same procedures in the European Union."¹⁴⁹

The next question, however, is this. If Tories like Cash and Thatcher are adamantly opposed to the creation of a federal Europe, why did they support the ratification of the SEA in 1986? As Ian Taylor pointed out, for example, it was in the SEA that one can find reference to the single currency and to the establishment of a social policy.¹⁵⁰ Ian Taylor also made the point that when the UK joined the EC in the 1970s, it was joining an institution that had all the makings of more than just a free trade area.¹⁵¹ In the House of Commons, Ian Taylor argued:

For heaven's sake, we left a free trade area to join the Community.... We knew what the institutional structure was when we joined. We knew that the Community's ambitions covered a range of issues and

¹⁴⁷ Spicer, *A Treaty Too Far*, 125.

¹⁴⁸ William Rees-Mogg, "Democracy at Stake," *The Times*, 22 July 1993, 16.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Parliamentary Debates, 14 January 1993, col. 1115.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., col. 1116.

could not be achieved by free trade alone. The institutional structure has been apparent since we joined, and we knew what we were in for. Indeed the words "European Community" have been used in all except legal documents in the Community since 1978. We had nearly ten years warning of what we were doing when we signed the Single European Act.¹⁵²

According to Ridley, Thatcher underestimated the constitutional ramifications of the SEA.¹⁵³ Thatcher notes that, like Major, she took a practical position to the SEA by concentrating her efforts in bringing about the single market, thus hoping to revive the Community's "liberal, free trade, deregulatory purpose."¹⁵⁴ While the signing of the SEA marked "the first time British law could be changed by a majority of other countries,"¹⁵⁵ Thatcher agreed to qualified majority voting because it was perceived at the time to be the optimal approach in bringing about the single market's successful completion.¹⁵⁶ After departing No. 10 Downing Street, however, Thatcher writes that one of the few things that she regrets was her failure to come "to grips with the rapidly changing scene in Europe."¹⁵⁷ In leaving office, Thatcher observes, "the groundwork was being laid for what would be the Maastricht Treaty, designed to set in place the framework for a federal

¹⁵² Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁵³ Ridley, *My Style of Government*, 143.

¹⁵⁴ Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 547.

¹⁵⁵ The transcript of the Radio 4 program can be found in "Thatcher Urges a Return to True Conservatism," *The Times*, 13 June 1995, 8. Thatcher corrects James Naughtie (the presenter of the program) by noting that qualified majority voting was already in the Treaty of Rome (ibid.).

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Thatcher, "Where I Stand on Britain and Europe," Sec. 3, 3.

United States of Europe."¹⁵⁸ The ERM was "being used for a purpose of which I not only disapproved but which I had made clear within government I would never implement."¹⁵⁹ Her only hope in leaving office was "in those [in the Party] who still carried on the battle of ideas."¹⁶⁰ Like Thatcher, Cash also underestimated the consequences of the SEA. Cash believed that the SEA was primarily about commercial and trading policies and "a sensible way in which to reduce barriers to trade and to increase free trade throughout Europe."¹⁶¹ Cash's objection to the TEU, however, is that it is based upon the fundamental belief that it "is primarily about government,"¹⁶² "the primary political impetus of which is to be at the European level, and the political parties at that level are intended to replace the national Parliaments."¹⁶³

The essential point for Euro-skeptics like Norman Lamont is that the EC Britain joined in the 1970s is very much different from the Europe today. In that previous era, the emphasis in EC affairs was in economics; "the need for access to a larger market and the need to achieve economies of scale."¹⁶⁴ Today's Europe emphasizes the political aspect of integration.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁶¹ Parliamentary Debates, 13 January 1993, col. 939

¹⁶² Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁶³ Ibid., col. 940.

¹⁶⁴ Norman Lamont, "Europe and No Further," *The Independent*, 12 October 1994, 19.

In arranging the special arrangements for Britain in the TEU, Lamont realized that there was "not a shred of evidence at Maastricht or since then that anyone accepts our view of Europe."¹⁶⁵ He continues noting that the "plain fact is that the 11 other members want a European Union that is a European state, *whether they express in these precise terms or not.*"¹⁶⁶

In late January 1993, there were those among the Euro-skeptics of the Party who attempted to take certain legislative measures which would not only impede the ratification process of the TEU, but, moreover, would demonstrate their sacrosanct commitment to parliamentary sovereignty. In this specific episode, a group of Euro-skeptic Tories came out to support a tabled Labor Party amendment which would have forced the Tory leadership to include the social chapter in the Maastricht Bill.¹⁶⁷ They supported the amendment not because they defended the need for social chapter *per se*, but that "it would not [then] be possible for the United Kingdom to ratify the treaty."¹⁶⁸ "Anything we can do to make it more difficult to go ahead with Maastricht," Sir Teddy Taylor said, "is well worthwhile."¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Nicholas Wood, "Tory Rebels Back Social Chapter," *The Times*, 21 January 1993, 8.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ As reported in Philip Webster, "Tebitt Backs Labor to Spur Maastricht Revolt," *The Times*, 10 February 1993, 1. (Emphasis added.)

In defending the inclusion of the social protocol -- and, more importantly, its work on the single market -- the Tory leadership challenged the Labour Party's amendment.¹⁷⁰ Their argument was that the social protocol was not subject to parliamentary approval because Parliament's only obligation is to "incorporate into domestic law those portions of the treaty that give rise to obligations on the United Kingdom..."¹⁷¹ The social protocol, which "expressly states that it does not affect domestic law,"¹⁷² falls "into the category of foreign undertakings that remain[s] the preserve of the executive under the Crown prerogative."¹⁷³

Euro-skeptic Tories like Bill Cash strongly objected to the Government's line of legal reasoning because by invoking royal prerogative on the social chapter, it *"betrays" the need for parliament.*¹⁷⁴ The debate over Labour's amendment on the social protocol became for Cash a matter of principle. The debate over the tabled Labour amendment was, in other words, part of a much greater discussion over the "flux" of the role of ideas in the British political agenda. By

¹⁷⁰ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 219, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 22 February 1993, col. 725.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., col. 740.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Baker, Gamble, Ludlam, "The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht," 49. See also Jill Sherman and Jonathan Prynn, "Major Faces Maastricht 'Constitutional Crisis'," *The Times*, 15 February 1993, 1.

¹⁷⁴ Sherman and Prynn, "Major Faces Maastricht 'Constitutional Crisis,'" 1. (Emphasis added.)

ratifying the TEU, Cash argues, the United Kingdom is legally obliged to take on certain rights, duties, obligations, and powers.¹⁷⁵ These responsibilities can only have "an impact on the people by virtue of enactment in the House of Commons."¹⁷⁶ As Cash eloquently notes:

...[I]f we do not get exercised about the way in which we are governed, about our Parliament, about whether we are to be taxed without consent, if we do not bother ourselves about whether the executive can railroad provisions irrespective, and possibly in defiance of Parliament, we shall deserve the fate which will befall us.¹⁷⁷

For Lord Hailsham, the ministers' treaty-making powers of prerogative must be "subject always to their total accountability to Parliament in its political or in its legislative capacity."¹⁷⁸ The basis for Rees-Mogg's legal challenge to the Government's Maastricht Bill, however, was that Major failed to seek parliamentary approval of the social protocol.¹⁷⁹ While the High Court ruled in July 1993 that the social protocol is "supplementary to the provisions of the treaty,"¹⁸⁰ Rees-Mogg's legal challenge fuelled the anti-European Tories' determination "to defend the basic institutions

¹⁷⁵ Parliamentary Debates, 22 February 1993, col. 725.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Lord Hailsham, "Ratify the Rule of Parliament," *The Times*, 21 July 1993, 14.

¹⁷⁹ Philip Webster and Frances Gibb, "Rees-Mogg Wins Right to Fight Treaty," *The Times*, 20 July 1993, 1.

¹⁸⁰ Nicholas Watt, "Judges Thwart Rees-Mogg Assault on Maastricht," *The Times*, 31 July 1993, 6.

of the British constitution and particularly Parliament and the courts."¹⁸¹

The Euro-skeptic Tories have also attempted to offer various policy alternatives to the UK's position on the EU. For example, a delegation of Euro-skeptics (led by Sir Richard Body) put together a manifesto articulating their disagreement with the Government's European policy.¹⁸² At a news conference, they insisted that their manifesto should not be construed as the launch of a new political party.¹⁸³ Rather, they issued the manifesto as a warning to other Tories that they "would lose the next General Election unless they changed tack on Europe."¹⁸⁴

John Wilkinson, one of the signers of the manifesto, believes that the Government needs "to recover powers and competences to the United Kingdom from the European Union."¹⁸⁵ According to the manifesto, Body's group would like to see Britain withdraw, for example, from the Common Fisheries Policy and the single currency. The "right of the European Court to intervene in national policies," the group insist,

¹⁸¹ Rees-Mogg, "Democracy at Stake," 16. See also "No Breach in Ratifying Treaty," *The Times*, 31 July 1993, 6.

¹⁸² Jill Sherman, "Tory Rebels in Disarray After Manifesto Launch," *The Times*, 20 January 1995, 9. The Tory MPs who signed the manifesto were the following: Sir Richard Body, Mr. N. Budgen, Mr. C.J.F. Gill, Mrs. T.E. Gorman, Mr. A. Marlow, Mr. Richard Shepherd, Sir Teddy Taylor, and Mr. John Wilkinson.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ John Wilkinson, in correspondence with the author, 16 May 1995.

"should be revoked and in particular the right to make decisions with retrospective effect should be removed."¹⁸⁶ The TEU should be subject of a referendum because its content (particularly the single currency) attempt to construct a new political organization.¹⁸⁷ Agreeing to the principles articulated in Body's manifesto, John Redwood eloquently writes

*This choice cannot be fudged, finessed, or brought down to issues of immediate political or economic advantage. It is not something to be decided later, on the spur of the moment, in response to the pressures of the day. It is not something that a handful of MPs on either side of the argument should be able to win by a timely shove during a moment of government weakness. It is a defining issue. What sort of people are we? Where do we belong? Do we value our independent institutions or don't we?*¹⁸⁸

Body's manifesto states, thus, that in considering Britain's membership to the European Union "[c]onsent is fundamental to such a profound change and acquiescence is insufficient to sustain the progressive transfer of the right to make our own laws to undemocratic and unaccountable foreign institutions."¹⁸⁹

Like Body's group of Euro-skeptics, Margaret Thatcher has called for the Tory government to repatriate certain EU powers back to the member states. Thatcher would like to see Britain reject the Maastricht Treaty, declare independence of the pound,

¹⁸⁶ Richard Body, et al., "Policy Paper," issued on 19 January 1995.

¹⁸⁷ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 204, Sixth Series, Session 1991-1992, 21 February 1992, col. 581.

¹⁸⁸ John Redwood, "One Vote is not Enough," *The Times*, 3 April 1996, 16.

¹⁸⁹ Body et. al., Policy Paper. (Emphasis added.)

and break away from all moves towards the establishment of a political union.¹⁹⁰ Thatcher would also like "to reverse" the growing protectionism of the Community by creating some form of an *Atlantic Free Trade Area*, incorporating North America and "the emerging market economies of central and eastern Europe as well as the EU itself."¹⁹¹ "The real danger" Lamont writes, "is not that we sell too little to Europe, but that we will concentrate on Europe to the exclusion of the great opportunities for increased trade in markets such as Asia that are growing much faster."¹⁹² The more fundamental point for Thatcher, however, is this:

A point has been reached -- indeed it was reached even before Maastricht -- at which the objectives and perceived interests of the different members of the Community radically differ. A clear understanding that this is so and that our strategy for 1996 must be planned accordingly is the essential foundation for success.¹⁹³

THE PRINCIPLE OF DEVOLUTION AND THE TORY PARTY

As with the issue of the European Union, the Conservative Party's objection to the devolution process also falls into two general levels of argument. The first general level of argument is a practical one pertaining to the Conservative Party's economic/political objections to devolution. These type of objections, as Fukuyama would assert, can be

¹⁹⁰ Alice Thomson, "Thatcher Urges Britain to Veto Political Union," *The Times*, 22 May 1995, 8.

¹⁹¹ Thatcher, "Where I Stand on Britain and Europe," Sec. 3, 3.

¹⁹² Lamont, "Europe and No Further," 19.

¹⁹³ Thatcher, "Where I Stand on Britain and Europe," Sec. 3, 3.

perceived to be merely "subsidiary" ones.¹⁹⁴ From an economic point of view, the Tory leadership objects to the Labour Party's understanding of the devolution¹⁹⁵ process because the Government claims that Scotland has done very well under the Union. Prime Minister John Major asserts that the United Kingdom has "enabled Scotland to develop an economy well-placed to meet the challenges of the next century."¹⁹⁶ For example, the Scottish economy has entered into the area of the computer industry and the European Community "has given our companies the biggest home market in the world."¹⁹⁷ In respect to the computer industry, Scotland is known as the "Silicon Valley" of Europe.¹⁹⁸ Scotland, for example, produces 11 per cent of Europe's semiconductors and over 35 per cent of Europe's personal computers.¹⁹⁹ As well, Scotland has produced over 50 per cent of Europe's automated banking machines.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Fukuyama. See also Chapter II of this dissertation.

¹⁹⁵ For more on the Labour Party's plans for a devolved Assembly in Edinburgh and its response from the Scottish National Party, see Chapter V of this dissertation.

¹⁹⁶ "Scotland: Strength Through Diversity in the United Kingdom," *Politics Today*, No. 1 (31 January 1994): 7.

¹⁹⁷ John Major, Speech to the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association Conference in Glasgow, Scotland (UK), 12 May 1995, *SCUA News Release*.

¹⁹⁸ "The United Kingdom: Maintaining the Union of its People," *Politics Today*, No. 4 (28 March 1995), 96.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

In being part of the United Kingdom, the former Scottish Secretary Ian Lang also argues that Scotland has benefited from European Union funds.²⁰¹ The latest export figures show that more than 60 per cent (about £5.6 billion) of Scottish exports go to states within the European Union.²⁰² More importantly Scotland will receive (over the next six years) from the European Union's Structural Funds £240 million to improve its less developed areas such as the Highlands and the Islands.²⁰³ The Tory leadership's goal is to continue to develop Scotland's business ties with Europe. Scotland Europa, for example, "provides a representative center for Scottish interests, giving them a direct voice in Brussels, and its opening marked a radical new departure for Scotland in Europe."²⁰⁴ In order to facilitate Scotland's strength as a "great trading nation," the Scottish Secretary established the Scottish Trade international in 1991. Made up of a staff from the Scottish Office, "the central priority of this agency must be to help Scottish exporters capitalize on the challenges of the Single Market."²⁰⁵

The Tory Party claims that the Labour Party's plans towards the establishment of a Scottish Assembly

²⁰¹ Lang, *The Fulfilled Society*, 13.

²⁰² *Scotland: A Region of the European Union* (London: Produced by the European Commission of the United Kingdom, 1994), 3.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Lang, *The Fulfilled Society*, 15. See also Parliamentary Debates, 7 February 1992, col. 612.

²⁰⁵ *Scotland in the Union: A Partnership for Good* (Edinburgh: HMSO, March 1993, Cm. 2225), 22.

would be to Scotland's economic disadvantage. The establishment of a Scottish Assembly with tax-raising powers would be, Scottish Secretary Michael Forsyth argues, dangerous to Scottish workers because such an Assembly could "produce a regressive taxation" in which Scottish workers would pay 15 per cent more tax "than their counterparts elsewhere in the United Kingdom."²⁰⁶ An extra tax would also be "potentially lethal" to business confidence, inward investment, and employment,²⁰⁷ in which, economist David Bell argues, the Scottish Parliament could "add to business costs by adopting more stringent health and safety regulation."²⁰⁸ As Lang practically summarizes, the Labour Party's understanding of devolution would drive foreign investors out of Scotland and, as a result, Scotland would "lose jobs and businesses to [its] neighbors and competitors."²⁰⁹

The Tories' practical objections to the Labour Party's advancement of a Scottish Assembly also falls into a political perspective, arguing that Shadow Scottish Secretary George Robertson's plans would add another layer of administration that could eventually

²⁰⁶ Michael Forsyth, "Scotland's Man in the Cabinet," *Scottish Leader*, Autumn 1995, 3. See also "Tartan Tax," *The Scottish Leader*, Autumn 1995, 1.

²⁰⁷ Michael Forsyth, "Now Can We See the Bill, Please?" *Scotland on Sunday*, 6 August 1995, 8.

²⁰⁸ David Bell, "Follow the Money," *Sunday Times-Scotland*, 27 August 1995, 3. See also Major's argument against the social chapter in Chapter VI of this dissertation.

²⁰⁹ "Lang Reveals 8 Billion Pounds Funding Gap in Separate Scotland," *SCUA News Release*, 3 May 1995.

produce a "spillover" effect into other functional competencies.²¹⁰ Another important concern for the Tory leadership is the effect that devolution would have on parliamentary sovereignty. The Labour Party's proposal on devolution, for the Tory Party, does not effectively deal with the West Lothian Question.²¹¹ Under the terms set out in the Scottish Constitutional Convention,²¹² as Ian Stewart argues, Scotland would continue to send to Westminster 72 MPs to Scotland in which they would be able to vote on English domestic legislation, but their English counterparts would have no ability to legislate on Scottish affairs.²¹³ "This creates," Stewart writes, "the bizarre situation that Gordon Brown will be able to vote on education policy for Durham but not for his own home constituency of Dunfermline."²¹⁴

The Scottish Constitutional Convention argues that the West Lothian Question can be solved by instituting Home Rule all round²¹⁵ in which such a scheme would "recreate Britain or the United Kingdom as a federal state."²¹⁶ Bill Walker finds a federal solution to the

²¹⁰ Ian Lang, "Labour Party's Proposals on Scottish Devolution," *The Times*, 5 January 1995, 19..

²¹¹ Interview with Stewart.

²¹² For example, read *Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Right* (Edinburgh: Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995), 25 and "How it Will Work," *Evening Times* (Glasgow), 28 November 1995, 31.

²¹³ Stewart, *Scotland's Future: The Scottish Constitutional Issue* (1995).

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ *Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Right*, 7.

²¹⁶ Lynch, "Labour Answers to the West Lothian Question," 19.

West Lothian Question to be a sound one²¹⁷ because Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and the different regions of England would each have their own assemblies to "decide domestic policy, with a UK Parliament continuing to legislate on national matters."²¹⁸ A federal style government would, thus, remove a source of "conflict" between the two houses "as each would be wholly sovereign in its own area of jurisdiction."²¹⁹ "However," Lynch writes, "while federalism contains all the answers to the West Lothian Question, it has very little party or public support."²²⁰

While the Conservative Party "stands unequivocally for the Union,"²²¹ the Conservative Party after the 1992 General Election promised, for reasons described below, that the Government would "look again at how the Union works."²²² In "Taking Stock," the Conservatives made it its electoral priority to introduce "procedural and administrative improvements to the existing system of Government for Scotland."²²³ In maintaining the health of the Union, Lang writes, the Tory Party must

²¹⁷ Interview with Walker.

²¹⁸ Ian Stewart, *Scotland's Future: The Scottish Constitutional Issue* (Edinburgh: Scottish Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1996).

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Lynch, "Labour Answers to the West Lothian Question," 19 and interview with Walker.

²²¹ Stewart, *Scotland's Future: The Scottish Constitutional Issue* (1996).

²²² Lang, *The Fulfilled Society*, 7.

²²³ Stewart, *Scotland's Future: The Scottish Constitutional Issue* (1996). (Emphasis added.)

be pro-active in our search for new ways to build on the strengths of the Union and to make it relevant to a new generation of Scots. It is our task now to breathe new life into the Union.²²⁴

In attempting to be a "pro-active" Party, Lang's Scottish Office issued its White Paper on Scottish government reform entitled *Scotland in the Union: A Partnership for Good* in March of 1993. The White Paper was the result of not only a 11 month examination of Scottish "constitutional issues" but "an attempt to counter Labour and nationalist claims that the Conservative Party had no mandate to govern north of the border, where it has only a quarter of the popular vote."²²⁵ In writing the White Paper, Ian Lang wished to assert Scotland's full and active membership in the United Kingdom.²²⁶ In the Foreword to *Scotland in the Union* John Major writes that

too often in recent years there has seemed to be in Scotland a genuine, if sometimes unformed, anxiety that the Union is in some way less relevant to Scotland and her aspirations. It is the Government's duty to address that anxiety and that is what this White Paper does.²²⁷

For the Major Government, the White Paper is an attempt to "encourage a distinctively Scottish approach to policy-making where that is in the interests of Scotland and renewed emphasis on identifying Scottish solutions for Scottish problems."²²⁸ The White Paper

²²⁴ Lang, *The Fulfilled Society*, 7.

²²⁵ Jonathan Prynn, "Lang Defends the Union in Reforms for Scotland," *The Times*, 10 March 1993, 10.

²²⁶ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 225, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 5 May 1993, col. 170.

²²⁷ *Scotland in the Union: A Partnership for Good*, 6.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 19.

asserts the need for change in policy-making at, for example, the European and Westminster levels.

At the Westminster level, the White Paper "aims at increasing the scrutiny powers of Scottish MPs and boosting the role and visibility of the Scottish Office..."²²⁹ For example, the Scottish Grand Committee would be allocated greater responsibilities and given more debating time at the Second Reading of Scottish bills.²³⁰ The type of Bills to go to the Scottish Grand Committee would gradually include Government Bills, Law Reform Bills and a Private Members Bills. While a formal vote on the Second Reading goes back to the House of Commons, this approach would enable the Scottish Grand Committee to take "more account ... of Scottish opinion during their consideration in principle, thus allowing a fuller Scottish legislative program."²³¹

At the European level, the UK government represents Scottish interests through the Office of the UK Permanent Representative (UKREP) in which the Scottish Office "contribute at relevant meetings of the Council of Ministers and of the Working Groups which prepare Council business across the policy spectrum."²³² While Lang recognizes the importance of Scottish representation in UKREP, however, he writes that "we

²²⁹ Prynn, "Lang Defends the Union," 10.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ *Scotland in the Union: A Partnership for Good*, 25.

²³² Ibid., 21.

cannot allow being part of Britain in Europe, with all the advantages it brings, to restrict at the same time the evolution of our own Scottish profile within the Community."²³³ An important strength of the Union, writes Lang, is that "its diversity within unity allows there to take place a confident pursuit by each of its constituent parts of their own interests and identity."²³⁴ For Lang, a "robust assertion" of Scottish interests in the EU "is not incompatible with Unionism, but the confident manifestation of it."²³⁵ The Scottish Office asserts that Scotland take a more direct role in its own affairs through, for example, the Committee of the Regions.²³⁶ The Committee of Regions, which is made up of representatives from regional and local bodies,

shall be consulted by the Council or by the Commission where this Treaty so provides and in all other cases in which one of these two institutions consider appropriate.²³⁷

The purpose of the Committee of Regions, then President of the European Commission Jacques Delors observes, is to "communicate local concerns and grassroots reactions, giving real substance to the debates which can often be rather abstract."²³⁸

²³³ Lang, *The Fulfilled Society*, 14.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ The Committee of Regions was set up as Chapter 4 under Title II of the TEU.

²³⁷ Title II, Chapter 4, Article 198c of the TEU.

²³⁸ Jacques Delors, "The Committee of the Regions," *European Access*, No. 3 (June 1994): 7.

The Conservative Party's argument against devolution, along an economic/political line of thinking, does not bring into full question the *End of History* paradigm for, as mentioned already in this chapter, Fukuyama could easily dismiss these issues as merely subsidiary. The next question, then, is to determine whether or not if the Conservative Party's allegiance to the Union is motivated by factors other than the mere pursuit of economic maximization and the institutional restructuring of Scottish affairs in Westminster politics.

In ascertaining why Conservatives are staunch Unionists, one should note three important factors. First of all, it is hard to understand why the Conservatives "stand unequivocally for the Union" at all when they enjoy minority political status in Scottish politics. The last time the Conservatives were able to win a majority of Scottish seats was in the General Election of 1955. The results of the General Election of 1955 can be seen in Table 1 below.²³⁹

²³⁹ A variety of sources were used to compile Table 1. They include: David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1979* (London: MacMillan Press, 1980), 391 and 402; F.W.S. Craig, ed., *British Electoral Facts, 1885-1975* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1976), 20-31; F.W.S. Craig, ed., *Britain Votes 4: British Parliamentary Elections, 1983-1987* (Hants: Parliamentary Research Services, 1989), 184; "Two Nations -- North and South," *The Economist*, 12 May 1979, 22; and Ian H. Wood and Roger Wood, eds., *The Times Guide to the House of Commons, April 1992*, (London: Times Books, 1992), 251.

Table 1
Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats Won by the
Conservative Party in the General Election in Scotland
1945-1992

Year	% of Votes	No. of Seats	Total
Seats			
1945	37.4	24	71
1950	44.8	31	71
1951	48.6	35	71
1955	50.1	36	71
1959	47.2	31	71
1964	40.6	24	71
1966	37.7	20	71
1970	38.0	23	71
1974 (Feb.)	32.9	21	71
1974 (Oct.)	24.7	16	71
1979	28.4	21	71
1983	31.4	22	71
1987	24.0	10	71
1992	25.7	11	72

According to Table 1, the Conservative Party (in alliance with the National Liberal Party) won the 1955 General Election by 50.1 per cent of the total votes. The Conservatives won more than 50 per cent of the seats (36 out of a total of 71 Scottish seats in that election year than in any other time since then. Since 1955, as Table 1 demonstrates, the Conservatives have been unable to repeat the same performance in other general elections. In the October 1974 General Election, for example, the Conservative Party only won 16 out of 71 Scottish seats. In the 1992 General Election, the Conservatives only won 11 out of 72 Scottish seats.²⁴⁰ The Tory Party's electoral difficulties in Scottish politics was further demonstrated in its poor showing in the April Scottish

²⁴⁰ Wood and Wood, *The Times Guide to the House of Commons*, April 1992, 251. For a commentary on this point, read Peter Riddell, "Minor Changes Mask Upheaval in Scotland," in Wood and Wood, *The Times Guide to the House of Commons*, April 1992, 291.

Council elections of 1995.²⁴¹ In May 1995 the Tories lost the Perth and Kinross by-election. The significance of this by-election was that the Scottish Tories controlled this seat for the past fifty-three years.²⁴²

It is also difficult to understand why Conservatives are for the Union when there is the constant claim among the Conservatives that the English taxpayers subsidize Scotland's economy.²⁴³ According to the Scottish Office, for example, Scotland makes up 8.8 per cent of the UK population and contributes only 8.9 per cent of total UK revenue; yet, Scotland receives 10.3 per cent of UK public spending.²⁴⁴ This means, the Scottish Office argues, that Scotland receives "some 17 per cent more public expenditure than the United Kingdom average and 21 per cent more per

²⁴¹ David Scott and Gary Duncan, "Triumphant Labor Halts SNP Advance, *The Scotsman*, 7 April 1995, 1.

²⁴² "Perth and Kinross: Historic Background," *The Courier and Advertiser*, 22 May 1995, 10. In that by-election, the SNP candidate Roseanna Cunningham was able to take the Perth and Kinross seat by a comfortable margin of 7,311 votes (Peter MacMahon, "SNP Sweeps to Victory in Perth," *The Scotsman*, 26 May 1995, 1).

²⁴³ For the SNP's response to this assertion, read Chapter V of this dissertation.

²⁴⁴ See Appendix B of this dissertation. Scottish Office, *Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland, 1993-1994* (Edinburgh: Scottish Office, 1995), i, 8 and 24. A similar report mentions this interesting point: "With only 5 per cent of the total UK population, Wales secured over 20 per cent of its inward investment in 1991-1992 -- more than any other part of the country" ("The United Kingdom: Maintaining the Union of its People," 102).

head than in England."²⁴⁵ The identifiable general government expenditure -- that is, those state functions which make up the Scottish Office's budget -- for Scotland in the area of health service, for example, is 25 per cent *higher* and in education *more* than 30 per cent than in England.²⁴⁶ Despite North Sea oil revenue, Lang argued before the Scottish Grand Committee in May 1995, there is a Scottish deficit of around £7 billion.²⁴⁷

A third reason pertains to the fact that the Labour Party is the dominant Party in Scotland and Wales. This is an interesting point because it was Labour wins in those parts of the United Kingdom which deprived the Tory Party the opportunity to form a Government in the General Elections of 1950, 1964, and 1974. The results of the General Elections of 1950, 1964, and 1974 can be seen in Tables 2 and 3 below.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ Scottish Grand Committee, "The Financial and Economic Implications of Independence for Scotland," 17 May 1995, col. 4.

²⁴⁶ Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

²⁴⁷ Ibid., col. 5.

²⁴⁸ Data was compiled from Craig, *British Electoral Facts, 1885-1975*, 20-31.

Table 2
Number of Conservative Seats Won in the General
Elections
of 1950, 1964 and 1974

	England	N.Ire.	Scotland	Wales	UK	Total
1950	253	10	31	4	298	625
1964	262	12	24	6	304	630
1974	268	-	21	8	297	635
1974	253	-	16	8	277	635

Table 3
Number of Labour Seats Won in the General Elections
of 1950, 1964, and 1974

	England	N.Ire.	Scotland	Wales	UK	Total
1950	251	-	37	27	315	630
1964	246	10	43	28	317	630
1974	237	-	40	24	301	635
1974	255	-	41	23	319	635

According to both tables, the Conservative Party had a narrow win of seats over Labour in English constituencies of the general elections cited above; however, Labor, as both tables demonstrate, was able to form a Government in these electoral years because of a win of seats over the Tory Party in both Scottish and Welsh constituencies. Without these seats, it seems then that the Labor Party would not have been able to form a Government.

The evidence suggests, then, that Scotland is a financial and electoral liability for the Conservative Party.²⁴⁹ If Scotland is indeed a liability for the

²⁴⁹ For more of a historical analysis on the decline of the Conservatives in Scotland read David Seawright and John Curtice, "The Decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 1950-92: Religion, Ideology or Economics," *Contemporary Record: The Journal of Contemporary British History*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Autumn 1995): 319-342. In this article, however,

Tories, why not relinquish Scotland and deprive Labour the opportunity (as seen in 1950, 1964, and 1974) to form a Government in Westminster altogether?²⁵⁰ If Scotland is such an economic basket case, then why is former Scottish Secretary Ian Lang so adamantly opposed to Labour's plans for a devolved Assembly in Scotland?²⁵¹ In examining the Tory Party's support for the Union, what reasons can there be for the Conservative Government to "regard the constitution of the United Kingdom as something to be cherished and guarded, while [Labor] regard it as a political plaything to be used to their advantage[?]"²⁵²

Seawright and Curtice places doubt on the beliefs that the Conservative Party is losing electoral approval because of "its opposition to devolution and [that the Party has] become too right wing for a normally progressive Scots electorate" (ibid., 319). Instead, the authors of this article that the Conservatives have failed to "appeal to certain symbols of Scots culture [like, for example, social democracy] and suffered from a leftward drift amongst the Scots electorate. But equally crucial has been the economic experience of Scots over the last forty years" (ibid.). It seems that the article refelects Fukuyama's line of thought in which "specific forms [of] capitalism and democracy ... can be quite varied depending upon the residue of cultural and historical pre-modern residue that arise and I don't think you will ever get rid of those entirely. ... There is certainly going to be many struggles over the economic and the share of the pie and that sort of thing. There will be fights between liberals and more social democratic types" (interview with Fukuyama).

²⁵⁰ "Time for a New Deal," *The Sunday Times* -- Scotland, 14 May 1995, 6.

²⁵¹ Ian Lang, Speech to the Conservative and Unionist Association Conference in Glasgow, Scotland (UK), 11 May 1995, SCUA News Release.

²⁵² Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 210, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 24 June 1992, col. 250. (Emphasis added.)

In ascertaining why the Conservatives are staunch Unionists, one must take, instead, an historic perspective. Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm can be challenged *along these lines* because for the Tories the Union is defended not for political gains,²⁵³ but because they perceive themselves to be the protectors of Great Britain's historic traditions and institutions.²⁵⁴ The Tories also fight for Scotland not because it is to their economic and electoral advantage, but because, as Lang suggests, they "care about Scotland's past, and its future that we stand steadfastly behind the Union."²⁵⁵ Major notes along the same historic lines that we

have deep instincts as Conservatives. We care passionately about the nations of the United Kingdom. Our feelings are emotional as well as intellectual.²⁵⁶

As Philip Norton suggests, the Conservatives "stand unequivocally for the Union" because it "represent[s] continuity with the past and they embody the unity of society and the norms and conduct of that society."²⁵⁷ Chris Patten argues that the unity of the Kingdom is "based on a common loyalty to the Crown, common citizenship and common representation in the

²⁵³ Interview with Walker.

²⁵⁴ David Clarke, *The Conservative Faith in the Modern Age*, Foreword by R.A. Butler (London: The Conservative Political Center, 1947), 10.

²⁵⁵ Lang, 1995 Speech to Scottish the Conservative and Unionist Association Conference in Glasgow.

²⁵⁶ Major, 1995 Speech to Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association in Glasgow.

²⁵⁷ Philip Norton, "Conservatism," in Foley, *Ideas that Shape Politics*, 41.

Westminster Parliament."²⁵⁸ In respect to the latter, the Tory Party leadership perceives the relationship between England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales to be legally bound by the establishment of a single parliamentary framework.²⁵⁹

As a part of its legal tradition, Westminster Parliament is perceived to be the law making body of the UK.²⁶⁰ As A.V. Dicey wrote:

The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.²⁶¹

The Conservatives argue that the Scots work *not* in an English parliament but in a UK parliament in "which Scotsmen take *their part*."²⁶² In taking part in a Westminster parliament, the Conservatives assert, the Scots can work along the lines of an unwritten constitution which has the ability to change. "The

²⁵⁸ Chris Patten, *The Tory Case* (London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1983), 46.

²⁵⁹ T.E. Utley, "Will Parliament Lose its Sovereignty?," in Charles Moore and Simon Heffer, eds., *A Tory Seer: The Selected Journalism of T.E. Utley* (London: Hamish Hamilton, Ltd., 1989), 98.

²⁶⁰ William B. Gwyn, "Political Culture and Constitutionalism in Britain," in Daniel P. Franklin and Michael J. Baun, eds., *Political Culture and Constitutionalism* (London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1995), 20.

²⁶¹ A. V. Dicey, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution*, Ninth Edition, with an Introduction and Appendix by E.C.S. Wade (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1939), 39-40.

²⁶² *The Answer to the Scottish Nationalists* (London: Scottish Unionist Whip Office, 1945), 17. (Emphasis added.)

constitution," Scottish Secretary Michael Forsyth writes, "is to a nation what the central nervous system is to the body,"²⁶³ in which its framework reflects

the accumulated practical wisdom of the community, ... the outcome of innumerable adjustments and modifications made by politically experienced individuals in circumstances of responsible political decision.²⁶⁴

While the tradition of the unwritten constitution is a "dispersed" one "written down in hundreds of places,"²⁶⁵ it is nevertheless a *flexible one* in which its uniqueness lies in *its organic nature*;²⁶⁶ "...its ability to change and move with the times, is often rightly proclaimed."²⁶⁷ The advantage of the unwritten constitution, in other words, is that it allows the Tories to practice "common sense politics."²⁶⁸ A political framework of this type, Willetts argues, allows practical men to address "specific abuses rather than trying to implement overarching schemes for reforms."²⁶⁹ In a lecture at the London School of Economics Lord Howe argues:

²⁶³ Forsyth, "Now Can We See the Bill, Please," 8.

²⁶⁴ Anthony Quinton, *The Politics of Imperfection* (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1978), 16.

²⁶⁵ David Willetts, *Modern Conservatism* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1992), 155. Willetts is a Conservative MP for Havant.

²⁶⁶ Lang, *The Fulfilled Society*, 7.

²⁶⁷ Ian Lang, "Taking the Slow Road," *The Times*, 10 March 1993, 18. (Emphasis added.)

²⁶⁸ John Barnes, "Ideology and Factions," in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball, eds., *Conservative Century: The Conservative Party Since 1900* (Oxford University Press, 1994), 318.

²⁶⁹ Willetts, *Modern Conservatism*, 153. (Emphasis added.)

The whole British political tradition of constitutional development is, of course, a very pragmatic one. Problems have been solved on a relatively ad hoc basis. You do it, and then put a name to it subsequently, so to speak. Theory between the two -- theory and fact--with most attempts to elevate any one theory into an eternal verity is likely to be disproved by events.²⁷⁰

Commenting upon Tory politics, David Millar of the Europa Institute in Edinburgh notes that the growing threat to sovereignty comes not only from the integration process, but by the "burgeoning realization by the 'submerged nations' of Europe of their nationality, their individuality, and their place in the wider *fin de siecle* Europe of the present decade."²⁷¹ For the Tory Party, however, the United Kingdom is a sacrosanct entity,²⁷² in which it is based upon an "unshakable belief that the people of these small islands share a common destiny and that both their shared and their distinctive social and economic interests require and justify a common Crown, Parliament and economic structure."²⁷³ While there have

²⁷⁰ Sir Geoffrey Howe, "Sovereignty and Interdependence in the World Today," The 1990 LSE Alumni Lecture Given on 8 June 1990 in London, England (UK), 6.

²⁷¹ David Millar, in correspondence with the author, 13 March 1995. Sir Teddy Taylor also writes: "... I think that you will know that I have personally taken the view for quite a while that our membership of the EC makes it more likely that Scotland will break away from the UK. This would be a means whereby they could have a role as a Member State sitting at the Council of Ministers" (Sir Teddy Taylor, in correspondence with the author, 22 November 1994).

²⁷² Gallie, in correspondence with the author, 16 November 1994. See also "Rifkind Spells Out His Views on Scotland and the Union," *The Scotsman*, 16 April 1988, 5.

²⁷³ Ibid.

been difficulties between the nations of England and Scotland,²⁷⁴ the Union is, as mentioned before, a marriage in which for better or for worse, the Conservatives perceive it as their Party's duty to defend and safeguard the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. "[S]o long as I have heart and voice," Major said to his fellow Tories in Glasgow 1995, "I will defend against all those who would weaken it."²⁷⁵ In Glasgow three years earlier Major eloquently observed:

It is our Party that supports the Union, not because it has always been good for us, but because it has always seemed *right* to us. Not always in our political interest, but always in that of our Kingdom and the countries within it.²⁷⁶

For richer or for poorer, the Tories perceive the Union to be their historic duty to defend for it is

a union in which our nations work together but in which each sustains and develops its rich and varied traditions.²⁷⁷

As in any marriage, the purpose of the Union is not for one side to dominate (or to overshadow) the other. Rather, the purpose of the Act of Union (1707) was (and continues to be) not to destroy, but to celebrate Scotland's "national identity."²⁷⁸ "Every people," Lord Howe notes, "has the right to preserve language,

²⁷⁴ Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 624.

²⁷⁵ Major, 1995 Speech to the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association Conference in Glasgow.

²⁷⁶ John Major, *Scotland in the United Kingdom* (London: Conservative Political Center, 1992), 8.

²⁷⁷ Major, *Scotland in the United Kingdom*, 8 (Emphasis in the original.)

²⁷⁸ Raymond Tong, "Scottish Nationalism: A View from England," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 265, No. 1546 (November 1994): 247.

culture, communication, faith and traditions."²⁷⁹ As Quinton Hogg notes, however, the aim of the Union is harmony

not struggle, is [the Union's] political objective. The health, security and prosperity of Britain and of all its people is its first guiding political principle.²⁸⁰

Under a common parliamentary framework, Scotland is able to maintain its distinctiveness through the continuation of its legal system, its educational tradition, its "contribution of Scottish regiments to the British Army and [its] ceremonial heritage."²⁸¹ "No better partnership," Lady Thatcher observed back in 1976, "has existed in the history of mankind, and we must do nothing to jeopardize its future, for it has much to contribute still."²⁸²

Nevertheless, the aftermath of the 1995 April Council elections demonstrated that there exists political discontent over Scottish Tory policy.²⁸³ The Scottish Tories seem to be in a political dilemma where on the one hand the status quo is "impossible to sustain," yet on the other hand "independence would be

²⁷⁹ Howe, *Nationalism and the Nation State*, 13-14.

²⁸⁰ Quinton Hogg, *The Case for Conservatism* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1947), 32.

²⁸¹ "Rifkind Spells Out His Views on Scotland and the Union," 5. See also A. H. Birch, *Political Integration and Disintegration in the British Isles* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1977), 21.

²⁸² Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 903, Fifth Series, Session 1975-1976, 13 January 1976, col. 233.

²⁸³ Arthur Bell, "MacKays a Man to Solve UK's Constitutional Crisis," *The Sunday Times*, 28 May 1995, 2.

a disaster."²⁸⁴ Arthur Bell, who is Chairman of Scotland's Tory Reform Group, notes that

[n]obody in the Conservative Party wants to see the United Kingdom disintegrate. Nor should we rush to hasty ... compromises. The matter is far too serious for that. The danger is, that by ignoring the evidence, the Conservatives would achieve that which they wish least -- destruction of the United Kingdom.²⁸⁵

In preserving the United Kingdom, however, the Tories have to bring about not only a "measure of social mobility,"²⁸⁶ but, moreover, a sense of political decentralization.²⁸⁷ Through decentralization, the Conservatives can facilitate "assemblies with limited rights to legislate over particular geographical areas of a state which remains unitary elsewhere."²⁸⁸ Lord Hailsham is a proponent of devolution because the House of Commons is overworked and, more importantly, "is attempting tasks which it ought not to assume, and arrogating to itself rights which it ought not to possess."²⁸⁹ Lord Hailsham eloquently notes:

A nation whose parts and classes are constantly at odds with one another can never be independent or truly sovereign. It is our job to find new arrangements within a wider whole which will reconcile the demands of diversity within the limits of unity. We must recognize that we are living in an age of change, and

²⁸⁴ "The 39 Steps to Home Rule," *The Economist*, 1 February 1992, 36.

²⁸⁵ Bell, "MacKay is a Man to Solve UK's Constitutional Crisis," 3.

²⁸⁶ Sir Teddy Taylor, "Scotland: Where Did the Tories Go Wrong?" *The Daily Telegraph*, 10 May 1979, 18.

²⁸⁷ Lord Hailsham, *The Dilemma of Democracy: Diagnosis and Prescription* (London: Williams Collins and Sons, Ltd., 1978), 138.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Lord Hailsham, "The Nation and the Constitution," in Colin MacLean, ed., *The Crown and the Thistle* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979), 75.

in such an age it is our business to fit our age-long institutions into our present requirements and aspirations.²⁹⁰

Unlike Labour, however, the Conservative political tradition does not perceive devolution as adding another layer of government; rather, it sees devolution bringing power to the people.²⁹¹ Forsyth argues that the bringing of power to the people can be brought forth by establishing new political links between citizens and local authorities, community councils, school boards, and other groups.²⁹² "As I have said before," Forsyth notes, "the ultimate unit of devolution is the individual."²⁹³

At the time of the Perth and Kinross by-election John Young and four other former chairmen of the Cathcart Conservative Constituency Association drafted the "Declaration of Cathcart."²⁹⁴ The Declaration was not only a demand for a referendum on devolution, but moreover, a call on the Government to listen to Scotland's grassroots.²⁹⁵ In a press conference, Mr. Addison said that the Conservative Party should "not close the door on devolution as a Government. We should

²⁹⁰ Ibid., 80.

²⁹¹ Elgar Jenkins, "Reform of Local Government," in Andrew Duff, ed., *Subsidiarity within the European Community* (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1993), 111.

²⁹² Forsyth, "Scotland's Man in the Cabinet," 3.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Gillian Bowditch, "Tories in Uproar as Rebels Demand Scottish Manifesto," *The Times*, 12 May 1995, 11. The other four signers of the declaration were the following: George Dallas, Jack Addison, Kenneth Ross, and Alistar MacKenzie (ibid.).

²⁹⁵ John Young, et. al., "Declaration of Cathcart," issued in May of 1995.

be prepared to examine the whole issue of the government of Scotland. We should have confidence in the people of Scotland."²⁹⁶ In this sense, it seems doubtful that one can characterize those who signed the Declaration as just "one of many other fringe groups"²⁹⁷ that have emerged in the annals of the Tory Party.

At the 1995 Scottish Tory Conference in Glasgow, however, Major made the point that he wants to reestablish Tory links to Scotland's grassroots in an attempt to understand what its electorate is thinking.²⁹⁸ As Major said in Glasgow three years earlier

I can tell you what I believe. But it is not for me, as an Englishman, to tell the people of Scotland what they should feel. I come here to listen to them. That is my way. To listen: that I will always do.²⁹⁹

As a successor to Ian Lang, Scottish Secretary Michael Forsyth wishes to explore innovative alternatives in improving the government of Scotland by "devolving power downwards, [by] giving Scottish people more power and more control over their own lives and more of a say in their own affairs."³⁰⁰ In looking at ways to transfer powers from the Scottish Office to local councils, Forsyth notes that the Tory Party must find ways of

²⁹⁶ As reported in Bowditch, "Tories in Uproar as Rebels Demand Scottish Manifesto," 11.

²⁹⁷ Telephone conversation with Gillian Bowditch on the 15 May 1995.

²⁹⁸ Nicholas Wood, "Major sets Out on a Quest for a People's Policy," *The Times*, 13 May 1995, 1.

²⁹⁹ Major, *Scotland in the United Kingdom*, 9.

³⁰⁰ Ewen MacAskill and Peter MacMahon, "Forsyth's New Deal: Power to the People," *The Scotsman*, 27 July 1995, 8.

convincing Scotland is not "losing out" in being part of the United Kingdom.³⁰¹ As Lang said in Glasgow in 1995:

But we don't need to abandon our policies. We need to have faith in our policies. Let's present them better, explain them better. For it's no good having policies that are right, that are working and succeeding unless we can get that message across...Because if we do, those policies and those beliefs can also win for the us the next general election.³⁰²

Like Lord Hailsham, Rifkind issued his wholehearted support for the preservation of the United Kingdom; however, he also notes that "the constitutional status of the England and Scotland must be compatible and comparable if the Union is to be strengthened and not overturned."³⁰³ The Union, after all, is a political and social entity that must evolve if it is to survive. "A state without some means of change," as Edmund Burke wrote back in 1790, "is without the means of its conservation. *Without such means it might even risk the loss of that part of the constitution which it wished most religiously to preserve.*"³⁰⁴

CONCLUSION

This chapter looked at various strands of thought in the Tory Party regarding its understanding of

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Lang, 1995 Speech to the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association Conference in Glasgow.

³⁰³ Malcolm Rifkind, Speech to the Conservative Women's Council of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association Conference in Glasgow, Scotland (UK), 12 May 1995, SCUA News Release.

³⁰⁴ Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Edited with an Introduction by Conor Cruise O'Brien (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1984), 106 (emphasis added).

Britain's role in the European Union. What emerged from the analysis is this. The Tory leadership (under John Major) demonstrated a practical economic assessment of the UK's relationship to the European Union, and it concluded that it was not in Britain's national interest to isolate itself from the EU framework because of the economic benefits that Britain would enjoy under its domain. In relation to Francis Fukuyama's *End of History* paradigm, Major's vision of Europe is about the widening of consumer markets and the ultimate success in spreading growth and prosperity the former communist states of Eastern Europe. Major's understanding of Europe, therefore, flows from economic charts, rather than from a romantic vision of what Europe can or should be.

The Euro-skeptics' fundamental complaint is about the TEU which they believe would be detrimental to parliamentary sovereignty. For them, this is epitomized by the proposed introduction of a single currency which Spicer and Lamont adamantly oppose. Moreover, they both perceive the UK's agenda for Europe as contrary to that the continent's vision of the EU. For Lamont, the UK should consider seceding from the EU and only participate in the European Economic Area.³⁰⁵ In this respect, argues Lamont, the UK would still enjoy access to European markets.³⁰⁶ Body's group of Euro-skeptics called on the Government to seek repatriation of state

³⁰⁵ Lamont, "Europe and No Further," 19.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

functions from the EU and for a referendum on the single currency. While Spicer does not like the idea of referendums in of itself, he believes that in this case it is a necessary one because of the TEU's political ramifications.³⁰⁷ In respect to the *End of History* paradigm, the debate within the Tory Party marked how significant ideas like self-determination state sovereignty are at the end of the twentieth century. The ultimate outcome over these issues remain to be seen. What has been demonstrated in this chapter is that the Conservatives' division over these important issues seem to signify that ideas remain an important theme in British politics and that the Euro-sceptics will do what is necessary to preserve what they feel is part of Britain's historic foundations.

In respect to devolution, the above analysis examined the question as to why the Tories are such staunch Unionists from an economic, electoral and historic perspective. Considering they were unable to win a majority of Scottish seats since the 1955 General Election and, moreover, considering they lost by narrow margins to form a Government (all because of Labour wins in Scotland) in the 1950, 1964, and 1974 General Elections, the Tories, nevertheless, adamantly believe in the Union. From an historic point of view, the Party perceives for itself an historic role in maintaining the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty

³⁰⁷ Parliamentary Debates, 13 January 1993, cols. 981-982.

and the unwritten constitution. While the "nations" of England, Scotland, and Wales each possess distinctive characteristics, they, for Conservatives, benefit and contribute to the common aspirations and interests of the United Kingdom. Even though the Tory Party has consistently, over the years, been a minority party in Scottish politics, the Tories perceive themselves as the guardian of Britain's historic institutions and traditions.

In 1995, the Tories suffered electoral defeats in Scotland's Local Council elections and in the Perth and Kinross by-election. For Scottish Tories, these electoral defeats were seen as a signal that perhaps they should not dismiss the concept of devolution altogether. Unlike the Labour Party, the Conservatives would like to see a form of devolution power closer to the people. Major is attempting to modernize the Union by reestablishing the Tory Party's links with the Scottish grassroots in an attempt to understand what the electorate is thinking.³⁰⁸ It remains to be seen as to whether or not they will be successful.

³⁰⁸ Nicholas Wood, "Major Sets Out on a Quest for a People's Policy," *The Times*, 13 May 1995, 1.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This dissertation posed a fundamental and important question: Is there more to politics than the mere pursuit of economic maximization? In analyzing the political scene of the post-Cold War world, Francis Fukuyama has asserted that there is emerging a trend in the international community in which a growing number of states are no longer struggling over whether to be democratic,¹ but are more concerned with economic activity in a global consumer market environment.² For example, Fukuyama refers in to the European Community as an example of his *End of History* paradigm³ because its member states of the European Community made a commitment in the Single European Act of 1986 not only to the creation of a single market, but to the development of a single currency and Central Bank.

In placing Fukuyama's paradigm within the context of international relations theory, this study revealed certain similarities between his paradigm and that of the writings of David Mitrany. For example, Mitrany believed that the practitioners of international

¹ Interview with Francis Fukuyama, at the RAND Corporation, in Washington, DC (USA), 16 December 1993. For a complete transcript of this interview, see Appendix A of this dissertation.

² Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: The Free Press, Ltd., 1995), xiii.

³ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton, Ltd., 1992), 67.

relations could concentrate upon the practical politics of alleviating social and economic problems.⁴ For Mitrany, what was important in the practice of international relations was no longer the battle over the role of political ideas, but the practical ability to make lives better for the citizens of the body politic through the development of an international system of functional agencies.⁵ Like Mitrany, Fukuyama, as was seen in Chapter II of this study, believed as well that the pursuit of international politics would no longer be driven by imagination or idealism, but "by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands."⁶

This study then compared Fukuyama's and Mitrany's writings to that of the integration theory of Ernst B. Haas. He believed that the creation of functional agencies would be implemented at the regional, rather than the global, level. An example of a regional functional agency was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in which its member states would cooperate in the production of coal and steel.⁷ Haas also asserted in his writings that the functional

⁴ David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest*, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 18. (Emphasis added.)

⁷ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).

attributes of the ECSC would "spillover" into other functional competencies such as the development of a common market and in the research and development of atomic energy, thus leading to the creation of a supranational entity.

Unlike Mitrany, however, Haas also observed that the creation of a functional agency at the regional -- let alone the international -- level requires the shifting of allegiances and loyalties of interest groups and political parties away from the state to that of the new economic and political institutions in question.⁸ What makes this point relevant to the *End of History* paradigm is that because the states of Western Europe were no longer in need to search for alternatives to the principles of liberal democracy,⁹ Haas believed that interest groups and political parties could therefore concentrate their efforts in looking for new institutional structures in solving economic and social problems. In his writings, Haas observed that institutions like the ECSC would be the best practical step forward for the states of Western Europe to begin developing a supranational structure.

Haas in his later work, however, observed that the issues of national identity and state sovereignty continued to be vibrant in West European political thinking. This form of political thinking created a backlash in which certain states involved in the

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Interview with Fukuyama. (Emphasis added.)

development of a European framework would assert their quest to preserve their historic institutions and traditions.

In analyzing the practitioners of European integration, Spinelli observed that the problem created by "federal functionalists"¹⁰ like Jean Monnet is that they failed to move beyond the mere technical and institutional problems of governance in Western Europe. For Spinelli, it is not enough simply to create institutions to deal with coal and steel and in bringing about a common price for agricultural products. What was also needed for the development of European unity, for Spinelli, was the creation of a new "political society."¹¹ As was demonstrated over the debate in attempting to ratify the European Defence Community,¹² certain practitioners of European politics at the end of the Second World War continued to think within the political mindset of national identity and state sovereignty.¹³

Another example of this political phenomenon was the advent of Charles de Gaulle in France. De Gaulle asserted his belief in the sanctity of national

¹⁰ David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London: Martin Robertson and Company, Ltd., 1975), 76.

¹¹ Altiero Spinelli, *The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the European Community*, translated by C. Grove Haines (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 12.

¹² See Chapter IV of this dissertation.

¹³ For an examination of these issues in the early post-1945 period read, Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State*, with the assistance of G. Brennan and F. Romero (London: Routledge, 1992).

identity and state sovereignty by challenging the merits for a supranational Europe through, for example, the Fouchet reports and the 1965-1966 "Empty Chair" crisis. In those reports, outlined a confederal structure in which the states would work together over certain problems of common interest but remain distinct in others fields of competence. Moreover, de Gaulle fought with the proponents of a supranational Europe not because they disagreed over "subsidiary"¹⁴ issues like agriculture, but because the supranationalists like Walter Hallstein were pushing for more federal responsibilities. For de Gaulle, the expansion of central powers would deny France its historic role as a leading player in European affairs. While a compromise between de Gaulle and his European counterparts over the future of Europe was found in Luxembourg, the debate between federalists and intergovernmentalists would continue.

The 1970s marked another period of tension between supranationalists and intergovernmentalists over the issue of European unity. In respect to the issue of state sovereignty, the oil crisis of the 1970s made it difficult for EC member states like Britain and France to draft a foreign policy or external economic relations agreement with its EC counterparts (let alone with the United States) over the issues of energy

¹⁴ Interview with Fukuyama.

and the Middle East.¹⁵ In retrospect, the former British Prime Minister Edward Heath asserted the practical purpose of European unity was to acknowledge that

we all have common problems, together we can solve them. What the leaders forgot in the second half of the 70s, and so far during the 80s, is that the problems were common. They [simply] turned in on themselves ...¹⁶

In looking at the practical problems of European unity, however, Fukuyama could very well dismiss these issues as subsidiary because they can be categorized as the "practical" concerns that states fight over in the realm of international politics.¹⁷ While this might be the case, the crux of the supranationalists' agenda was not simply about the establishment of a free trade zone; rather, the European unity movement marked a fundamental turning point as to how Europeans were to govern themselves. This fundamental reevaluation of European statecraft manifested itself when supranationalists like Roy Jenkins pushed for the development of a single currency and a central bank.

The supranationalists' agenda also manifested itself in the Single European Act of 1986 and the Treaty on European Union of 1992. In the SEA, the supranationalists not only called for the establishment of a single currency, but it also called for the wider

¹⁵ For an examination of the oil crisis in Western Europe, read William C. Cromwell, *The United States and the European Pillar: The Strained Alliance* (London: MacMillan Press, 1992).

¹⁶ Hugo Young, "No, Prime Minister," *Marxism Today*, November 1988, 16.

¹⁷ Interview with Fukuyama.

use of majority voting in bringing about the creation of single market. The Treaty on European Union's federal agenda not only included the Social Chapter and the establishment of European citizenship, but, moreover, the resolve "to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe..."¹⁸

In the 1990s, however, the supranationalists' agenda of an ever closer union was challenged by the Danes in their referendum on the TEU in 1992 and by the Norwegians in their referendum on EU membership in 1994. Victor Smart of *The European* comments on the growing uneasiness within Europe over European unity as simply

a vicious clash between two forces with opposing interests. On the one hand there are the politicians and their technocrat advisers with a vision of a single currency, likely to prove a stepping stone towards wider political integration. On the other are ordinary people who grow impatient of the entire monetary union discussion once it threatens their economic self-interest.¹⁹

However, can Europe's uneasiness over the future of European unity simply be about "the economic share of the pie"?²⁰ Is there something more to this crucial debate than the mere political squabble "between liberals and social democrats"?²¹ For the Danes, the fundamental debate was not about economics or how to

¹⁸ Preamble of the TEU. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁹ Victor Smart, "Will Maastricht Stir a Revolt of the Masses?," *The European*, 14-20 December 1995, 11. (Emphasis added.) See also "Politics v. Economics," *The European*, 8-14 February 1996, 12.

²⁰ Interview with Fukuyama.

²¹ Ibid.

best proceed with making a single market work. Rather, it was based on the belief that European Union would "destroy national independence, even national character."²² While a part of the Norwegian debate revolved around fishing rights, there also existed an historic element in the Norwegian mindset which is skeptical of relinquishing sovereignty to a supranational entity.²³ While the role of economic maximization certainly is evident in the realm of international politics, the concept of national identity retains its validity for the nation "is a place where people feel a natural connection with each other because they share a common language, a religion, or something else strong enough to bind them together and make them feel different from others: 'we,' not 'they.'"²⁴

The crucial clash of ideas was also analyzed within the British case study of this dissertation. The economic/practical side of political activity was highlighted both within the Scottish National Party (SNP) and British Conservative Party camps. Politicians like Jim Sillars and John Major, for example, assert an economic rationale for being within the European Union because both have advocated the economic and material

²² "Why the Danes Wouldn't," *The Economist*, 6 June 1992, 42. (Emphasis added.)

²³ Norway Not Hooked," *The Economist*, 22 May 1993, 41.

²⁴ "The Nation State is Dead. Long Live the Nation State," *The Economist*, 5 January 1996, 17. (Emphasis added.)

benefits of being part of a single market. While the SNP would agree with the basic tenets of the European Union's social chapter, Major objects to the chapter; however, these objections are more for practical reasons. Major is an opponent of the social chapter because it would make Britain's industries uncompetitive in the world market. In relation to Scotland, Major asserts that the Westminster Parliament protected Scotland's economic base by opting out of the social chapter because it would, as Major noted in his 1992 Glasgow speech, have destroyed Scotland's competitive edge in attracting foreign investment.²⁵

Sillars' and Major's economic rationale for European unity is also highlighted in the necessity of not isolating Britain (or, in case of the SNP, Scotland) in an interdependent environment. Both Sillars and Major are pro-Europeans not because they are ardent federalists, but because they perceive the European Union as a means in achieving for Britain (or, for the SNP, Scotland) economic and social prosperity. Arguing from their own point of view, Major and Sillars believe in the importance of constructive participation in the shaping of the European Union.

Nevertheless, the economic/practical reasoning of Sillars and Major generated an argument among those within the SNP and the Tory Party who assert that the political controversy over European unity is much more

²⁵ John Major, *Scotland in the United Kingdom* (London: Conservative Political Center, 1992), 7.

than about "subsidiary" issues. Politicians like Jim Fairlie and Margaret Thatcher are opposed to the European Union because of the detrimental effect issues like the single currency and the establishment of a central bank would have on the sovereignty of the state. While both Fairlie and Thatcher admit to the importance of cooperation in an interdependent world, this does not require the creation of a supranational organization.

Beyond the economic arguments, for supporters sympathetic to their viewpoint there is something of profound significance in which the process of Europeanization "has undermined the vitality and integrity of British politics."²⁶ For both Fairlie and for Thatcher, the Treaty on European Union is the antithesis to their particular perception of national identity and state sovereignty. Beyond the mere squabbles of economic maximization, Fairlie and Thatcher believe that there are certain principles (like national identity and state sovereignty) worth striving and fighting for. They both share a common belief in the need to protect "political accountability and self-government."²⁷ "No Government," Cash writes, "has the right to give this inheritance away."²⁸

²⁶ Bill Cash, "A Party of the Nation?," *The Times*, 21 March 1996, 20.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

The last two chapters also discussed the future of Scotland's continuing relationship to the United Kingdom. The Conservative Party hold several objections to the Labour/Liberal Democratic proposals for establishing a devolved parliament in Edinburgh.²⁹ A few of the Conservative Party's objections to an Assembly can be construed as to what Fukuyama would categorize as "subsidiary" issues. For example, the Conservatives object to the introduction of a devolved assembly because it would add another layer of administration and would add an extra tax on the Scottish population. An extra tax could, as Chapter VI demonstrated, cost business confidence and could threaten an economic exodus of Scottish jobs.

While the Tory Party argue, for example, that the Constitutional Convention does not answer detailed issues like the West Lothian Question,³⁰ they also concentrate their energies in asserting principles which transcend economic maximization and "short term political gain."³¹ The British Conservative Party's objections to devolution (along Labour/Liberal Democratic lines) can challenge Fukuyama's paradigm when it is analyzed from an historic perspective. For

²⁹ *Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Right*, (Edinburgh, Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995). See Chapter V of this dissertation.

³⁰ For more on this point, read Peter Lynch, "Labor Answers the West Lothian Question," *Glasgow Herald*, 20 January 1996, 19 and Calum MacDonald, "A Great Chance for Lib-Labbery," *New Statesmen and Society*, 8 March 1996, 20.

³¹ Interview with Bill Walker at Constituency Office in Blairgowrie, Scotland (UK), 18 August 1995.

the Tories, the United Kingdom is perceived to be a marriage³² in which, for better or for worse, it has evolved for the past three hundred years.³³ In that time, the Union has adapted to changing circumstances to strengthen and encourage the Kingdom's organic growth.³⁴ "For me," Lord Mackay writes, "the value of the Union is beyond price," for it is a Union which consists of nations with a rich source of diversity.³⁵ While the Scottish Enlightenment inspired Margaret Thatcher's political thinking,³⁶ the Conservatives have maintained their faith in the Kingdom despite poor economic and electoral performance. In sickness and in health, the Conservative Party upholds the sanctity of the Union even when Scotland runs an 8 billion deficit and, moreover, even when in the past the Scots have proven (as they did in the General Elections of 1950, 1964 and 1974) to be less than reliable Tory voters.

While the Conservative Party maintains a uniform belief over the sanctity of the United Kingdom,³⁷ there are factions within the SNP who are divided over the merits (or lack thereof) of a Scottish Assembly. While

³² Interview with Ian Stewart at Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association Headquarter, in Edinburgh, Scotland (UK), 29 August 1995.

³³ Interview with Walker.

³⁴ Ian Lang, *The Fulfilled Society* (Edinburgh: Scottish Conservative Unionist Central Office, 1993), 7.

³⁵ Lord Mackay, "A House Divided Against Itself," *The Times*, 7 February 1996, 18.

³⁶ Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 618.

³⁷ Robbie Dinwoodie, "Devolution? It's a Trap," *The Glasgow Herald*, 14 January 1995, 10-11.

the SNP leadership and the rank and file are firm in their belief of an independent Scotland, there are divisions over whether a devolved Assembly is an appropriate "springboard"³⁸ for independence or an impediment to the SNP's political destination.

As pointed out in Chapter V, Alex Salmond and other SNP colleagues like Allan Macartney and Roseanna Cunningham are proponents of a devolved Assembly not because they perceive it to be the best offer for Scotland, but that they can "use it" to slowly but surely reach an independent Scotland.³⁹ In asserting an economic rationale, the SNP believes a devolved Assembly can be used as a platform to (at least) start addressing Scotland's economic and social problems and start the process of building for Scotland a better future. Nevertheless, the SNP maintains an "Independence" platform for the Party remains very much devoted as to how it can "speed up the process so that in the new millennium Scotland will once again play her part as an independent nation."⁴⁰

SNP opponents of a Scottish Assembly like Christine Creech and Jim Fairlie assert, however, a belief that the quest for independence cannot be based upon an economic rationale. While a devolved assembly

³⁸ Allan Macartney, "A Springboard for Independence," *The New Politics for Independence*, 1995 SNP Conference Issue, 6-7 and Alex Salmond, "Truth and Devolution," *Scotland on Sunday*, 5 February 1995, 6-7.

³⁹ Roseanna Cunningham, "Use it, Use it, Use it!," *The New Politics for Independence*, 1995 SNP Conference Issue, 4.

⁴⁰ Macartney, "A Springboard for Independence," 5.

might be able to alleviate economic and social problems in the short run, a subordinate Assembly to that of Westminster does not help bring about a new political society in the long run.⁴¹ Fairlie and Thatcher may share a common dislike for the European Union; nevertheless, their understanding of state sovereignty and of the historic traditions they wish to uphold are very much very different from one another. Fairlie and others who share his sentiments shout for independence not so that Westminster might then restructure its government so that Scottish needs are better met or, for that matter, so that Scotland attains a greater "share of the pie," but for the simple fact that Scotland is a *distinct* nation in its own right and is therefore worthy of statehood.

The purpose of writing this dissertation, then, was to ascertain whether or not in the post-Cold War world there was more to the pursuit of politics than the mere creation of a consumer culture. While the pursuit of political activity is driven (but not exclusively) by economics and by the realities of "practical politics," this study has attempted to demonstrate that politics is not simply about maintaining a "culture of contentment."⁴² There are

⁴¹ Christine Creech, "Devolution -- A Unionist Parliament," *The New Politics for Independence*, 1995 SNP Conference Issue, 6-8 and Jim Fairlie, "I Am Not a Nationalist, But...", in David Rollo, ed., *The Scotland We Seek* (Oban: Scots Independent (Newspapers) Limited, 1987), 8-9.

⁴² John K. Galbraith, *The Culture of Contentment* (London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1992).

those, for example, in the British political arena who, as this dissertation highlighted, believe in historic principles and traditions which cannot be sacrificed for the mere attainment of economic and political gain.

In examining the western political world, one can also cite that other examples where political activity is not merely driven by economic calculation. In November 1995, for example, the Canadian province of Quebec voted 50.6% to 49.4% "to remain part of Canada."⁴³ Despite the narrowness of the vote, the separatists' defeat has "given new energy to this long quarrel"⁴⁴ calling for a new referendum on independence. While there are hopes that the narrow federal victory will encourage the Canadian government to enter into a new dialogue with Quebec over Constitutional reform,⁴⁵ what are the prospects of Quebec attaining a "distinct society" clause as "protection against efforts by English-speaking Canada to undermine its language, culture or civil code of justice based on the French system"?⁴⁶ Is constitutional reform in itself enough to appease Quebec's separatist movement?⁴⁷ Moreover, if Quebec were to be worse off after independence, would

⁴³ Robbie Dinwoodie, "Quebec Divides Scots," *Glasgow Herald*, 1 November 1995, 1.

⁴⁴ "Another Referendum?," *International Herald Tribune*, 2 November 1995, 8.

⁴⁵ Clyde H. Farnsworth, "What Next for Quebec Separatist Movement?," *International Herald Tribune*, 2 November 1995, 3 and "The Way Ahead," *International Herald Tribune*, 2 November 1995, 8.

⁴⁶ Farnsworth, "What Next for Quebec Separatist Movement?," 3.

⁴⁷ Dinwoodie, "Quebec Divides Scots," 1.

those in the nationalist movement still favor a constitutional divorce from Canada?⁴⁸

Another interesting case study would be to examine the Republic of Ireland's changing relationship to the European Union and the Catholic Church. As a member of the European Union, Ireland is attempting to secularize its institutional and political practices as it enters into the next century.⁴⁹ For example, the people of Republic of Ireland has made it easier now for couples to obtain a divorce.⁵⁰ The secularization process of Ireland has opened up a debate between the Catholic Church and more progressive Irish over issues like abortion.⁵¹ To what extent is there a possibility of a clash between the "pre-West" (for example, the Catholic Church) and the "post-West" (for example, feminism) over western principles of individualism and liberalism as Ireland enters the twentieth century?⁵²

In conclusion, what this dissertation has attempted to demonstrate is that political ideas and

⁴⁸ For more on the issue of Quebec nationalism and and its relation to Canada, read Tim A. Mau, "'Le Quebec Libre': An Idea Whose Time Has Come?," *Woodstock Road Editorial: An Oxford Magazine of Politics and current Affairs*, Michealmas 1993, 43-44; Jacques Parizeau, "The Case for a Sovereign Quebec," *Foreign Policy*, no. 99 (Summer 1995): 69-77; and Daniel Johnson, "The Case for a United Canada," *Foreign Policy*, no. 99 (Summer 1995): 78-87.

⁴⁹ John F. Stacks, "Irish Renaissance," *Time*, 11 December 1995, 30-33.

⁵⁰ "A Different Ireland," *International Herald Tribune*, 29 November 1995, 10.

⁵¹ Stacks, "Irish Renaissance," 33.

⁵² For more of a discussion on the terms "pre-West" and post-West," read James Kurth, "The Real Clash," *The National Interest*, no. 37 (Fall 1994): 3-15.

beliefs are now in a state of "flux."⁵³ In analyzing the *End of History* paradigm, this dissertation has asserted that Fukuyama's work was (or continues to be) too narrow in scope; that is, Fukuyama only discusses his paradigm within the parameters of there no longer being any clear alternatives to the principles of liberal democracy. While this might be the case, this study has illustrated that ~~there~~ are a plethora of other ideas that occupy Western political thought which can be construed as a challenge to the political principles of, for example, national identity and state sovereignty which can trace their historic roots back to the days of the French Revolution in 1789. If one can broaden the scope of Fukuyama's paradigm then the "Age of Discussion", as the late Russell Kirk had once observed,⁵⁴ does not appear to be ephemeral.

⁵³ Michael Foley, "Introduction," in Michael Foley, ed., *Ideas that Shape Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 2.

⁵⁴ Russell Kirk, *Beyond the Dreams of Avarice: Essays of a Social Critic* (Peru, Illinois: Sherwood Sugden and Company, Publishers, 1991), 50.

APPENDIX A

TRANSCRIPT

INTERVIEW WITH FRANCIS FUKUYAMA
AT THE RAND CORPORATION
IN WASHINGTON, DC (USA)
16 DECEMBER 1993

Gabriel Kikas: GK.

Francis Fukuyama: FF.

GK: How would you respond to the criticism that the very idea of the *Last Man* is somehow a contradiction of the idea of the *End of History*? Are you convinced that there is in politics an inexorable, almost determinist force which leads to the end of the development of ideas?

FF: Well, I don't think it is a determinist force by any means. It depends on what you mean by determinist. The nature of science and the way we understand the world leads to a coherent unfolding of the historical process because the mastery of science is not a random process. It takes place in concrete stages, which then determines a number of things, like the kinds of economic production possibilities which are available to us and therefore the nature of economic probes and the nature of warfare and that dictates also all kinds of social and political structures like the nation state, for example, after the Peace of Westphalia which was driven in large measure by the needs for warfare which in turn was driven by higher technological developments and that required the ending of little sovereignties and the creation of larger centralized bureaucracies and tax systems.

And in that sense, if you want to call that determinist you can. But there are many degrees of freedom in that broad framework for alternative lines of development and certainly the development of self is very discontinuous so it is never linear moving ahead, but it is still motion in a random direction and it is not cyclical. It is moving in a certain way. And I think there is a limit to the overall...[Does not complete the sentence.]

Overall, I think the economic process leads to homogenization of certain structures in human societies, but there is a limit to how homogenous they become and broadly speaking there is no alternative to markets in the general sense, and to determine prices and economic structures, and not a lot of alternatives to some forms of democracy for advanced societies. But there are specific forms like capitalism and democracy

that can be quite varied depending upon the residue of cultural and historical pre-modern residue that arise and I don't think you will ever get rid of those entirely. And this, I think, is what you are dealing with now. You have a broad framework of a house established and how they decorate each room is very hard to determine.

GK: Yes, I can see that. The *End of History* paradigm suggests that the *End of History* does not necessarily mean the end of politics.¹ You mention that political events would still occur. In your judgment, what is the primary purpose of politics? Does not democracy and the very nature of politics presuppose disagreement? Isn't politics about the struggle of ideas?

FF: Well, yes, it is. It depends, to some extent, on the level of the struggle. That, in that sense, Europe is no longer struggling over whether or not it should be democratic, like if they should be ruled by the throne or through popular election. There is certainly going to be many struggles over the economic and the share of the pie and that sort of thing. There will be fights between liberals and more social democratic types. And then there will be fights over quality of recognition. You can see this in the United States. Fights over feminism, race relations and, this year, Gay rights and this sort of thing. Essentially, over specific rights of recognition. And within that democratic framework, I think politics, in that sense, is never going to disappear.

GK: The one thing that I find interesting is that you seem to define communism v. liberal democracy as the great ideological confrontation of the twentieth century. Can ideological confrontation go beyond East-West competition? You describe the driving forces of history (that is, technological expansion and the struggle for recognition). [However], you do not seem to define ideology per se. Liberal democracy might seem to be the dominant ideology, but, as Samuel P. Huntington explains, one cannot exclude the possibility of the emergence of new ideologies.² Cannot confrontation within liberal democracy bring about the need for a new synthesis in contemporary political culture? Ideology being a much a broader term about ideas.

FF: Well, yes. Obviously, there will be a lot of ideas in conflict. But the question is are there are going to be new foundational ideas. That has to do with the

¹ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest*, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 4.

² Samuel P. Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," *The National Interest*, no. 17 (Fall 1989): 9.

basic political structure of a society and the principles of equality and liberty, for example, or if you can up with alternative principles. You know, I am not a prophet. I cannot say that there will not be new ideas. *But it is remarkable among the vanguard of world development that how today that are no major alternatives in terms of political principles, but that there are plenty of fights on subsidiary issues. But the basic ones are there.* (Emphasis added.)

GK: Well what about Conservatism v. Liberalism within the United States? Both come from the same source (that is, social contract theory). Conservatism [is] about duties and obligations [whereas] liberalism more about rights. Now, that seems to be a clash of ideas. And they agree on the same things, like free elections and so forth. How do you see that?

FF: There are a variety ways of explaining. One is liberal democracy is founded on the twin principles of liberty and equality and both of those principles must be honored. [T]he struggle between Conservatives and Liberals over how you can't maximize those at the same time. [Alex] de Tocqueville said that there is a tradeoff generally speaking where more equality means less liberty and vice versa. And it seems to me that in the US most fights between Liberals and Conservatives could be reduced as to where one draws the line between liberty and equality on urban programs for poor blacks, they can cost alot of money. Affirmative Action, you may be discriminating against a qualified white person, limit of higher taxes and this and that. So, that is going to be an illustration of that struggle. Liberal wants social programs, and the conservative does not want it because it diminishes freedom. But both agree that some degree of equality and some degree of freedom are worthwhile. Now, that is different from alot of European conservatives, who, for example, have different attitude to freedoms. *Alot of British Tories, for example, who do not accept an egalitarian premise.* [Emphasis added.] They are not happy with democracy in certain ways.

GK: The Scots [for example] are not happy with Tories at all. I have lived but in Scotland close to three years and the word Tory [for many Scots] is a very ugly word. Let us go on to some other questions regarding international relations. You mention in your book that the predominate trend in international politics is the liberal democratization of the state. This trend signifies a possible *End of History*. In a *New Republic* article (17 August 1992), however, you write, "The truth is that not all countries are equally capable of sustaining stable democracies... Indeed, the current 'third wave', as Huntington notes, has probably exhausted itself and may well retreat in the

next few years."³ Has this pragmatism come from changing from a political philosopher back to policy maker?

FF: It is all in the book. Look, my argument in the book, among other things, is that democracy is related or follows economic development. [Emphasis added.] The whole of Part II is dedicated to demonstrating that there is a relationship between economic development and the possibility of stable democracy. And, just in the beginning, there is obviously a vast difference in the ability of a country, like Hatti, to support a working democracy with that of a country like Poland. And, in fact, I think that this is the big mistake that the Clinton Administration has made in that everyone is equally capable of building a democracy and I think that's just not an absolute rule. You have to be conscious of your expectations. I think you have to be cautious in your expectations for very poor Third World countries to be able to be able to create a workable democratic system. And I also admit to there be many cultural factors that presuppose[?] certain societies to democratize. There is a great correlation between Christianity and democracy, which explains why a vast majority of the world's democracies are culturally Christian countries.

GK: You mention nationalism and religious fundamentalism as being major impediments to the end of history. How important is state sovereignty at the end of the twentieth century? Do you think, for example, Samuel P. Huntington's thesis of the "Clash of Civilizations"⁴ challenges the *End of History* [paradigm]? And how would you respond to this challenge?

FF: I think there are several problems. First of all, [Dr. Huntington] does not take into account the homogenizing consequences of the development of culture. Japanese and Chinese culture (what he calls Confucian culture) is not what it was a hundred years ago. It has evolved considerably as a result of economic modernization. And I don't think that there is anything in that culture that is so strong that a Confucian society from not becoming a democratic society. And once it becomes a democracy, the degree of potential conflict between those societies as a whole and the West as a whole (or Christendom if you like) becomes much less. And, furthermore, I guess my main problem with the thesis is that the boundaries of these cultures of civilizations are not at all clear. It is variable [that is] subject to change. And I think that

³ Francis Fukuyama, "The Beginning of Foreign Policy," *The New Republic*, 17 August 1992, 30.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

this is the major defect. You know people do not think of themselves in living within a homogeneous, cultural, entity. I do not think of myself as a member of Christendom. They might have done that in the fourteenth century. You think of yourself as an American, German, or Japanese. That would not be a part of Christendom, but that is not a meaningful... [Fukuyama does not complete his sentence.]

I think [the "Clash of Civilizations] thesis works best in the Middle East where there is, particularly among the fundamentalists, a concept of a Muslim [?] which transcend ... particular national identities; it is higher than those identities and people in that region do [not] think of the fight between Libya and the United States as a fight between two nation states, but as a fight between Christians and Muslims. *So there is validity to [Dr. Huntington's] model, but it does not make any sense in the Far East, in Latin America, in Europe, for the most part.* (Emphasis added.)

GK: In Bosnia, the one thing that seems to be clear is that both Greeks and Serbs are worried about the rise of an Islamic state in Europe. [Can that be classified] as a "Clash of Civilizations"?

FF: I don't think that this is the issue.

GK: You don't think that this is the issue?

FF: First of all, in Bosnia the Muslim identity was never really that important. And Huntington uses that as an example of the "clash" of two civilizations. But, on the one hand, the US-Soviet fight in the Cold War was an intra-civilizational fight, where all the fighting took place within Western civilization,⁵ whereas the Bosnian-Serb fight or the Serb-Croat fight is a "Clash of Civilizations." And I think that's ridiculous. The Bosnians and the Serbs and the Croats share much more in common with each other than the Russians and Americans ever did. They differ in religion, but they speak the same language, have the same history, they know each other well and they eat the same food, and so many of their cultural practices are identical in ways that was never true for Russians and Americans. And to call one intra-civilizational and the other a fight between civilizations is very hard to do. (Emphasis added.)

GK: One of the political theorist that I am dealing with is David Mitrany. He perceives politics to be the problem in international relations. Like yourself, Mitrany concluded that the history of

⁵ James Kurth discusses this interesting point in "The Real Clash," *The National Interest*, no. 37 (Fall 1994): 3-15.

political philosophy can no longer move forward because all the great questions of political philosophy have been answered.⁶ The major challenge for Mitrany is this: "We have reached a stage where the state is in danger of breaking down under the strain of the functions and in consequence of the powers imposed upon it by the community which it serves."⁷ You still think within a system of states. And from what I understand from other theorists (like Marx) is that the state would wither away but in your [paradigm, the state] does not wither away.

FF: Actually, Kojève was a great believer in the withering away of the state.

GK: Is the system of states a suitable actor in fulfilling the ends of liberal democracy?

FF: Yes, I think it will be. Not for theoretical reasons. You know if you are a true Universalist liberal you probably will look forward to the eventual creation of a world federation, the withering away of all these national identities. I just think that realistically that is not likely to happen because peoples identity are still formed within national communities. The possibility of common action is limited to the, I mean, largest, you know, scale that you will accomplish is the nation state. The reasons for that, I think, are kind of complicated. Peoples' social identity is stronger the smaller the group is. They operate within, the more they have in common, the greater the moral authority that will exist. And I think that sense of community is important to people. It can be eroded to some extent but it will never disappear. So I think for that reason a German will think of himself as a German to a large extent and not simply as a European. And least of all as a citizen of the world.

GK: There is only so much strain a state can take. As Kolakowsky seems to assert that we seem to have "endless expectations"⁸ and that somehow given the erosion to our economic resources become critical, how does that affect the overall...

FF: No, no, look. The state is obviously losing its sovereignty both to supranational organizations and to sub-national organizations. But, I thought the question was more, will there be an end to that process,

⁶ David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933), 16-18.

⁷ Ibid., 19.

⁸ Leszek Kolakowsky, "Uncertainties in a Democratic Age," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1990): 47-50.

will the state disappear and my answer to that is no. But I think clearly it is losing its sovereignty. We are returning to a sort of medieval world where we have a hierarchy of different organizations which some are international and some subnational. The makers of all that were from the post-war period all the national economic institutions. (Emphasis added.)

GK: The World Order Models Project (WOMP)⁹ conceives of a world political system beyond the realm of the state. This is because the state is unable to cope with current political problems (for example, the security of the environment, human rights, nuclear proliferation) [which are considered] to be transnational. How would you respond to people like, for example, Richard A. Falk? Is WOMP an unrealistic endeavor?

FF: Well, certainly in the terms he lays out, yes. Look I think you can only have order among entities that have basic agreement and values. People like Professor Falk think we can cooperate with the Libyans or we could have cooperated with the Soviets during the Cold War and I think essentially that's nonsensical. The things that divide these entities are much stronger than that which unites them. As I said in the book I think you can have, in terms of regional organizations, are things like NATO or the CSCE (and even that is too large), but at least a regional organization where every body has the same political structure, the same ideology and that sort of thing. But if you attempt to extend that I think that it is kind of hopeless.

GK: Do you see the revitalization of religion at the end of history? Richard A. Falk, in *Explorations at the Edge of Time*, writes:

"Politics is being reinfused with religious symbols and claims; religion is being summoned to the trenches of popular struggle, even lending support in some circumstances to violent tactics. This breakdown of the separation and antagonism between politics and religion represents an effort by modernists to handle a new agenda of societal demands. What is most revealing is the reconciliation of Marxism and Christianity in a series of Third World settings, a process that is one of mutual enrichment without any necessary effort to subordinate one to the other."¹⁰

⁹ For example, read Saul Mendlovitz, ed., *On the Creation of a Just World Order* (New York: The Free Press, 1975) and Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

¹⁰ Richard A. Falk, *Explorations at the Edge of Time* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 35.

Is religious fundamentalism the new Hegelian antithesis to liberal democracy? What impact, for example, will the Religious Right in the United States have on the *End of History*?

FF: Well, first of all, religious fundamentalism is not a homogenous phenomenon. It is very heterogeneous. In the Islamic world, it is antithetical to liberal democracy. But this form of religion is not tolerant.

GK: But what the Religious Right in the United States for example. They have some very interesting ideas of what one type of books should be read and what should be taught in schools. They seem to be limiting liberty of the freedoms one could be exposed to. How do you respond to that?

FF: Well, that is a matter of degree. No liberal society has been perfectly liberal. There has always been some constraint. You cannot show hard core pornography on prime time TV; so the question is where you draw the line. The [line] [over the constraints of liberalism] was at the time of the [Founding Fathers?] was drawn here, then it was shifted over here, and now the religious fundamentalists want to move it back a little like this. Now that is not a fundamental assault on liberalism it seems to me. That is just an adjustment, a bit of fine tuning.

In general, I think that the problem with this sort of analysis is that [Professor Falk only discusses] liberation theology and the conversion of Marxism and Christianity. I think the more important religious phenomenon in Latin America is Conservative Protestantism, which is a very big phenomenon. A third of Chile's population is now Pentecostal; [this is] 20% of Brazil's population, very large protestant communities in Central America. And then there is a lot of sociological literature on these people now. And almost all of it now confirms Max Weber's observations of the effect of Protestantism in Europe. Because basically what they are (we call them fundamentalists today) are like the Puritans of the sixteenth century in England. They have the same sort of relationship to Capitalism and democracy that Puritanism historically in Western Europe did. That is to say, especially in the first generation, where one tends to be very strict and rigorous and not liberal in the sense we interpret it. They create a kind of private space in the ability to work together. They are sectarian; that is, the foundation (especially in a Catholic country) of a sort of social organization that one would need as part of a healthy civil society. They promote these puritan virtues of thrift and hard work and this and that. Level of education and hygiene go up.

And this is why religious fundamentalism is just not a homogenous phenomenon. Conservative Christianity in the West (generally speaking) has been (not directly supportive) of modern democracy, but created a social environment in which both capitalism and democracy became much more possible. It is the basis of modern individualism, and it provides the support of the individual conscious against the state, and all of these liberal concepts. Fundamental Islam does not do that.

GK: Please elaborate as to what you see as the fundamental impediment to West European integration today? And how does that affect the *End of History*?

FF: There is a couple of things. One thing, the concept of the EC itself. I think the concept has been driven by the European Commission and has been heavily influenced by the French and, particularly, by the French socialists. And they have a concept of ultimately of a Europe that looks like France, in which the French bureaucracy has a role in regulation and the setting of standards and getting into certain social issues (like workers' rights) and this sort of thing. And, it seems to me, that the more ambitious your goals, the less chance of your realizing it. Because the consensus for that type of thing does not exist. And I think that was the basis for Margaret Thatcher's unhappiness with it.

And, I think, until you arrive to a greater degree of (and I think alot of the anti-Maastricht votes were not the result of some Neanderthal nationalism, but alot of, when it came right down to voting for Maastricht, alot of the European public supported the general concept of Europe. But alot of it means the way we are going to label our local wines is going to change, and some bureaucrat in Brussels is going to tell us how long of a sausage we can create, and do we really want this. And, I think, that is going to be a major stumbling block. And in the abstract, every national identity will want; [does not complete the sentence] every nation has a characteristic fiscal policy. That what really caused the currency crisis from last year. The Germans are incredibly tight fisted and they don't like inflation and they have the internal and social discipline to run a very tough anti-inflationary policy. Whereas the Italians were never able to balance a budget in their national existence. [There is] something not very Italian about it.

And I think until you overcome this sort of thing; and they are not the most important differences in the world, in way you can see the same differences with the States in the United States. Obviously, out of those differences, some sort of federalism is possible. But

whether it is the tight degree envisioned in Maastricht, or something is looser, it is going to be harder to do it.

GK: What is also required for a wider political Europe is for some foreign policy consensus. And the Europeans have never been able to pull that off.

FF: That's for sure.

GK: Now this revolves around a clash of ideas as to how the world should look. It is the same case in the United States. You have what we might define as democrats and then , on the other hand, what we might be called Realists. And some of those ideas ...

FF: Yes, but some of that has to do with the constitutional structure. The Europe that is envisioned does not have a strong executive. And foreign policy has always had the problem of the executive v. the legislative branch. If, American foreign policy was made by Congress and there was no president our foreign policy would look like the EC. We would never get into war, we never do anything risky... and invest into the future. And I think that [there is a strong] case where you need a strong executive agent. For other reasons, Europe is not going to build that strong executive agent. Right now they have this unit veto system where any member can jinx any initiative that they got. If any one of the American states could veto any foreign policy cooked up by Washington, we would not have much of a foreign policy.

GK: I understand the foreign policy process. But in the West we have come to the crossroads as to where international relations should go, what type of world structure we want to create. And I think that I see a clash of ideas. Thatcher's whole disagreement with Europe is the lack of common principles. And so long as you have state interests, it will be difficult to do anything.

FF: Well, maybe it is a bit harder to do that now because the whole world is in a broad transitional phase and it is very hard to understand what is going on. I am not sure that within the terms of the principles of foreign policy that there is a greater degree of disagreement than in the earlier times. There has always been this tension between realpolitik and a more idealistic one. It went all the way back to Colonial times. I think that it is permanent tension in foreign policy that won't go away. And in that respect I do not think that is more confusing than it was during the Cold War. The world is certainly more confusing and you are right. It just now finding what organizations are appropriate to deal with it.

GK: Given the critiques, given current events, are there any themes or points in *The End of History and the Last Man* you would write differently?

FF: Well, I think nationalism has gotten worse. There is still a transitional phase. These nationalisms have been suppressed and are coming out. But the model of the future will not be Serbia. Once these passions have been played out, the model will be like the EC and it may take a long time to happen. Eastern Europe will move towards Western Europe and not the reverse. The length of time that will take will be quite a long one.

GK: Essentially, in international relations there are no guarantees to anything. You are right in the sense that at the present moment there does not seem to be an alternative that can confront liberal democracy. But there has always been confrontations with liberal democracy since the beginning. The rise of Marxism was the result of a disagreement with liberal democracy. And there is no reason to believe that there could emerge a new disagreement. It seems as though nature has a way of perhaps starting history. There is uncertainty.

FF: Well, I accept that. That seems to be the message of the latter half of my book. We have not stopped at a random point. There are good reasons why large parts of the world are democratic; but whether if you could prove it was the *End of History* in the theoretical sense you have to show that there are no remaining contradictions that democracy cannot deal with. And that I think you cannot show frankly. There are parts of the human personality that are not going to be satisfied in a democratic society. Therefore will seek some form of expression that could be very dangerous to democracy.

GK: As you said in the book, there are forces within liberal democracy that could undermine the very principles we wish to uphold. Huntington wrote that there is nothing worse than the heretic.¹¹ In a book review by R.E. Jones he notes that you seem to side with Leo Strauss rather than with Alexandre Kojève regarding the problems of liberal democracy.¹² Is the real hero of your book Strauss, not Kojève?

FF: To a certain way, that is right. What Strauss said the defect of Kojève's argument is the *Last Man*. The creature that is produced in the historical process that is something less than human. And I think that ultimately Kojève does not have a good answer to that.

¹¹ Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism, 9.

¹² R. E. Jones, "Thinking Big," *Review of International Studies* (1993), : 202.

GK: What I find interesting is that you mention about pessimism in the first half of the book. You mention people like Jeane Kirkpatrick and Jean-Francois Revel. And then you go into the *Last Man* and all the problems that come with it you seem to come full circle. This pessimism makes the *End of History* a dubious enterprise. You would say that the question mark is very much there.

FF: That is a good way of putting it.

GK: I guess what I am asking is about the intention of writing the book. You certainly provide alot of empirical evidence for your argument. However, like the philosopher, you do not come to a final answer.

FF: Yes, I think that is right. The more important part of the book is not the empirical part, but the philosophical and normative. However, it is informative, in the sense of Hegel, that the issue is not for a group of graduate students to sit around in their dorm rooms to discuss what is the best regime in the world that they can imagine. The real question is the best regime has to answer in historical terms. That it is not the figment of someone's imagination; you have to look at what ideas have been thought and tried. And then given the test of historical reality. And given that sort of test, liberal democracy seems to have a privileged position; but, ultimately I do not think you can answer that question simply empirically. You have to return to the normative. At that point, we would have to say that in the end you cannot tidy up all the loose ends. You can say why liberal democracy has been broadly appealing to many people; but it is not going to be appealing to all people at all times. Therefore, one cannot constitute a true end.

GK: If you read the *End of History* as a reader, what's your reaction be?

(marked)
FF: I say it is a very good question.

APPENDIX B

IDENTIFIABLE GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BY COUNTRY					
£m	1989-90	1990-91	1991-92	1992-93	1993-94
England	112,795	124,569	143,030	157,865	167,848
Wales	7,671	8,537	9,553	10,944	11,372
N.Ireland	5,930	6,121	6,704	7,295	7,802
Scotland	14,973	16,300	17,881	20,323	21,426
UK	141,368	155,527	177,169	196,427	208,448

IDENTIFIABLE GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE
OF UNITED KINGDOM TOTAL

%	1989-90	1990-91	1991-92	1992-93	1993-94
England	79.8	80.1	80.7	80.4	80.5
Wales	5.4	5.5	5.4	5.6	5.5
N.Ireland	4.2	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.7
Scotland	10.6	10.5	10.1	10.3	10.3
UK	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

IDENTIFIABLE GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE PER HEAD BY
COUNTRY

£ per head	1989-90	1990-91	1991-92	1992-93	1993-94
England	2,373	2,612	2,990	3,263	3,458
Wales	2,685	2,971	3,315	3,376	3,913
N.Ireland	3,757	3,867	4,218	4,508	4,781
Scotland	2,939	3,202	3,505	3,976	4,185
UK	2,477	2,717	3,086	3,386	3,582

(Source: The Scottish Office, *Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland, 1993-94.*)

NORTH OIL REVENUES

Year	£billion	Year	£billion
1979-80	2.3	1988-89	3.2
1980-9	3.7	1989-90	2.4
1981-82	6.5	1990-91	2.3
1982-83	7.8	1991-92	1.0
1983-84	8.8	1992-93	1.3
1984-85	12.0	1993-94	1.2
1985-86	11.3	1994-95	1.6
1986-87	4.8	1995-96	2.4
1987-88	4.6		

GENERAL GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS IN SCOTLAND, 1993-94

	United Kingdom £million	Scottish Estimates £million	Scotland as a percentage of UK
Income Tax	58,400	4,600	7.9
Social Sec. Contributions	39,500	3,500	8.7
Value Added Tax	38,900	3,300	8.6
Local Authority Revenue	21,200	2,000	9.3
All Other Revenue	72,000	7,000	9.7
Total Revenue	230,000	20,400	8.9

(Source: Scottish Office, *Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland, 1993-94.*)

THE "FISCAL DEFICIT" IN SCOTLAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
IN 1993-1994

	Scotland	United Kingdom	Scotland as a % of UK
General	28.4	283.5	10.0 (5)
Government Expenditure (£ bn)			
General	20.4	230.0	8.9
Government Revenues (£ bn)			
General	8.1	53.5	15.1
Government Borrowing Requirements (£ bn)			
GGBR as % of GDP	15	8.5	-

(Source: The Scottish Office, *Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland, 1993-1994*.)

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